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Joan M. Fisher and O l i v e r  Loewy 
Attorney& for Appellant- 
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F&d this o f  1 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
DOCKET #34198, #34199 
GENE FRANCIS STUART, 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent, 
Gene Francis Stuart - Petitioner - Attorneys for Petitioner - Joan NI. Fisher and 
Oliver Loewy, Capital Habeas Unit, Federal Defender Services of Idaho, 317 West 
6th Street, Suite 204, Moscow, ID 83843 
State of Idaho - Respondent - Attorneys for Respondent - L. LaMont Anderson, 
Attorney General's Office, P.O. Box 83720, Boise, ID 83720-0010 and Lori Gilmore, 
Clearwater County Prosecutor's Office, P.O. Box 2627, Orofino, ID 83544 
TRANSCRIPT OF APPEAL 
Appealed from District Court of the Second Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in 
and for the County of Clearwater 
Honorable Ron Schilling, District Judge Presiding 
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Order For Attorney's Fees 
Interim Hearing Held 
Order Granting Limited Appearance And Waiver 
Court Minutes 
Briefing Order 
Order For Attorney Fees 
Amended Order To Appoint Special Prosecutor 
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12/23/2003 ORDR SUE Order For Attorney's Fees Ron Schilling 
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/6/2006 HRHD SUE Hearing result for Telephonic Status Conference Ron Schilling 
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Petitioner's supplemental briefing in opposition to Ron Schilling 
1) motion for summary dismissal of petition for 
postconviction relief andlor writ of habeas corpus 
and 2) Rule 35 petition 
Supplemental Brief in Support of Respondent's Ron Schilling 
Motion for Summary Dismissal 
Hearing result for Telephonic Scheduling Ron Schilling 
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Affidavit of Debra K. Johnson Ron Schilling 
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AFFD SUE Affidavit pf Rose Mary Connelly Ron Schilling 
Document sealed 



























Affidavit of Rose Mary Connelly 
Document sealed 
Affidavit of Malry Jane Bigley 
Document sealed 
Affidavit of Gene Lee Dally 
Document sealed 
Affidavit of Sharie Lee Kuhl 
Document sealed 
Affidavit of Virginia Lee Presler 
Document sealed 
Affidavit of Thomas H. Thorn 
Document sealed 
Affidavit of Jim Bigley 
Document sealed 
Affidavit of Malvin W. Kraft 
Document sealed 
Affidavit of Delores Mary Nichols 
Document sealed 
Affidavit of Donna Marquette 
Document sealed 
Affidavit of Susan Kathleen Stuart 
Document sealed 
Scanned 4/26/07 














4/23/2007 NOTA SUE NOTICE OF APPEAL Ron Schilling 
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SUE Appealed To The Supreme Court Ron Schilling 
SUE Motion that costs of appeal be at county expense Ron Schilling 
SUE Order Ron Schilling 
SUE Amended Notice of Appeal Ron Schilling 
SUE Second Amended Notice of Appeal Ron Schilling 
SUE Stipulation Ron Schilling 
Document sealed 
SUE Order Ron Schilling 
Document sealed 
SUE Notice of lodging reporters transcript and clerk's Ron Schilling 
record 
SUE Affidavit in support of motion Ron Schilling 
SUE Motion for extension of time in which to file Ron Schilling 
objections to clerk's record and reporters's 
transcripts 
SUE Order Ron Schilling 
SUE Notice of an objection to clerk's record Ron Schilling 
SUE Notice of hearing In RE: Settlement of Clerk's Ron Schilling 
Record 
BARB1 E Hearing Scheduled (Objection 10/09/2007 10:OO Ron Schilling 
AM) 
SUE Stipulation regard~ng correction of clerk's record Ron Schilling 
SUE Order regarding correction of clerk's record Ron Schilling 
Date: 1/18/2008 Second Judicial District Court - Clearwater County User: SUE 
Tlme 02 3P-PM & 3 ROA Report 
Page 1 of"?-a Case. CV-2002-0000443 Current Judge Ron Schllllng 
Gene Francis Stuart, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
Gene Franc~s Stuart, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 











































































New Case Filed Ron Schilling 
Petition For Post-conviction Relief And/or Ron Schilling 
Writ Of Habeas Corpus 
Affidavit In Support Of Petition 
Ron Schilling 
Ron Schilling 
Certificate Of Delivery Ron Schilling 
Affidavit In Support Of Motion Ron Schilling 
Motion For Summary Dismissal Ron Schilling 
Brief In Sup. Of Motion For Summary Dismissal Ron Schilling 
Certificate Of Mailing Ron Schilling 
Notice Of Intent To File Opposition And Ron Schilling 
Supporting Memorandum & Req. Hearing Ron Schilling 
Motion For Limited Admission Ron Schilling 
Petitioner's Response In Opp. To Mot. For Ron Schilling 
Summary Dismissal Of Petition Ron Schilling 
Hearing Scheduled - (04/09/2003) Ron Schilling Ron Schilling 
Interim Hearing Held Ron Schilling 
Order Granting Limited Appearance And Waiver 
Court Minutes 
Supplemental Authority Supporting Petition 
For Post-conviction Relief And/or Writ H.c. 
Briefing Order 
Petition For Appt. Of Special Prosecutor 
Amended Petition For Appt. Of Special Pros. 









Post Conviction Relief And/or Habeas Corpus Ron Schilling 
Certificate Of Mailing Ron Schilling 
Affidavit In Support Of Motion For Extension Ron Schilling 
Of Time Ron Schilling 
Motion For Extension Of Time Ron Schilling 
Reply Brief In Support Of State's Motion For Ron Schilling 
Summary Dismissal Ron Schilling 
Hearing Scheduled - (03/03/2004) Ron Schilling Ron Schilling 
Affd. In Support Of Mot. To Stay Proceedings Ron Schilling 
Pending Dispo. In The Idaho Supreme Ct. Ron Schilling 
Mot. To Stay Proceedings Pending Disposition Ron Schilling 
Interim Hearing Held Ron Schilling 
Court Minutes Ron Schilling 
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SUE Stay Pending Supreme Court Decision Ron Schilling 
ORDR SUE Order Staying Proceedings Pending Dispositon in Ron Schilling 
the Idaho Supreme Court 
HRSC SUE Hearing Scheduled (Telephonic Status Ron Schilling 
Conference 01/06/2006 10:OO AM) 




SUE Prosecutor assigned Lori Gilmore Ron Schilling 
SUE Motion to lift stay Ron Schilling 
SUE Hearing result for Telephonic Status Conference Ron Schilling 
held on 01/06/2006 10:OO AM: Hearing Held 
SUE Court Minutes Ron Schilling CMlN 
HRSC SUE Hearing Scheduled (Telephonic Scheduling Ron Schilling 
Conference 0313012006 10:OO AM) 
SUE Notice Of Hearing Ron Schilling 
SUE Petitioner's supplemental briefing in opposition to Ron Schilling 
1) motion for summaiy dismissal of petition for 
postconviction relief and/or writ of habeas corpus 
& 2) Rule 35 petition 
SHARON Supplemental Brief in Support of Respondents Ron Schilling 
Motion For Summary Dismissal 
SUE Hearing result for Telephonic Scheduling Ron Schilling 




SUE Court Minutes Ron Schilling CMlN 
HRSC SUE Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled Ron Schilling 
05/22/2006 10:OO AM) To be held at the . 
maximum security prison in Boise 
SUE Affidavit of Susan Kathleen Stuart Ron Schilling AFFD 
Document sealed 
SUE Affidavit of Jim Bigley Ron Schilling 
Document sealed 
SUE Affidavit of Mary Jane Bigley Ron Schilling 
Document sealed 





SUE Affidavit of Daniel Heagy Ron Schilling AFFD 
AFFD SUE Affidavit of Malvin W. Kraft Ron Schilling 
Document sealed 
SUE Affidavit of Sharie Lee Kuhl Ron Schilling AFFD 
Document sealed 
SUE Affidavit of robert Daniel McDowell Ron Schilling AFFD 
AFFD SUE Affidavit of Donna Marguette Ron Schilling 
Document sealed 
Date: 111 812008 Second Judicial District Court - Clearwater County User: SUE 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2002-0000443 Current Judge: Ron Schilling 
Gene Francis Stuart, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
Gene Franc~s Stuart, Plalnt~ff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
Date Code User Judge 
5/22/2006 AFFD SUE Affidavit of Delores Mary Nichols Ron Schilling 
Document sealed 
AFFD SUE Affidavit of Claudia J. Petrie Ron Schilling 
AFFD SUE Affidavit of Doug Seeger Ron Schilling 
AFFD SUE Affidavit of Coby L. Smith Ron Schilling 
AFFD SUE Affidavit of Thomas H. Thorn Ron Schilling 
Document sealed 
AFFD SUE Affidavit of Sheri Ward Ron Schilling 







311 212007 CDlS SUE 
MEMO SUE 
SCAN SUE 
Affidavit of Virginia Lee Presler Ron Schilling 
Document sealed 
Affidavit of Michael A. Lowe Ron Schilling 
Affidavit of Debra K. Johnson Ron Schilling 
Affidavit of Rose Mary Connelly Ron Schilling 
Document sealed 
Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on Ron Schilling 
05/22/2006 10:OO AM: Case Taken Under 
Advisement To be held at the maximum security 
prison in Boise 
Court Minutes Ron Schilling 
Civil Disposition entered for: Gilmore, Lori, Other Ron Schilling 
Party; State Of Idaho, Other Party; Stuart, Gene 
Francis, Subject. 
order date: 3/12/2007 
Memorandum Opinion on Petition for Post Ron Schilling 
Conviction Relief and/or Writ of Habeas Corpus & 
Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence, to vacate 
sentence of death and for new sentencing trial. 
Scanned 03/29/07 Ron Schilling 
$11 812007 JDMT SUE Judgment Dismissing Case with Prejudice Ron Schilling 
SCAN SUE Scanned 04/26/2007 Ron Schilling 
1/23/2007 APSC SUE Appealed To The Supreme Court Ron Schilling 
NOTA SUE NOTICE OF APPEAL Ron Schilling 
MOTN SUE Motion that costs of appeal be at county expense Ron Schilling 
1/30/2007 ORDR SUE Order Ron Schilling 
5/8/2007 MlSC SUE Amended Notice of Appeal Ron Schilling 
j/6/2007 MlSC SUE Second Amended Notice of Appeal Ron Schilling 
i/28/2007 STlP SUE Stipulation Ron Schilling 
Document sealed 
'/2/2007 ORDR SUE Order Ron Schilling 
Document sealed 
'/25/2007 NOTC SUE Notice of lodging reporters transcript and clerk's Ron Schilling 
record 
uate: 111812008 Second Judicial District Court - Clearwater County 
T~me  022gPM 
$$&$ 
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ROA Report 
Case: CV-2002-0000443 Current Judge: Ron Schilling 
Gene Francis Stuart, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
User: SUE 
Gene Francis Stuart, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
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Affidavit in support of motion for extension Ron Schilling 
Motion for extension of time in which to file Ron Schilling 
objections to clerk's record and reporter's 
transcript 
Order Ron Schilling 
Notice of hearing In RE: Settlement of Clerk's Ron Schilling 
Record 
Notice of and objection to clerk's record Ron Schilling 
Hearing Scheduled (Objection 10/09/2007 10:OO Ron Schilling 
AM) 
Stipulation regarding correction of clerk's record Ron Schilling 
Order regarindg correction of clerk's record Ron Schilling 
ALAN G. LANCE 
Attorney General 
State of ldaho 
MICHAEL A. HENDERSON 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
L. LaMONT ANDERSON, ISB # 3687 
T. PAUL KRUEGER II, ISB #5071 
KIMBERLY J. BLAS, ISB #5159 
Deputy Attorneys General 
Criminal Law Division 
Capita! Lltigatior! Clnlt 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ldaho 83720-001 0 
Telephone: (208) 334-2400 
Facsimile: (208) 334-2942 ORIGINAL 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 




VS. ) DEATH WARRANT 
) 




TO: Tom Beauclair, Director of Correction, and Greg Fisher, Acting 
Warden, ldaho Maximum Security Institution: 
DEATH WARRANT - I 
WHEREAS, the above-named Defendant, on the 1 4 ' ~  day of October, 
1982, was found guilty of the crime of First Degree Murder as charged in the 
prosecutor's information; and, 
WHEREAS, on the gth day of December, 1982, the Court made and 
entered its Findings of the Court in Considering the Death Penalty, finding that 
the Defendant is guilty of Murder in the First Degree and imposing the sentence 
of Death; and, 
WHEREAS, on the 3rd day of May,' 1985, the ldaho Supreme Court 
issued its opinion upholding the conviction and sentence; and, 
WHEREAS, on the I l t h  day of May, 1987, the Court did enter an order 
denying the Defendant's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief; and, 
WHEREAS, on the 16th day of October, 1990, the ldaho Supreme Court 
issued its opinion affirming the Court's denial of post-conviction relief; and, 
WHEREAS, on the 23rd day of May, 2000, the Court did enter an order 
denying the Defendant's Second and Subsequent Petition for Post-Conviction 
Relief; and, 
WHEREAS, on the 4th day of December, 2001, the ldaho Supreme Court 
issued its opinion affirming the Court's denial of post-conviction relief and issued 
its Remittitur on the 26th day of December, 2001, which ordered this Court to 
forthwith comply with the directive of the Opinion; and, 
WHEREAS, ldaho Code § 19-2715(2) mandates that upon a remittitur 
being issued after a sentence of death has been affirmed, the district court shall 
set a new execution date; and, 
DEATH WARRANT - 2 
WHEREAS, the Court is not aware of the existence of any stay of 
execution or other impediment to execution of the judgment; 
NOW THEREFORE, YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED, pursuant to 
ldaho Code § 19-2716 and the Judgment of this Court, to receive said Defendant 
into your custody, and on the 241h day of January, 2002, you shall cause the 
execution of said sentence of death to take place, unless said sentence is stayed 
by law, and that you shall make a return upon this Death Warrant, showing the 
time, mode and manner in which it was executed pursuant to ldaho Code § 19- 
271 8. 
DATED this loth day of January, 2002. 
DEATH WARRANT - 3 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 










Case No.: 8495 
ORDER FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the fees in this matter in the amount of $1,767.40 at 
the rate of $100.00 per hour be and the same hereby are approved and payable to Randall, 
Blake & Cox, ]'.A. 
P- DATED THIS / 9 day of March, 2002. 
ORDER FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES 
JOAN &/I. FISIXEII 
Idaho State Bar No. 2854 
Capital Habeas Unit B ~ G  2 q 4 ' r J j (  dub ,, 
Federal Defenders of Eastern. Washington & Idaho 
201 N. Main \ I , ' - , r  1 s?~&tc*c) 104 
Moscow, Sf) 83843  IT - 
(208) 883-01 80 Fi Y &&A r ' Y  
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TIIE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN ANSI FOR TISE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
GENE FRANCIS STUART 1 case NO. 0 2 -( iO /flq 
Petitioner, 1 
1 PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION 
v. ) IXES,IEF AND / OR WRIT OF 
I-IABII:AS CORPUS 
) 





STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
Plaintiff ) Case No. 8495 
1 
V. ) MOTION TO CORRECT ILLEGAL 
1 SENTENCE, TO VACATE 
GENE FRANCIS STUART ) SENTENCE OF DEATH AND FOR 
Defendant. 1 NEW SENTENCING TRIAL 
Gene Francis Stuart, Petitioner, by and through his attorney of record, Joan M. Fisher of 
the Federal Defenders of Easten1 Washington and Idaho, Capital Habeas Unit, and pursuant to 
Idaho Constitution Article 1 ,  Sections 1,  5, Idaho Code Sections 19-27 19, -4901, et. seq. and 
Idaho Criminal Rules 35 and 57, petitions this Court for post-conviction relief. More specifically, 
Petitioner seeks re-sentencing on the ground that his sentence violates his right to a jury trial as 
PETITION FOR POS~'-CONVICTIO~ mL IEI- AI\'D/OI< WRIT OF  HABEAS CORISUS; MOTION TO 
CORRECT ~LLE<;AI> SENTENCE, TO VA"C ATE SENI ENCE OF DEATH, AND FOR NFW SENI ENClhG TRIAL - 1 
guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the IJnited States Constitution and the 
Idaho Constitution, Article I, Section 7; to due process as guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Idaho Constitution, Article I, Section 13; 
and to notice of the charges against him as guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth A~nendrnents 
to the United States Constitution and the Idaho Constitution, Article I, Section 13. 
On June 24, 2002, the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in Ring v. Arizonu, 
536 U.S. --, 122 S. Ct. 2428 (June 24, 2002). In Ring, the Court held in part that Apprendi v. 
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), applies to capital cases. Noting that Appret?ci~ held that "[i]f a 
State makes an increase in a defendant's authorized punishment contingent on the finding of a 
Fact, that fact ... must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt[,]" Ring holds that because 
Arizona's "enumerated aggravating factors operate as the 'functional equivalent of an elenlent of 
a greater offense,' Apprctzd~, 530 IJ.S., at 494, n. 19, the Sixth Amendment requires that those 
factors be found by a jury." Rzng, 536 U.S. at - , 122 S. Ct. at 2443. In this regard, no 
principled distinction can be drawn between Arizona and Idaho's capital sentencing statutes: 
IJnder each a sentence of death is not authorized absent a finding that one or more aggravating 
factors exist. 
This same requirement existed at the time Mr. Stuart was sentenced to death. Idaho's 
sentencing statute then in effect provided that "a sentence of death shall not be imposed unless 
the court finds at least one (1) statutory aggravating circumstance." 1.C. 5 19-25 15(b) (1 977). 
The trial court sentenced Mr. Stuart to death based on aggravating circumstances which it-not a 
jury found to exist. A jury played no role in the determination of the statutory aggravating 
circumstances. 
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTIOW RELIEF AND/OR \I1RIT OF  HABEAS CORPUS; ~ ~ O T I O N S  TO
COtlREC'T 11,LEGAL SENTENCE, VACATE SENTENCE OF DEATH, A N D  FOIi NEW SE;NTENCINC; T I ~ I A I ,  - 2  
Ring holds that any fact, not just aggrdvating factors, necessary to '%n increase in a 
defendant's authorized punishment ... must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt[,]" 
Apprencli, 530 U.S ., at 494,n. 19. Idaho's sentencing statute in effect when Mr. Stuart was tried 
made an increased authorized sentence to death contingent on filldings ( 1 )  whether mitigating 
circumstances existed,(2) whether the mitigating circumstances outweighed the aggravating 
circrrmstances, and (3) whet'l-ler the mitigating circumstances made the imposition of death 
unjust. I.C. 4 19-25 15(h)( 1977). 
Additionally, I'ctitioner is entitled to relief because "'under the ... notice and jury trial 
guarantees of the Sixth Arnendrllent [and the Fourteenth Anrendment1,any fact (other than prior 
conviction) that i~icreascs the rnaximunl penalty for a crime must be charged in an indictment, 
submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt."' Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476 (quoting 
Jones v. Unilecl Stcrles,526 U.S. 227, 243, 11. 6 (19999)). Pctitiorler is entitled to relief or1 the same 
grounds under the Idaho Constitution, Article I, Section 7 ('jury trial guarantee); Idaho 
Constitution Article 1, Section 13 (notice guarantee); and Idaho Constitution, Article I, Section 
13 (due process). 
The Ring decision has immediate, obvious and profound implications for this case. Most 
obviously, it means that petitioner's death sentence is unconstitutional because he was not given a 
jury trial on the statutory aggravating factors that made him eligible for a death sentence under 
Idaho law--the very reason the Court in Ring held the death sentence imposed by the State of 
Arizona in that case was unconstitutional. It also means that petitioner's death sentence is 
unconstitutiorlal because the procedures by which it was imposed disregarded the Jones principle 
in a number of other ways, ways that were not immediately at issue in Ring itself. In addition, 
PETITION FOR POST-(~ONVICTION RELIEF AND/OI< WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; MOTIONS 7'0 
CORRECT ILLEGAL SENTENCE, VACATE SENTENCE OF DEATH, AND FOR NEW SENTENCING TRIAL - 3  
the concurix~g opinion of Justice Breyer in Ring reopens a related constitutional issue which is 
presented by t h ~ s  case, an issue previously thought to be foreclosed by Supreme Court precedent: 
whether the jury sentencing in capital cases that the vast majority of death penalty states 
afford is required by the Eighth Amendment. And the principles set forth and applied in Rzng 
and Jones call into question the continued validity of the Idalio Supreme Court's previous 
decisions rejecting claims that jury trials on capital eligibility and sentence are required by 
Idaho's constitution. The decision in Rlng is thus a truly extraordinary legal development which 
compels this Court's reconsideration of the constitutionality of Petitioner's death sentence under 
both the United States' and Idaho's constitutional protections. This petition is being filed so that 
this Court can give t111s case that reconsideration. 
Failure to grant Petitioner relief requested herein will result in a manifest injustice, deny 
Petitioner protect1011 of his rights to a jury trial and notice as guaranteed under the S ~ x t h  and 
Fourteerlth Amendments, to be free of cruel and unusual punishment as guaranteed by the Eighth 
and Fourteenth Amendments, due process and equal protectio~l as guaranteed by the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitutio~l and the correlative state rights as guaranteed under 
Idaho Constitution Article 1 ,  Sections 1 ,  2, 3, 5 ,  6, 7, 8, 13, 18 and 21. 
PETITION FOR POSI -CONVICT ION RELIEF AXD/OR WRIT OF HABEAS CORI'US; MOTIONS TO 
CORRECT ILLEGAL SEIVTENCE. VACATE SENTENCE OF DEATH, A N D  FOR NEW SENTENCING TIIIAL - 4  
Petitioner alleges as follows: 
I. CURRENT CUSTODY OF PETITIONER. 
Petitioner is in custody of the Idaho Department of Correction and is being held at the 
Idaho Maximum Security Institute at Boise, Idaho, on death row in solitary confinement with 
severely restricted visitation. Petitioner has been held by the Idaho Department of Correction on 
death row since 1982. 
11. JUDGMENT AND SENTENCE 
Petitioner was convicted in the Second Judicial District Court of the State of Idaho, 
sitting in Moscow, Idaho, in proceedings presided over by Judge Andrew Schwam. 
Subsequently, sitting in Orofino, Idaho, Judge Schwanl sentenced Petitioner to death. The date of 
Petitioner's judgment and sentence was December 9, 1982. 
111. CONVICTIONS COMPLAINED OF 
The case number in the tnal court was 8495. The offense for which sentence was 
imposed was first degree murder. 
IV. SENTENCES COMPLAINED OF 
Sentence was imposed from the bench on December 1 ,  1982. On December 9, 1982, the 
sentencing court filed its Findings of the Court In Considering Death Penalty IJnder Section 19- 
25 15, Idaho Code (Exhibit l) ,  as well as it's Judgment of Conviction, and written orders 
sentencing Petitioner to death. The sentence imposed which is at issue herem 1s death. 
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTIOK RELIEF AND/OR WRIT O F  HABEAS CORPUS; hfOT1ONS TO 
CORRECT IL,I,EGAL SENTENCE, VACATE SENTENCE OF DEATH, A N D  FOR NEW SENTENCING TRIAL - 5  
V. JURY VERDICT 
The finding of guilty was made after a plea of not guilty, and a jury trial had thereon, 
except on the elements of capital first degree murder, namely the statutory aggravating 
circumstances which were neither alleged nor submitted to the jury, the mitigating circumstances, 
the weighing of the mitigating circumstances against the gravity of the aggravating 
circumstances, and the determination that the mitigating circumstances do not make imposition 
of death unjust. Petitioner was represerlted at trial by court-appointed counsel, Robert E. Kinney. 
VI. DIRECT APPEAL 
Petitioner appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Judgment of Conviction and 
Imposition of Sentence and was represented for the purpose of said appeal by court-appointed 
counsel, Robert E. Kinney, then of Orofino, Idaho. The opinion of the Idaho Supreme Court, 
filed on May 3, 1985, affirmed the trial court's judgment and imposition of sentence. State v. 
Stuart, 7 15 P.2d 833 (1985). 
VII. PRIOR POST-CONVICTION PROCEEDING 
(a) Petitioner has twice previously sought post-conviction relief in the state courts. The 
post-conviction proceedings were held in the District Court for the Second Judicial District of 
Idaho in the County of Clearwater, County Case No. 8495, before the Honorable Ron Schilling. 
The Idaho Supreme Court affinned the trial court's denials of relief. Stuart v. State, 801 P.2d 
12 16 (Ariz. 1990), and Stuart v. State, 80 1 P.2d 1283 (Ariz. 1990), on return from remand, 907 
P.12d 783 (1 996), 011 retunl from second remand, 36 P.3d 1278 (2001). 
PETITIO?+ FOR POST-CONVICTIO\ RELIEF AKD/OII WR17 O F  HABEAS CORPUS; MOTIONS TO 
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VIII. OTI-IER PROCEEDINGS 
Petitioner has sought habeas corpus relief in the United States District Court for the 
District of Idaho, Civil Case No. 02-020-S-BLW. I-lis pet~tion for writ of habeas corpus is now 
pending. 
IX. DUE DILIGENCE 
The bases for relief alleged herein raise a s~rbsta~ltial doubt about the constitutionality of 
the sentence of death imposed. Petitioner could not, in the exercise of due diligence, have 
prevailed on the issues earlier due to the erroneous eorlstitutional analysis appl~ed by the Idaho 
Supreme Court urhich prevailed until the United States Supreme Court recognized the 
longstanding constitutional infirmities of excluding the jury fronl its constitutional fact-finding 
function in the f'dctual elements, r.e., statutory aggravating circumstances, which expose a person 
convicted of first degree murder to death. 
X. GROUNDS FOR REI,IEF 
A. Relevant Factual Background 
Petitiorler was charged by Amended Information: 
That Gene Francis Stuart of Orofino, Idaho, on or about the 19Ih 
day of September, 1981, at Orofi~lo, in the County of Cleanvater, 
State of Idaho, then and there being, did then and there unlawfully 
and feloniously kill a human being, -with the intentional applicat~on 
of torture to said human being, to wit: that the said Gene Francis 
Stuart did strike and hit Robert Miller, a human being, repeatedly 
with the ~ntent o cause suffering or to satisfy some sadistic 
inclination of the said Gene Francis Stuart, thereby inflicting great 
bodily injury upon Robert Miller and mortally wounding Robert 
Miller, from wh~ch wounds the said Robert Miller, a three year old 
boy, sickened and died In the County of Cleanvater, State of Idaho, 
on the 19"' day of September 198 1.  (Exhib~t 2) 
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF AND/OR WRIT 01; HABEAS CORPUS; MOTIONS 7'0 
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At trial the jury was not required to determine the Petitioner's mens rea as constitutionally 
required under Enrnund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982). 
In Mr. Stuart's case, no jury trial was held to determine the existence of any statutory 
aggravating circumstance and to make other relevant factual determinations necessary to 
increasing the maximum sentence against Petitioner to death. No instructions were given on the 
factual issues of whether aggravating circumstances existed, whether mitigating circumstances 
existed, whether the mitigating circumstances outweighed the gravity of any aggravating 
circumstances, and whether the mitigating circumstances made imposition of death unjust. See 
I.C. $19-25 15(b)(1977). 
On appeal, the question of jury participation or factfinding was raised on direct appeal 
The Idaho Supreme Court ruled against Petitioner. State v. Stuart, 715 P.2d at 845. 
B. Claims 
1. The existence of aggravating circunlstances necessary to increase Petitioner's 
maximum sentence to death was not determined by a jury, in violation Petitioner's rights under 
the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and the Idaho 
Constitution Article 1, Sections 1,7, 13, & 18, I.C. 19-1902, and Ring v. Arizona, 536 1J.S. at -, 
122 S. Ct. 2428 (June 24, 2002). Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U. S. 466 (2000); Sullivan v. 
Louisiuna, 508 U.S. 275 (1993); In re Wirzship, 397 U.S. 358 (1972); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 
U.S. 145 (1968). 
2. Petitioner was not given notice in the charging document of the aggravating 
circumstances necessary to increase his maximum sentence to death, in violation of Petitioner's 
rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the IJnited States 
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF AND/OR \\'RIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; MOTIONS TO 
CORRECT ILL,EGAL SENTENCE, VACATE SENTENCE OF DEATH, AND FOR NEW SENTENCING TRIAL - 8 
Constitution, the Idaho Constitution, Article I, Sections 1, 8, Bt, I.C. 19-102, Jones v. United 
States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999), and Rine v. Arizona. 
3. No preliminary examinatiorl was held on the existence of aggravating circumstances 
necessary to increase Petitioner's maximum sentence to death, in violation of Petitioner's rights 
under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the IJnited States Constitution, the 
Idaho Constitution. Article 1, Sections 1, 7, 13 and 18, I.C. 19-1 02, Jones v. United Stutes, 526 
U.S. 227 (1999), and ltirzg v. Avzzo~zu, supra. 
4. Petitioner's sentence was not determined by a jury, in violation of Petitoiner's rights 
under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, Idaho 
Constitution, Article 1 ,  Sections 1, 6, 7 and 13, and Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. at -- , 122 S.Ct. at 
2446 (Breyer J., conctlvrrtzg in the jzrdgment); Furman v. Georg~a, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
5. A jury did not determine whether Petitioner acted with requisite nlens rea as required 
under Enmund v. Florru'u, 458 U.S. 477 (1 98 1), in violation of Petitioner's rights under the Sixth, 
Eighth, and Fourteenth A~nendments to the IJnited States Constitution and Idaho Constitution, 
Article 1 ,  Sections 1 ,  7, 13 and 18. 
6. A jury did not determine whether mitigating circumstances existed, the determination 
of which was necessary to increase Petitioner's maximum sentence to death, in violation of the 
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution and Idaho Constitution, 
Article 1 ,  Sections 1 ,  7, 13 and 18. 
7. A jury did not determine whether the mitigating circumstances outweighed the 
aggravating circumstances, which determination was necessary to increase Petitioner's nlaxirnurn 
PETITIOX FOR POST-GON\~ICTION REI,IEF AND/OR \%'KIT O F  ~JAREAS CORPUS; MOTIONS 7 0 
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sentence to death, in violation of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the IJnited States 
Constitution and Idaho Constitution, Article 1, Sections 1, 7, 13 and 18. 
8. A jury did not determine whether the mitigating circumstances made the imposition of 
death unjust, which determination was necessary to increase Petitioner's maximum sentence to 
death, in violation of the Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution, Ring v. Ar~zonu, and Idaho Constitution, Article 1 ,  Sections 1, 7, 13 and 18. 
9. By the twenty year judicial delay in the correct determination of the unconstitutionality 
of the death sentence imposed on Petitioner, Petitioner has been u~lconstitutionally subjected to 
cruel and unusual purlish~nent in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth amendments to the 
United States Constitution and Idaho Constitution, Article 1, Sections 1 ,  6, 13 and 18. 
10. To execute petitioner despite the clear unconstitutionality of the procedures by which 
his death sentence was imposed, despite the fact that he made timely objections to those 
procedures, and despite the fact that most or all other similarly situated and tried capital 
defendants in Idaho will not be put to death without being afforded those constitutional 
protections, would constitute a gross and unjustifiable denial of the equal protection of the law 
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the IJnited States and Article 1 ,  
Section 2 of the Idaho Constitution and the arbitrary imposition of death in violation of the 
Eighth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and Article 1 ,  Section 6 of the Idaho 
Constitution. Furman v. Georgia, 408 US.  238 (1 972) ; Douglas v. Calfornra, 372 U.S. 353, 
357 (1963); Smith v. Bennetl, 365 U.S. 708, 713-14 (1961). 
PETITION FOR POST-~ONVICTION RELIEF AND/OR WRIT O F  HABEAS CORPUS; MOTIONS TO 
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XI. RELIEF REQUESTED 
WHEREFORE, Petitioner seeks from this court the following: 
I .  An order vacating petitioner's sentence of death and setting the same for re-sentencing 
with instructions that death may not be imposed; and 
2. Any and all other relief which the court deems necessary in the interest ofjustice. 
DATED this &day of August, 2002. 
dttorney for Petitioner 
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STATE OF IDAHO ) 
:ss 
County of Ada 1 
Ciene Francis Stuart, being first duly sworn under oath, deposes and says as follows: 
That he is the Petitioner i n  the above-entitled action; that he has read the above and 
foregoing Fourth Petition For Post-Conviction Relief, that he knows the contents thereof and that 
the facts slated herein are true and to the best of 111s knowledge and belief. 
G&-7L/&L  e Francis S uart 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this / gay of August, 2002 
1% TITIO\ FOR POCT-CONVICTION RELIEF AND/OR ~5 KIT O F  HABEAS COKPCIS; MOTIOR'S TO 
< ' O R ~ ~ E C T  II.I,EGAL. SF~TE~CF,  VACATE SENTE~CF OF DEATII, A N D  FOR x~Lt' SENTENCIRG T IAI, - 12 
EXHIBIT 1 
(Findings of the Court in Considering Death Penalty 
Under Section 19-251 5, Idaho Code) 
ALLf r'! f I '  3 4t.rq 
C L E R C  o i  r r  c o u u ~  
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DIS.@IFID'OF, B$iTY 
Ottokfh ,. 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CL ARW T iEC $ TOOP X ' A Z  
C A S E  N I ~  -a%L_ 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
1 C a s e  No. 8 4 9 5  B Y  .-&-. 0EPUl-Y 
P l a i n t i f f ,  ) 
FINDINGS OF THE COURT IN 
v  s CONSIDERING DEATH PENALTY 
1 UNDER SECT ION 1 9 - 2 5 1 5 ,  
GENE FRANCIS STUART, ) IDAHO CODE 
1 
D e f e n d a n t .  ) 
T h e  a b o v e  d e f e n d a n t  w a s  f o u n d  g u i l t y  b y  a  j u r y  o f  t h e  
c r i m i n a l  o f f e n s e  o f  F i r s t  D e g r e e  Murder  b y  T o r t u r e ,  w h i c h  u n d e r  
t h e  l a w  a u L h o r i z e s  t h e  i m p o s i t i o n  o f  t h e  d e a t h  p e n a l t y .  T h e  
C o u r t  t h e n  o r d e r e d  a  p r e - s e n t e n c e  i n v e s t i g a t i o n  o f  t h e  d e  f e n d a n  t 
a n d  t h e ' r e a f t e r  h e l d  a  s e n t e n c i n g  h e a r i n g  t o  r e c e i v e  a l l  r e l e v a n t  
e v i d e n c e  a n d  a r g u m e n t  o f  c o u n s e l  
T h e  C o u r t  m a k e s  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  f i n d i n g s :  
1 .  T h a t  t h e  d e f e n d a n t ,  w h i l e  r e p r e s e n t e d  by  R o b e r t  K i n n e y ,  
c o u r t  a p p o i n t e d  c o u n s e l ,  w a s  f o u n d  g u i l t y  o f  t h e  o f f e n s e  o f  F i r s t  
D e g r e e  M u r d e r  b y  j u r y  v e r d i c t .  
2 .  T h a t  a  p r e - s e n t e n c e  r e p o r t  w a s  p r e p a r e d  b y  o r d e r  o f  t h e  
C o u r t  a n d  t h e  d e f e n d a n t  o r  h i s  c o u n s e l  r e c e i v e d  a  c o p y  o f  t h i s  
p r e - s e n t e n c e  r e p o r t  t w o  d a y s  p r i o r  t o  t h e  s e n t e n c i n g  h e a r i n g .  
T h e  C o u r t  s p e c i f i c a l l y  i n q u i r e d  o f  d e f e n s e  c o u n s e l  a n d  t h e  
d e f e n d a n t  w h e t h e r  t h e y  h a d  a n y  o b j e c t i o n  t o  p r o c e e d i n g  w i t h  t h e  
h e a r i n g  a n d  t h e  s e n t e n c i n g ,  h a v i n g  h a d  t h e  p r  e - s e n t e n c e  r e p o r t  
f o r  t w o  d a y s ,  a n d  b o t h  i n d i c a t e d  t h e y  d i d  n o t .  
3 .  T h a t  a  s e n t e n c i n g  h e a r i n g  w a s  h e l d  o n  D e c e m b e r  l s t ,  
1 9 8 2 ,  p u r s u a n t  t o  n o t i c e  t o  c o u n s e l  f o r  t h e  d e f e n d a n t  a n d  i n  t h e  
p r e s e n c e  o f  t h e  d e f e n d a n t  t h e  C o u r t  h e a r d  r e l e v a n t  e v i d e n c e  i n  
a g g r a v a t i o n  a n d  m i t i g a t i o n  o f  t h e  o f f e a s e  a n d  a r g u m e n t s  o f  
c o u n s e l .  F u r t h e r ,  i t  w a s  a g r e e d  a n d  u n d e r s t o o d  by  b o t h  t h e  S t a t e  
a n d  t h e  d e f e n d a n t  t h a t  t h e  C o u r t  w o u l d  r e l y  u p o n ,  a s  p a r t  o f  t h e  
s e n t e n c i n g  h e a r i n g ,  t h e  t e s t i m o n y  a t  t h e  p r e l i m i n a r y  h e a r i n g  a n d  
t h e  t r i a l .  
4 .  T h e  C o u r t  e x a m i n e d  t h e  f o l l o w i n g  p o s s i b l e  m i  t i g a t i n g  
f a c t o r s  i n  m a k i n g  i t s  d e c i s i o n  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  t h i s  m a t t e r :  
a .  THE DEFENDANT'S PRIOR CRIMINAL HISTORY AND WHETHER OR NOT 
I T  I S  RELEVANT TO THIS OCCURRENCE OF HOMICIDE. T h e  C o u r t  f o u n d  
t h a t  t h e  d e f e n d a n t ' s  p r i o r  c r i m i n a l  r e c o r d  w a s  t e r r i b l e ,  t h a t  i t  
w a s  a s s a u l t i v e  i n  n a t u r e  a s  w e l l  a s  i n c l u d i n g  c r i m e s  o f  t h e f t ,  
a n d  t h a t  t h e  d e f e n d a n t  p l e d  g u i l t y  i n  t h i s  c a s e  t o  b e i n g  a  
h a b i t u a l  c r i m i n a l .  
b .  WHETHER OR NOT THE DEFENDANT WAS UNDER EXTREME STRESS AT 
THE TIME OF THE OCCURRENCE. T h e  C o u r t  f o u n d  t h a t  t h e  d e f e n d a n t  
w a s  n o t  u n d e r  a n y  p a r t i c u l a r  s t r e s s  a n d  t h a t  t h e  d e f e n d a n t  w a s  
t o t a l l y  c a p a b l e  o f  c o n t r o l l i n g  h i s  b e h a v i o r .  .The f a c t s  s h o w  t h a t  
t h e  d e f e n d a n t  h a s  n u m e r o u s  f r i e n d s ,  who h a v e  f o u n d  h i m  t o  b e  
c a p a b l e  o f  c o n t r o l l i n g  h i s  b e h a v i o r ,  a n d  t h a t  t h e  d e f e n d a n t  
d u r i n g  a  p e r i o d  f r o m  1 9 7 5  t o  1 9 7 6  r e m a i n e d  a  l a w  a b i d i n g  c i t i z e n  
a n d  w a s  a b l e  t o  r e l a t e  w e l l  t o  a  f e m a l e  a s s o c i a t e  a n d  t h a t  w h e n  
d e f e n d a n t  i s  m o t i v a t e d  t o  d o  s o ,  h e  h a s  n o  d i f f i c u l t y  w h a t s o e v e r  
i n  c o n t r o l l i n g  h i s  b e h a v i o r .  
c .  WHETHER THE DEFENDANT HAS A  PERSONALITY DISORDER WHICH 
PREVENTED HIM FROM FULLY UNDERSTANDING THE CRIMINALITY OF H I S  
ACTS. T h e  C o u r t  f o u n d  t h a t  t h e  d e f e n d a n t  d o e s  n o t  h a v e  a  
p e r s o n a l i t y  w h i c h  i m p a i r s  h i s  a b i l i t y  t o  u n d e r s t a n d  t h e  c r i m i -  
n a l i t y  o f  h i s  a c t s .  T h e r e  w a s  t e s t i m o n y  p r o d u c e d  a t  t h e  t r i a l  b y  
a  p s y c h i a t r i s t  f o r  t h e  d e f e n s e ,  who o f f e r e d  a n  e x p l a n a t i o n  f o r  
d e f e n d a n t ' s  b e h a v i o r ,  w h i c h  t h e  C o u r t  f o u n d  t o  b e  u t t ~ e r l y  u n s u p -  
p o r t e d  b y  t h e  e v i d e n c e .  T h e r e  was  n o  e v i d e n c e  i n  t h i s  t r i a l  t o  
i n d i c a t e  t h a t  t h i s  d e f e n d a n t  w a s  a  p e r f e c t i o n i s t ,  w h o  w a s  
a t t e m p t i n g  t o  c a u s e  o t h e r s  t o  b e  p e r f e c t .  T h e  e v i d e n c e  i n d i c a t e s  
o v e r w h e l m i n g l y  t h a t  t h i s  d e f e n d a n t  i s  a  s a d i s t i c  m a n ,  who c a n  
e a s i l y  c o n t r o l  h i s  b e h a v i o r  i f  h e  w i s h e s .  T h e  d e f e n s e  p s y c h i a -  
t r i s t  a l s o  t e s t i f i e d  t h a t  t h e  d e f e n d a n t  was  i m p u l s i v e ,  b u t  a l l  o f  
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t h e  e v i d e n c e  a d d u c e d  a t  t h e  t r i a l  d e m o n s t r a t e s  c l e a r l y  t h a t  t h e  
d e f e n d a n t  is  n o t  i m p u l s i v e .  H i s  n u m e r o u s  f r i e n d s  who t e s t i f i e d  
i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  h e  w a s  q u i t e  c a p a b l e  o f  c o n t r o l l i n g  h i s  t e m p e r  a n d  
t h a t  t h e y  f o u n d  h i m  t o  b e  e v e n  t e m p e r e d .  
d .  WHETHER OR NOT THE DEFENDANT COOPERATED WITH THE POLICE 
DURING THE INVESTIGATION OF T H I S  MATTER. T h e  C o u r t  f o u n d  t h a t  
t h e  d e f e n d a n t  l i e d  t o  t h e  p o l i c e .  T h e  d e f e n d a n t  d u r i n g  h i s  
t e s t i m o n y  a t  t r i a l  a d m i t t e d  t h a t  h e  h a d  l i e d  t o  t h e  p o l i c e .  T h e  
d e f e n d a n t  m a d e  a  s i m i l a r  a d m i s s i o n  d u r i n g  t h e  s e n t e n c i n g  h e a r i n g .  
T h e  l i e s  t o l d  t o  t h e  p o l i c e  r e l a t e d  t o  t h e  v e r y  h e a r t  o f  t h e  
c h a r g e  i n  q u e s t i o n  a n d  i n  n o  w a y  d o  t h e  f a c t s  d e m o n s t r a t e  t h a t  
t h i s  d e f e n d a n t  c o o p e r a t e d  w i t h  t h e  p o l i c e .  D e f e n s e  c o u n s e l  h a s  
o f f e r e d  a s  a  s i g n  o f  d e f e n d a n t ' s  c o o p e r a t i o n  t h a t  h e  a g r e e d  t o  
t a k e  a  l i e  d e t e c t o r  t e s t  w h i c h  w a s  n e v e r  g i v e n .  C o n s i d e r i n g  t h a t  
t h e  d e  f e n d a n t  h a s  a d m i t t e d  t h a t  p r i o r  t o  i n d i c a t i n g  h i s  w i l l i n g -  
n e s s  t o  t a k e  a  l i e  d e t e c t o r  t e s t  h e  had  i n  f a c t  b e e n  l y i n g ,  t h e  
C o u r t  f i n d s  t h a t  t h i s  a g r e e m e n t  t o  t a k e  a  l i e  d e t e c t o r  t e s t  w a s  
m e r e l y  a n  e f f o r t  t o  m a n i p u l a t e  t h e  p o l i c e  i n t o  b e l i e v i n g  t h a t  h e  
w a s  t e l l i n g  t h e  t r u t h .  
e .  WHETHER OR NOT DEFENDANT'S PSYCHOLOGICAL MAKE UP AND H I S  
BACKGROUND OFFER SOME MITIGATION FOR THE EVENTS WHICH TRANSPIRED. 
T h e  C o u r t  f o u n d  f r o m  d e f e n d a n t ' s  own s t a t e m e n t s  i n  t h e  p r e - s e n -  
t e n c e  r e p o r t  ' t h a t  h e  h a d  a  g o o d  f a t h e r  a n d  a  g o o d  m o t h e r  a n d  a  
p r o p e r  u p b r i n g i n g ,  n o t  i n  a n y  way c h a r a c t e r i z e d  b y  e m o t i o n a l  o r  
e c o n o m i c a l  d e p r i v a t i o n .  T h e  C o u r t  c o u l d  f i n d  n o t h i n g  i n  t h e  
d e f e n d a n t ' s  b a c k g r o u n d  w h i c h  w o u l d  m i t i g a t e  t h i s  o c c u r r e n c e .  W i t h  
r e s p e c t  t o  d e f e n d a n t ' s  p s y c o l o g i c a l  m a k e  u p ,  t h e  C o u r t  h a s  
a l r e a d y  f o u n d  a s  i n d i c a t e d  a b o v e  t h a t  t h e  d e f e n d a n t  i s  c a p a b l e  o f  
c o n t r o l l i n g  h i s  b e h a v i o r  a n d  n o t  p a r t i c u l a r l y  i m p u l s i v e .  
f .  W H E T H E R  OR NOT D E F E N D A N T ' S  L I F E  V I E W E D  AS A WHOLD W O U L D  
PROVIDE SOME MITIGATION WITH RESPECT TO T H I S  OCCURRENCE. T h e  
C o u r t  r e v i e w e d  d e f e n d a n t ' s  e n t i r e  a d u l t  l i f e  i n  a n  e f f o r t  t o  f i n d  
s o m e  g o o d  o r  s o m e  c o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  s o c i e t y  w h i c h  w o u l d  m i t i g a t e  
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t h e  e v e n t s  o f  t h i s  c a s e .  A s  a  r e s u l t  o f  t h i s  r e v i e w  t h e  C o u r t  
f i n d s  t h a t  d u r i n g  d e f e n d a n t ' s  a d u l t  l i f e ,  a l m o s t  e v e r y o n e  who 
b e c a m e  i n v o l v e d  w i t h  h im i n  a  s o c i a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  had t o  e s c a p e  
f r o m  him f o r  t h e i r  own w e l l - b e i n g ,  and t h a t  t h e  o n e  e x c e p t i o n  was 
a f e m a l e  a c q u a i n t a n c e ,  who was i n v o l v e d  w i t h  t h e  d e f e n d a n t ,  j u s t  
s h o r t l y  a f t e r  h e  was r e l e a s e d  f rom t h e  M o n t a n a  P e n i t e n t i a r y  a n d  
o b v i o u s l y  s t i l l  i7  a  s t n t e  o f  f e a r  a s  a  r e s u l t  o f  h i s  r e c e n t  
p u n i s h m e n t .  The C o u r t  d u r i n g  t h i s  r e v i e w  f o u n d  t h a t  t h e  d e f e n -  
d a n t  c o n s t a n t l y  moved and c o n s t a n t l y  c h a n g e d  employment  and t h a t  
t h e  d e f e n d a n t  was i n  f r e q u e n t  t r o u b l e  w i t h  t h e  l a w .  An e x a m i n a -  
t i o n  o f  t h i s  d e f e n d a n t ' s  a d u l t  l i f e  r e v e a l s  n o  p a r t i c u l a r  good 
and no  p a r t i c u l a r  c o n t r i b u t i o n  t o  s o c i e t y  wh ich  i n  a n y  way w o u l d  
m i t i g a t e  t h e  a c t s  i n v o l v e d  i n  t h i s  c a s e .  
g .  THE COURT EXAMINED THE FOLLOWING POSSIBLE MITIGATING 
FACTORS.AND FOUND THEM TO BE UNRELATED TO THE FACTS OF THIS CASE: 
1) W h e t h e r  o r  n o t  t h e  v i c t i m  was a  p a r t i c i -  
p a n t  i n  t h e  d e f e n d a n t ' s  h o m i c i d a l  a c t .  
2 )  W h e t h e r  o r  n o t  t h e  m u r d e r  was  c o m m i t t e d  
u n d e r  c i r c u r n s  t a n c e s  w h i c h  t h e  d e f e n d a n t  
b e l i e v e d  t o  p r o v i d e  a  m o r a l  j u s t i f i c a t i o n  f o r  
h i s  c o n d u c t .  T h e  C o u r t  f i n d s  t h i s  t o  b e  
u n r e l a t e d  t o  t h i s  c a s e  b e c a u s e  t h e  j u r y  f o u n d  
b e y o n d  a  r e a s o n a b l e  d o u b t  t h a t  d e f e n d a n t ' s  
i n t e n t i o n  was n o t  t o  d i s c i p l i n e  b u t  t o  
t o r t u r e .  T h e  C o u r t  a g r e e s  t h a t  t h e  e v i d e n c e  
s h o w s  t h i s  beyond  a  r e a s o n a b l e  d o u b t .  
3 )  l i h e t h e r  t h e  d e f e n d a n t  was a n  a c c o m p l i c e  
i n  a  m u r d e r  c o m m i t t e d  by a n o t h e r  p e r s o n .  
4 )  W h e t h e r  t h e  d e f e n d a n t  a c t e d  u n d e r  d u r e s s  
o r  t h e  d o m i n a t i o n  of a n o t h e r  p e r s o n ,  and 
5 )  Whe the r  o r  n o t  t h e  d e f e n d a n t  was p a r t i c u -  
l a r l y  y o u t h f u l  a t  t h e  t i m e  o f  t h e  c r i m e .  
A s  t h e  a b o v e  a n a l y s i s  i n d i c a t e s ,  t h e  C o u r t  c o u l d  f i n d  n o t h i n g  i n  
m i t i g a t i o n  a n d  i n  f a c t  a n a l y z i n g  t h i s  d e f e n d a n t  i n  a  s e a r c h  f o r  
m i t i g a t i o n  p r o d u c e s  a  n e g a t i v e  h i s t o r y  w i t h  r e s p e c t  t o  t h i s  
d e f e n d a n t  . 
5 .  T h e  p r o s e c u t o r  r e q u e s t e d  t h a t  t h e  C o u r t  c o n s i d e r  t h r e e  
p o s s i b l e  a g g r a v a t i n g  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  l i s t e d  i n  I d a h o  C o d e  S e c t  i o n  
1 9 - 2 5 1 5 ( f ) .  T h e  C o u r t  w i l l  d e a l  w i t h  t h e s e  i n  n u m e r i c a l  o r d e r  
1 9 - 2 5  1 5  ( f )  ( 5 )  THE MURDER WAS ESPECIALLY HEINOUS, ATROCIOUS 
OR CRUEL, MANIFESTING EXCEPTIONAL DEPRAVITY. T h e  C o u r t  f i n d s  
t h i s  a g g r a v a t i n g  c i r c u m s t a n c e  t o  b e  t r u e  a n d  p r e s e n t  b e y o n d  a  
r e a s o n a b l e  d o u b t  i n  t h i s  c a s e .  T h e  e v i d e n c e  s h o w e d  a  s y s t e m a t i c  
m o n t h s  l o n g  t o r t u r e  o f  a  t w o  t o  t h r e e  y e a r  o l d  c h i l d ,  c u l m i n a t i n g  
i n  d b r u t a l  a n d  s a v a g e  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  f o r c e  t h a t  p r o d u c e d  t h e  
d e a t h  o f  t h e  c h i l d .  T h e  e v i d e n c e  s h o w s  t h a t  t h i s  l e n g t h y  
a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  t o r t u r e  and  f o r c e  w a s  d o n e  t o  t h i s  s m a l l  c h i l d  i n  
a n  a l l e g e d  e f f o r t  t o  c a u s e  t h i s  c h i l d  t o  c o n f o r m  t o  t h e  d e f e n -  
d a n t ' s  c a p r i c i o u s  a n d  i n c o n s i s t a n t  e v e r  c h a n g i n g  w h i m s ;  a  t a s k  
w h i c h  w a s  o b v i o u s l y  i m p o s s i b l e  a n d  w a s  u n d e r t a k e n  m e r e l y  t o  
p r o v i d e  a n  e x c u s e  t o  o b t a i n  s a d i s t i c  p l e a s u r e  b y  h u r t i n g  t h e  
c h i l d  o v e r  a n d  o v e r  a n d  o v e r .  
I t  i s  a p p r o p r i a t e  a t  t h i s  p o i n t  t o  l i s t  s o m e  o f  t h e  t o r -  
t u r o u s  d e m a n d s  m a d e  u p o n  t h i s  t i n y  c h i l d ,  w h i c h  i n v a r i a b l y  
p r o v i d e d  a n  e x c u s e  t o  i n f l i c t  p a i n  u p o n  t h e  c h i l d .  T h e  d e f e n d a n t  
d e m a n d e d  t h a t  t h e  c h i l d  e a t  p u r s u i n g  a  p r e s c r i b e d  p a t t e r n  o f  
h a n d l i n g  t h e  s i l v e r w a r e ,  t h e  g l a s s e s  a n d  t h e  n a p k i n ,  w h i c h  was s o  
c o m p l e x  t h a t  m o s t  a d u l t s  w o u l d  h a v e  d i f f i c u l t y  a c h i e v i n g  s a t i s -  
f a c t o r y  r e s u l t s  a n d  t h e n ,  u p o n  t h e  c h i l d ' s  f a i l u r e ,  w o u l d  p u n i s h  
t h e  c h i l d .  T h e s e  p u n i s h m e n t s  w o u l d  i n c l u d e  w i t h h o l d i n g  o f  f o o d ,  
c o l d  s h o w e r s  a n d  b e a t i n g s .  D e f e n d a n t  d e m a n d e d  t h a t  t h i s  t i n y  
c h i l d  n o t  e v e r  w h i n e ,  c r y  o r  p o u t .  I f  t h e  c h i l d  f a i l e d  e v e n  i n  a 
s m a l l  way t h e  r e s u l t  w o u l d  b e  b e a t i n g s  o r  c o l d  s h o w e r s .  
Any p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  t h e  d e f e n d a n t ' s  b e h a v i o r  was a n  a t t e m p t  
a t  d i s c i p l i n e  was  t o t a l l y  d i s p e l l e d  by  t h e  o v e r w h e l m i n g  e v i d e n c e  
t h a t  d e f e n d a n t  u s e d  t h i s  s a m e  t o r t u r o u s  m e t h o d  t o  d e a l  w i t h  
n u m e r o u s  a d u l t  women h e  b e c a m e  i n v o l v e d  w i t h  d u r i n g  h i s  l i f e t i m e .  
T h e  e v i d e n c e  s h o w e d  b e y o n d  a  r e a s o n a b l e  d o u b t  t h a t  t h i s  d e f e n d a n t  
p s y c h o l o g i c a l l y  a n d  p h y s i c a l l y  t o r t u r e d  t h i s  t i n y  c h i l d  by  m a k i n g  
a b s u r d  d e m a n d s  u p o n  t h i s  c h i l d  a n d  t h e n  r o u t i n e l y  i n f l i c t i n g  
FINDINGS OF THE COURT IN CONSIDERIt4G - - .  -., --.. . -,. ....- -- - - - -  . -  - 
s e v e r e  p h y s i c a l  a b u s e  f o r  t h e  c h i l d ' s  f a i l u r e  t o  c o m p l y  w i t h  
t h e s e  i m p o s s i b l e  demands .  A m o r e  d e p r a v e d ,  h e i n o u s ,  a t r o c i o u s  a n d  
c r u e l  c o a r s e  o f  c o n d u c t  c a n n o t  b e  i m a g i n e d .  
1 9 - 2 5 1 5  ( f )  (6 )  BY THE MURDER, OR CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUND1 N G  
ITS COMMISSION, THE DEFENDANT EXHIBITED UTTER DISREGARD FOR HUMAN 
L I F E .  The C o u r t  f i n d s  t h a t  t h i s  h a s  n o t  b e e n  d e m o n s t r a t e d  beyond  
a  r e a s o n a b l e  d o u b t .  The  C o u r t  f i n d s  t h i s  p a r t i c u l a r  s t a n d a r d  o r  
c i r c u m s t a n c e  q u i t e  c o n f u s i n g ,  b u t  i f  i t  was a p p l i e d  a n d  f o u n d  t o  
e x i s t  i n  t h i s  c a s e ,  t h e n  i t  w o u l d  e x i s t  i n  e v e r y  c a s e  i n  wh ich  a n  
i n t e n t i o n a l  h o m i c i d e  o c c u r r e d  a n d  t h e  e n t i r e  p r o c e s s  o f  e x a m i n a -  
t i o n  f o r  a g g r a v a t i n g  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  would  b e  u n d e r m i n e d .  
1 9 - 2 5 1 5  ( f )  ( 8 )  THE DEFENDANT B Y  PRIOR CONDUCT OR CONDUCT IN 
THE COMMISSION OF THE MURDER AT H A N D  HAS EXHIBITED A PROPENSITY 
TO COMMIT M U R D E R  WHICH WILL PROBABLY CONSTITUTE A CONTINUING 
THREAT TO SOCIETY. T h e  C o u r t  f i n d s  t h i s  t o  b e  t r u e  b e y o n d  a  
r e a s o n a b l e  d o u b t  i n  t h i s  c a s e .  T h e  f a c t s  a d d u c e d  a t  t h e  t r i a l  
a n d  a t  t h e  p r e l i m i n a r y  h e a r i n g  a r e  t h a t  t h e  d e f e n d a n t  h a s  
b r u t a l i z e d ,  a t  t i m e s  w i t h  t h e  u s e  o f  w e a p o n s ,  a l m o s t  e v e r y  p e r s o n  
w i t h  whom h e  h a s  b e c o m e  e m o t i o n a l l y  i n v o l v e d .  T h e  e v i d e n c e  
d e m o n s t r a t e s  t h a t  i t  was o n l y  a  m a t t e r  o f  t i m e  u n t i l  o n e  o f  t h e  
d e f e n d a n t ' s  v i c t i m s  d i e d  a s  a  r e s u l t  o f  t h e  d e f e n d a n t ' s  b r u t a l  
b e h a v i o r .  T h e  C o u r t  i s  c o n v i n c e d  beyond  a r e a s o n a b l e  d o u b t  t h a t  
i f  t h i s  d e f e n d a n t  c o n t i n u e s  t o  e x i s t ,  i t  w i l l  a g a i n  b e  o n l y  a  
m a t t e r  o f  t i m e  u n t i l  a n o t h e r  v i c t i m  i s  m u r d e r e d .  T h e  e v i d e n c e  
d e m o s t r a t e s  b e y o n d  a  r e a s o n a b l e  d o u b t  t h a t  t h i s  d e f e n d a n t  
a t t e m p t e d  t o  d rown  a  woman a s  a  m e a n s  o f  t o r t u r e  a n d  t h a t  t h i s  
d e f e n d a n t  i n f l i c t e d  b r u t a l  b e a t i n g s  u p o n  h i s  s e c o n d  w i f e  a n d  
r a p e d  h e r  w h i l e  s h e  was i n  t h e  h o s p i t a l  r e c o v e r i n g  f r o m  a n  
a u t o m o b i l e  a c c i d e n t .  T h e  d e f e n d a n t ' s  b r u t a l  b e h a v i o r  t o w a r d  s o  
m a n y  differ en^ p e o p l e  o v e r  a  p e r i o d  i n  e x c e s s  o f  a  d e c a d e  
d e m o n s t r a t e s  b e y o n d  a  r e a s o n a b l e  d o u b t  a  p r o p e n s i t y  t o  commit 
m u r d e r  i n  t h e  f u t u r e .  
FINDINGS OF T H E  COURT I N  CONSIDEKING 215 
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T h e  C o u r t  h a s  c h o s e n  t o  i m p o s e  t h e  d e a t h  p e n a l t y  b e c a u s e  t h e  
c o n t i n u e d  e x i s t e n c e  o f  t h i s  d e f e n d a n t  p o s e s  a  c o n s t a n t  t h r e a t  t o  
a l l  a r o u n d  h i m ;  a n d  b e c a u s e  o n l y  t h e  m o s t  s e r i o u s  p u n i s h m e n t  i s  
a p p r o p r i a t e  f o r  s u c h  a n  a t r o c i o u s ,  d e p r a v e d  and h e i n o u q  c r i m e  a s  
t h e  o n e  c a n m i t t e d  by t h i s  d e f e n d a n t .  A s  t h e  C o u r t  h a s  i n d i c a t e d ,  
i t  c o u l d  f i n d  n o t h i n g  i n  m i t i g a r i o n  w h i c h  w o u l d  o u t w e i g h  t h e  
a g g r a v a r e d  c i r c u m s t a n c e s  of t h i s  c r i m e  and t h i s  d e f e n d a n t .  
CONCLUSION 
T h a t  t h e  d e a t h  p e n a l t y  s h o u l d  b e  i m p o s e d  on t h e  d e f e n d a n t  
for  t h e  c a p i t a l  o f f e n s e  oE w h i c h  h e  was c o n v i c t e d .  
ENTERED t h i s  7 t h  d a y  of D e c e m b e r ,  1982 .  
Andrew Schwam 
D i s t r i c t  J u d g e  
EXHIBIT 2 
(Amended Information) 
STEPHEN L CALHOUN ~ o ! I  S l ,  f { l ~ ,  
P r o s e c u t ~ n g  A t t o r n e y  DEPUTY J o h n  A Swayne 
County  o f  C l e a r w a t e r  r 4 < f  I, 
P o s t  O f f i c e  Eox 1742 r#?~ 
O r o f i n o .  Idaho  83544 
B Y  d- o i r l u i u  
T e l e p h o n e  (208)  4 7 6  5611 
I N  THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF I D A H O .  I N  AND FOR TIIE Cr3:lNTY OF CLEARWATER 
STATE OF I D A H O .  1 CASE 110. 8495 
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GENE FRANCIS STUART 1 
S t e p h e n  L .  C a l h o u n ,  P r o s e c u t i n g  A t t o r n e y  i n  and f o r  t h e  
County o f  C l e a r w a t e r .  f o r  and i n  b e h a l F  o f  t h e  S t a t e  o f  I d a h o ,  
comes i n t o  t h e  above  e n t i t l e d  C o u r t  i n  t h e  y e a r  1 9 8 2 ,  and 
g i v e s  t h e  C o u r t  t o  u n d e r s t a n d  and be in fo rmed  t h a t  t h e  above-  
named d e f e n d a n t .  Gene F r a n c i s  S t u a r t  ' , i s  a c c u s e d  
b y  t h i s  I n f o r m a t i o n  o f  t h e  c r i m e  of  1 s t  Degree  Murder 
and p r i o r  t o  t h e  f i l i n g  o f  t h i s  I n f o r m a t i o n .  a  p r e l i m i n a r y  e x a n i -  
n a t i o n  was he  1.d b e f o r e  a  Judge o f  t h e  a b o v e - e n t i t l e d  
C o u r t .  and was h e l d  t o  answer  t o  t h e  s a i d  D i s t r i c t  C o u r t  f o r  
t h e  above-named c r i m e  commi t ted  a s  f o ~ i o w s :  
T h a t  Gene F r a n c i s  S t u a r t  o f  O r o f i n o ,  I d a h o ,  on o r  a b o u t  
t h e  1 9 t h  day o f  S e p t e m b e r  1 9 8 1 ,  a t  O r o f i n o ,  i n  t h e  County 
o f  C l e a r w a t e r ,  S t a t e  o f  I d a h o .  t h e n  and t h e r e  b e i n g ,  d i d  
t h e n  and t h e r e  u n l a w f u l l y  and f e l o n ~ o u s l y  k i l l  a  human 
b e i n g .  w i t h  t h e  i n t e n t i o n a l  a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  t o r t u r e  t o  s a i d  
human b e i n g ,  to w i t :  t h a t  t h e  s a i d  Gene F r a n c i s  S t u a r t  
d i d  s t i k e  and  h i t  R o b e r t  M i l l e r ,  a human b e l n g ,  r e p e a t e d l y  
w i t h  t h e  i n c e n t  t o  c a u s e  s u f f e r i n g  o r  t o  s a t i s f y  some s a -  
d i s t i c  i n c l i n a t i o n  o f  t h e  s a i d  Gene F r a n c i s  S t u a r t ,  t h e r e b y  
i n f l i c t i n g  g r e a t  b o d i l y  i n j u r y  upon R o b e r t  P l i l l e r  and m o r t a l l y  
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woundinp R o b e r t  M i l l e r ,  f r o m  whrch wounds t h e  s a i d  Rober t  
M i l l e r ,  a  t h r e e  y e a r  o l d  b o y ,  s i c k e n e d  and  d l e d  r n  t h e  
County o f  C l e a r w a t e r ,  S t a t e  o f  I d a h o ,  on  t h e  1 9 t h  day o f  
Sep tember  2981.  
A l l  of  which  i s  c o n t r a r y  t o  S e c t i o n  1 8 - 4 0 0 1 ,  18-4003 of 
t h e  I d a h o  Code. 
PART 11. 
S t e p h e n  L .  C a l h o u n ,  P r o s e c u t i n 8  A t t o r n e y  i n  a n d  f o r  t h e  
County of  C l e a r w a t e r .  f o r  and i n  behaLf  o f  t h e  S t a t e  o f  
I d a h o .  comes i n t o  t h e  a b o v e - e n t i t l e d  C o u r t  a n d  a l l e g e s  
t h a t  Gene F r a n c e s  S t u a r t  r s  a  p e r s i s t e n t  v i o l a t o r  w i t h i n  
t h e  meaninp o f  S e c t i o n  19-2514 o f  t h e  I d a h o  Code and 
s h o u l d  b e  s e n t e n c e d  a s  a  p e r s i s t e n t  v i o l a t o r  f o r  t h e  
r e a s o n  t h a t  Gene F r a n c i s  S t u a r t  h a s  b e e n  p r e v i o u s l y  con- 
v i c t e d  o f  t h r e e  ( 3 )  f e l o n i e s  a s  f o l l o w s :  
1 .  T h a t  t h e  s a i d  Gene F r a n c e s  S t u a r t  was c o n v i c t e d  
o f  t h e  c r i m e  o f  R a p e ,  a f e l o n y ,  commit ted i n  R a v a l l i  
Countzy. S t a t e  o f  Montana ;  c o n v i c t e d  on t h e  2 6 t h  day o f  
November o f  1973 upon a  p l e a  of g u i l t y  a s  e v i d e n c e d . b y  
a n  o r d e r  d a t e d  t h e  1 4 t h  day  o f  J u n e  1 9 7 4 .  
2 .  T h a t  t h e  s a i d  Gene F r a n c e s  S t u a r t  was c o n v i c t e d  
o f  t h e  c r i m e  o f  U n l a w f u l l y  Obtaining T e l e p h o n e  S e r v i c e s  
FI i thou t  t h e  I n t e n t i o n  t o  Pay  and T h e f t .  a  f e l o n y :  con- 
v i c t e d  by e n t e r i n g  a p l e a  o f  g u i l t y  on  t h e  7 t h  day o f  
J u n e  o f  1974 and  a  Judgment  s i g n e d  t h e  1 4  dav o f  J u n e  
1974 i n  and f o r  R a v a l l i  C o u n t y ,  S t a t e  o f  Montana .  
3 .  T h a t  t h e  s a i d  Gene F r a n c e s  S t u a r t  was c o n v i c t e d  
o f  t h e  c r i m e  o f  v i o l a t i o n  o f  t h e  Uniform C o n t r o l l e d  Sub- 
s t a n c e s  Act by  a f i n d i n g  o f  g u i l t y  on t h e  4 t h  day of  J u n e  
1981 a s  e v i d e n c e d  i n  a  Judgment and s e n t e n c e  o f  t h e  Su-  
p e r i o r  C o u r t  o f  t h e  S t a t e  o f  Wastlington i n  and  f o r  t h e  
County o f  K i n g .  d a t e d  t h e  4 t h  day  of  J u n e  o f  1981 .  
A l l  o f  which  i s  c o n t r a r y  t o  S e c t i o n  1 9 - 2 5 1 4  o f  t h e  I d a h o  
Code 
& d p L  
STEPHEM L .  CALHOUN 
P r o s e c u t i n g  A t t o r n e y  
- 
STATE OF IDAHO 1 
) s s  
C o u n t y  o f  C l e a r w a t e r )  
S t e p h e n  L .  C a l h o u n ,  b e i n g  f i r s t  d u l y  s w o r n .  d e p o s e s  and 
s a y s  t h a t  h e  knows t h e  c o n t e n t s  o f  t h e  f o r e g o i n g  I n f o r m a t i o n  
a n d  v e r i l y  b e l i e v e s  t h e  same t o  b e  t r u e  a s  h e r e i n  s e t  f o r t h  
P r o s e c u t i n g  A t t o r n e y  
d ,  
SUBSCRIBED and  SWORN t o  b e f o r e  me t h i s  X d a y  o f  F e b r u a r y  1982 
,~LLL=N /YPJAM+ 
wftees %-i?&pE 
C l e r k  o f  t h e  D i s t r i c t  C o u r t  
STATE ' S  bJITNESSES 
D e l o r e s  Adams Plar i p a y  Cone Nick A l b e r s  
S h e r i  D a l l y  J e a n  F a c k e n t h a l l  R o b e r t  Cihak MD 
J o h n  F l o y d  MD L e s l i e  Gombus MD Douglas  Graves  
K a t h y  Hunt T h e r e s a  J a c o b s o n  J o y c e  K a i s e r  
C h a r l i e  K e l t n e r  J e s s  Mechl ing  R e t s y  McCrosky 
D e n n i s  McCrosky K a t h y  M i l l e r  C a r o l  Mort imer  
V i c k i  (Owens) N e l s o n  J o a n  P a r e  S h a r o n  P r u e s s l e r  
Dav id  R i c h a r d s o n  Cindy  R i c h a r d s o n  Angie  Rupg 
B e t h  S m i t h  Mike l ? i l s o n  B .  D o u ~ l a s  \ J a l k e r  
Dona ld  T .  Reay MD Ann B r a d l e y  R o b e r t  Rears  
Ken S t u k o r  J o h n  P r y a n t  S c o t t  Palmer  
K a r l  May Debbie  H a s s e n o e r h r l  V i c k i e  Ba tey  
B e l e n d a  Brown S a n d r a  S t u a r t  Yvonne T u r n e r  
Brandy  S h a l e  S u s a n  P e t e r s o n  J a n e t  J o h n s o n  
B o n n i e  J e n n i n p s  
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Idaho State Bar No. 2854 J 
Capital Habeas Unit ,, kus I+ ..... :i 'U  
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IN TIIE DISTRICT COURT OF TIIE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TIIE 
STATE OF IDAIIO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
GENE FRANCIS STUART 1 case N O  S/JZ+~~Z?/L~~ 
Petitioner, 1 
1 AFFIDAVIT I N  SUPPORT OF 
v. 1 PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION 
1 RELIEF AND / OR WRIT 01; HABEAS 
1 CORPUS 





STATE OF IDAHO, 1 Case No. 8495 
Plairitiff 1 
1 AFFIDAVIT I N  SUPPORT OF 
v. 1 RlOTIOIV TO CORRECT ILLEGAL, 
1 SENTENCE, TO VACATE 
GENE FRANCIS STUART ) SENTENCE OF DEATII AND FOR 
Defendant. 1 NEW SENTENCING TRIAL 
STATE OF IDAHO 1 
: S S  
County of Latali 1 
I, Joan M. F~sher, counsel for the P e t i t i o n e r ,  a person over e~gllteen years of age and 
competent to test~fy, and ni~ndful  of the penalt~es of  perju~y,  and In compl~ance ~ s r ~ t h  Idaho Code 
$19-27 19(5)(a) say and declare as follows: 
AFFIDAk'IT IN SUf'POKT O F  PETITION F O R  POST-CONVICTION KE1,IEF ANIjIOK WKI7' O F  I iAUEAS COIZPUS; RIOTION 
T O  C O R R E C T  ILLEGAI- SENTENCE.  'TO X'ACATE SENTENCE: O F  IjEATH. A N D  FOR NE\\' SEN'TENCINC 'I'lilAl, - 1 
1. 1 am and have been the court-appointed counsel for Petitioner since January 18,2002, and 
as such am fully hrniliar with the facts and c~rcumstances urrounding Petitioner's 
convictions and sentences which are challenged herein, 
2. That 1 am familiar with the record of the case and law surrounding the issues ra~sed 
herein. 
3.  The doc~lments attacl~ed to the Petition are true and correct copies of the orig~nal 
documents filed In the underlying conviction, State ofldaho vs. Gene Francis Stuart, 
Gleanvater County Case No. 8495. 
4. The facts raised in the Petition for Post-conv~ction Rel~ef, and Motions to Correct Illegal 
Sentence, to Vacate Sentence of Dcath and For New Sentencing Trial are true and correct 
to the best of my knowledge. 
DATED this J day of August, 2002. 
/' day of August, 2002 SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL IJJSTRlCT D? THE STATE 
OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ELEARWATER 
GENE FRANCIS STUART, 1 CASE NO. SP02-00109 
> 
Petitioner, ) CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
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GENE FRANCIS STUART, 1 
) 
Defendant. ) 
I, Sue K. Summerton, Deputy Clerk of the above entitled Court, hereby certify that a 
true and correct copy of the Petition for Post-Conviction Relief andlor Writ of Habeas 
Corpus and Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence, to Vacate Sentence of Death and for New 
Sentencing Trial and supporting Affidavits, were delivered on the 5'h day of August, 2002. 
to the following: 
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I hereby certify that on the gth day of August, 2002, 1 caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing Cert~ficate of Delivery, by method indicated below, and 
addressed to the following. 
Joan M. Fisher 
Federal Defender 
201 N. Main 
Moscow, ID 83843 
(mailed) 
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John A. Swayne 
Clearwater County Prosecutor 
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THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TI-IE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
GENE FRANCIS STUART, 1 
1 Case No.. 8495 
Petitioner-Appellant, 1 
1 ORDER FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES 
VS. 1 
1 
STA'I'E OF IDAHO, 1 
1 
Defendant-Respondent. ) 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the fees in this matter in the amount of $884.87 at 
the rate of $100 00 per hour be and the same hereby are approved and payable to Randall, 
Blake & Cox, P.A. 
DATED THIS /9%ay of August, 2002 
ORDER FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES - 1 - 
JOHN A, SWAYNE 
ISBN: 1985 
Prosecuting Attorney 
County of Clearwater 
Post Office Box 2627 
Orofino, Idaho 83544 
Telephone: (208) 476-56 1 1 
Fax: (208) 476-9710 
Deputy: Denise L. Rosen 
ISBN: 4163 
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BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL - I 
COMES NOW, JOHN A. SWAYNE, Prosecuting Attorney for Clearwater County, 
State of Idaho, and do hereby submit this brief in support of the State's Motion 
for Summary Dismissal. 
BACKGROUND 
Stuart was convicted in Latah County by jury of the charge of first degree 
murder by torture and was sentenced to death by District Judge Andrew 
Schwam in December, 1982. Stuart appealed his conviction on several 
grounds, one of which was the assertion that under the Eighth Amendment, 
the jury should have been responsible for the sentencing phase. State v. 
Stuart, 110 ldaho 163, 715 P.2d 833 (1985), p. 175. Stuart's conviction for 
first degree murder and death sentence were affirmed by the Supreme Court, 
State v. Stuart, 11 0 ldaho 163, 71 5 P.2d 833 (1 985), the court specifically ruling 
against him on the jury involvement in sentencing issue. 
Stuart filed his first petition for post conviction relief. The Supreme Court, 
Stuart v. State, 118 ldaho 865, 801 P.2d 1216 (1990), upheld the District Court's 
denial of relief on the first petition. 
Stuart then filed second petition based on allegation of interference with 
attorney client communications based upon allegations of newly discovered 
evidence. The Supreme Court, 1 18 ldaho 932, 801 P.2d 1283 (1 990), reversed 
denial of relief by the District Court . After an evidentiary hearing on remand, the 
Supreme Court, 127 ldaho 806,907 P.2d 783 (19952, again remanded. After the 
second hearing on remand, the Second Judicial District Court, Clearwater 
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FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL - 2 
County, Ron Schilling, J., ruled that Stuart's constitutional rights were not 
violated by recording conversations between defendant and his attorney. Stuart 
appealed this decision and in Stuart v. State, 136 ID 490, 36 P3d 1278 (2001 ) 
the ldaho Supreme Court denied Stuart relief. 
In Stuart v. States 128 ID 436, 914 P 2d 933 (1996), Stuart filed a third 
petition, a motion under ldaho Rules of Civil Procedure. This was characterized 
by the ldaho Supreme Court as a post conviction action. The supreme court 
ruled against retroactive application of its decision in State v. Tribe, [ 123 ID 721, 
853 P.2d 87 (1987), to Stuart because Stuart's case was final when Tribe was 
decided. 
After the United States Supreme Court decision in R i n ~  v. Arizona, (122 
S.Cf. 2428 (20021, Petitioner filed the current actions, his fourth post conviction 
action. 
ARGUMENT 
Because The Claims Raised in Stuart's Successive Petition For Post-Conviction 
Relief Were Known Or Reasonablv Could Have Been Known When He Filed His 
First Petition For Post-Conviction Relief, This Court Must Dismiss His Latest 
Successive Petition 
A. Introduction 
Stuart raises a number of claims all based upon the United States Supreme 
Court's decision in Ring, supra. Issued June 24, 2002, which held that the Sixth 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
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Amendment requires statutory aggravating factors be found by juries. Prior to the 
holding in, m, the United States Supreme Court's ruling on jury determination of 
sentencing was set out in Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, (1990). Although an 
Eighth Amendment question of jury sentencing was raised and decided against 
Stuart on direct appeal State v. Stuart, 1 10 ldaho 163, 71 5 P.2d 833 (1 985), p. 
175. , Stuart claims because he allegedly could not have prevailed on this Sixth 
Amendment claim until was issued and has filed his successive petition less 
than forty-two days after was issued, he has met the requirements of 
I.C. 6 19-271 9 for filing a successive petition. 
I..C. 5 19-2719 imposes a jurisdictional bar if Stuart's successive petition 
does not meet the stringent requirements of I.C. 6 19-2719(5). Irrespective of 
whether he could have "prevailed" prior to m, Stuart has failed to meet the 
"heightened burden" of I.C. !$ 19-2719(5) and has failed to make the prima facie 
showing that issues raised in his successive petition fit within the narrow exception 
provided by the statute. 
B. Stuart's Successive Petition For Post-Conviction Relief Is Governed By 
ldaho Code !$ 19-2719(5) 
I .C. 5 19-271 9 sets forth special appellate and post-conviction procedures 
in all capital cases. Capital post-conviction proceedings, like non-capital post- 
conviction proceedings, which are governed by the Uniform Post-Conviction 
Procedure Act (UPCPA), are civil in nature and governed by the ldaho Rules of 
Civil Procedure. Pizzuto v. State, 127 ldaho 469,470, 903 P.2d 469 (1995), I.C. 
§ 19-2719 does not eliminate the applicability of the UPCPA in capital cases, but 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL - 4 
acts as a modifier and "supersedes the UPCPA to the extent that their provisions 
conflict." McKinney v. State, 133 ldaho 695, 700, 992 P.2d 144 (1999); Pizzuto, 
127 ldaho at 470. 
Specifically, I.C. 3 19-2719 provides a capital defendant one opportunity to 
raise all challenges to the conviction and sentence in a post-conviction relief petition 
which must be filed within forty-two days after entry of judgment. State v. Rhoades, 
120 ldaho 795, 806, 820 P.2d 665 (1991). The only exception is provided in I.C. § 
19-2719(5), which permits a successive petition "in those unusual cases where it 
can be demonstrated that the issues raised were not known and reasonably could 
not have been known within the time frame allowed by the statute." Creech v. 
State 
- 1  - Idaho , P.3d , 2002 WL 1225040, *2 (2002). If a capital 
defendant fails to comply with the specific requirements of I.C. 5 19-271 9, including 
the time limits specified, the issues are "deemed to have [been] waived" and "[tlhe 
courts of ldaho shall have no power to consider any such claims for relief as have 
been so waived or grant any such relief." I.C. 6 19-271 9(5); Creech, 2002 WL 
1225040. 
A capital defendant who brings a successive petition for post-conviction relief 
has a "heightened burden and must make a prima facie showing that issues raised 
in that petition fit within the narrow exception provided by the statute." Pizzuto, 127 
ldaho at 471. Failure to meet the requirements of I.C. 6 19-2719(5) mandates 
dismissal of the successive post-conviction petition. Fields v. State, 135 ldaho 286, 
289-91, 17 P.3d 230 (2000). Stuart, in fact, filed three post conviction procedures 
prior to filing this action. 
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Additionally, claims which were not known or which could not have 
reasonably been known within forty-two days of judgment "must be asserted within 
a reasonable time after they are known or reasonably could have been known." 
Paz v. State, 123 ldaho 758, 760, 852 P.2d 1355 (1993); McKinney, 133 ldaho at 
701. If the petitioner fails to comply with each of the requirements detailed in I.C. 
9 19-271 9(5), the petition must be summarily dismissed. I.C. 5 19-271 9-271 9 State 
v. Beam, 115 ldaho 208, 213, 766 P.2d 678 (1988), cerf. denied, 489 U.S. 1073, 
109 S.Ct. 1360, 103 L.Ed.2d 827 (1989)-2719 Murch v. Mottram, 409 U.S. 41, 93 
S.Ct. 71, 34 L.Ed.2d 194 (1972)-2719 Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 108 
S.Ct. 1981, 100 L. Ed.2d (1 988)-2719-2719; Pizzuto, supra; Lankford v. State, 127 
Idaho 100, 897 P.2d 991 (1 995); m, supra; Fetterlv v. State, 121 ldaho 41 7, 825 
P.2d 1073 (1991). The court has also historically followed the requirements of I.C. 
§ 19-2719, strictly and regularly affirming the district courts' dismissal of successive 
capital post-conviction claims because of Petitioners' failure to meet the narrow 
exceptions of I.C. $j 19-2719(5), including the pleading requirements of 
I.C. 55 19-271 9(5)(a) and (b). See Fields, supra; Pizzuto v. State, 134 ldaho 793, 
10 P.3d 742 (2000); Sivak v. State, 134 ldaho 641, 8 P.3d 636 (2000); McKinney, 
supra. 
B. Stuart Has Failed To Make A Prima Facie Showinq That His Successive 
Post-Conviction Claims Were Not Known Or Reasonablv Could Not Have 
Been Known When He Filed His Petition For Post-Conviction Relief 
Stuart did raise a jury involvement in sentencing on his direct appeal and the 
ldaho Supreme Court ruled against him. State v. Stuart, 110 ldaho 163, 715 P.2d 
833 (1 985), p. 175. The issue was one that was routinely raised in death penalty 
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cases. State v. Creech, 670 P. 2d 463 (1983). Obviously, because the claim 
whether bas& on Sixth or Eighth Amendment challenges had been previously 
raised by Stuart as well as other defendants, it is not a new or original defense 
position, but one of new interpretation. The argument was known or reasonably 
could have been known prior to Stuart's filing of the instant petition and as stated 
in Stuart's direct appeal, were clearly known or reasanably could have been known 
when Stuart filed his first post-conviction petition. 
Stuart's argument on direct appeal and today are that a jury should have 
weighed aggravating1 mitigating factors. It is the same argument whether the jury 
role was to do the whole of sentencing or be just limited to weighing those factors. 
The procedural effect of either position, whether raised as a Sixth amendment or 
Eighth amendment argument, is essentially the same. That the matter was 
addressed during the original appeal is clear, particularly when Justice Bistline and 
Justice Huntley's dissenting opinions are reviewed. 
Stuart contends he exercised "due diligence" in bringing the instant claims 
because he "could not have prevailed on the issue earlier due to the erroneous 
constitutional analysis applied by the Idaho Supreme Court which prevailed until the 
United States Supreme Court recognized the longstanding constitutional infirmities 
of excluding the jury from its constitutional fact-finding function in the factual 
elements ..... which expose a person convicted of first degree murder to death." 
(#SP 02-00109, Petition, p.7), However, Stuart's claim misconstrues 
I.C. 5 19-2719(5); the question is not whether Stuart could have "prevailed," but 
whether he knew or reasonably could have known the claims when he filed his first 
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petition for post-conviction relief. Obviously, the fact that Stuart raised the jury 
sentencing issue on his direct appeal, even if on different grounds, shows he was 
aware of the arguments. 
In m, supra, the petitioner made a similar claim to justify the filing of his 
successive post-conviction petition. Fetterly claimed the "Charboneau interpretation 
of I.C. 5 19-2515 was not a claim that was known or should have been known" 
when he filed his initial post-conviction petition. In State v. Charboneau, 116 ldaho 
129, 153, 774 P.2d 299 (1 989), the supreme court concluded, "the trial court may 
sentence the defendant to death, only if the trial court finds that all the mitigating 
circumstances do not outweigh the gravity of each of the aggravating circumstances 
found and make imposition of death unjust." Because Charboneau, had not been 
issued prior to the filing of his initial post-conviction petition, Fetterly contended the 
claim was not known and could not have been known when he filed his initial 
petition. The supreme court expressly rejected Fetterly's claim, finding, "this claim 
is one 'that should be reasonably known immediately upon completion of the trial 
and can be raised in a post-conviction petition."' m, 121 ldaho at 419. 
In =, the court also discussed the question of retroactivity. Relying 
upon Griffith v. Kentuckv, 479 U.S. 314 (1987), the court explained that new 
decisions do not apply to defendants whose cases were final before the issuance 
of the new decision. Fetterly, 121 ldaho at 41 8-1 9. This basic principle of law was 
also applied to the Petitioner in Stuart v. State, 128 ldaho 436, 914 P.2d 933 
(1996). In Stuart, the petitioner sought retroactive application of the supreme 
court's holding in State v. Tribe, 123 ldaho 721,852 P.2d 87 (1987), which reversed 
a murder case because the jury was not instructed on second degree murder by 
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torture. The supreme court concluded, because Stuart's case was final when Tribe 
was issued, the court was precluded from applying Tribe retroactively. See also 
Butler v. State, 129 ldaho 899, 901, 935 P.2d 162 (1 997) [refusing to retroactively 
apply the court's holding in State v. Townsend, 124 ldaho 881, 865 P.2d 972 
(1 993)(holding that hands, other body parts, or appendages may not by themselves 
constitute deadly weapons under the aggravated assault and aggravated battery 
statutes)]. 
Stuart's appeal from his conviction, sentence and denial of post-conviction 
relief were final long before the Supreme Court issued Ring. Because was 
issued after the district court's decisions were final, Stuart cannot rely upon eina to 
meet the prima facie showing that the issues in his successive petition were not 
known or reasonably could not have been known. 
II. 
Stuart's Successive Petition Is Ex~ressly Barred By I.C. 5 19-271 9(5)(cl 
As detailed above I.C. 6 19-2719(5) provides an exception for the filing of 
successive post-conviction petitions in capital cases if the petitioner can establish 
that the "issues raised were not known and reasonably could not have been known 
within the time frame allowed by the statute." Creech, 2002 WL 1225040, *2. 
However, I.C. 5 19-271 9(5)(c) provides an exception: 
"A successive post-conviction pleading asserting the exception 
shall be deemed facially insufficient to the extent it seeks retroactive 
application of new rules of law." 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
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In his successive petition, Stuart states, "he could not have prevailed earlier 
because of the erroneous constitutional analysis applied by the ldaho Supreme 
Court until the United States Supreme Court recognized that only a jury may make 
the factual findings which make a defendant eligible for the death penalty." (#SP 
02-00109, Petition, p.7.) Stuart is trying to argue established a new rule of 
law that was not binding on the ldaho Supreme Court when it first addressed 
Stuart's claims. 
In 1990, the United States Supreme Court, relying upon prior Supreme Court 
precedent dating back to 1976, reaffirmed that the Constitution does not mandate 
juries impose a death sentence or find statutory aggravating factors prior to a death 
sentence being imposed. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 647-49 (1990). Not 
until m, did the Supreme Court expressly overrule Walton. m, 122 S. Ct. at 
2443. 
Stuart is seeking the retroactive application of a new rule of law. Because 
I.C. 6 19-271 9(5}(c) expressly prohibits successive post-conviction petitions seeking 
the retroactive application of new rules of law, Stuart's successive post-conviction 
petition must be dismissed. 
Even If Pled As A Rule 35 Motion, Stuart's Petition Is Barred By I.C. !j 19-271 9 
Stuart attempts to avoid the pitfalls of I.C. $j 19-2719(5) by also raising his 
successive claims under the guise of a motion under I.C.R. 35. I.C.R. 35, in 
relevant part, reads as follows: 
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The court may correct an illegal sentence at any time and may 
correct a sentence that has been imposed in an illegal manner within 
the time provided herein for the reduction of sentence. 
However, I .C. $ 19-271 9(4) expressly states: 
"Any remedy available by post-conviction procedure, habeas 
corpus or any other provision of state law must be pursued according 
to the procedures set forth in this section and within the time 
limitations of subsection (3) of this section." 
In State v. Beam, 121 ldaho 862, 864, 828 P.2d 891 (1992), the defendant 
claimed his sentence was illegally imposed because the district court failed to weigh 
each aggravating circumstance against all mitigating circumstances in accord with 
Charboneau, supra. Without addressing whether Beam's claim even constituted 
an illegal sentence, the supreme court examined the apparent conflict between 
I.C.R. 35 and I.C. 19-2719, and concluded: --
"Because of the unique nature of the death penalty, as 
provided in chapter 27, title 19, ldaho Code, as well as the stringent 
constitutional protections afforded to a person sentenced to death, we 
hold that I.C. 5 19-2719(3), which, in turn, creates, defines, and 
regulates a primary right, is a substantive rule. 
Therefore, we conclude that the forty-two (42) day time 
limitation of I.C. 5 19-2719(3) applies to claims of illegality of a 
sentence of death. " 
Because Stuart failed to file his successive claims pursuant to the time limits 
of I.C. 5 19-2719, his Rule 35 motion fails. 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL - 11 
IV. 
This Court Is Without Jurisdiction To Hear Stuart's Case As A Writ Of Habeas 
Corpus 
Stuart further attempts to avoid I.C. 6 19-271 9 by alternatively captioning his 
successive claims under the guise of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. 
Assuming without conceding the claims in Stuart's successive petition can even be 
raised in a petition for writ of habeas corpus, this court is without jurisdiction to hear 
Stuart's claims. 
I.C. 5 19-4202 expressly grants original jurisdiction to consider a petition for 
writ of habeas corpus to the ldaho Supreme Court or "The district court of the 
county in which the person is detained." In m, supra, the district court dismissed 
a habeas claim based upon the length and conditions of the petitioner's 
confinement. On appeal, the ldaho Supreme Court dismissed Row's claim because 
she filed the petition in Ada County, but was being detained at the Pocatello 
Women's Correctional Center. Id., 135 ldaho at 580. 
As detailed in Stuart's successive petition, he is being detained at the ldaho 
Maximum Security Institute in Boise, Idaho. (#SP 02-001 09, Petition, p.5.) Clearly, 
this court does not have jurisdiction to hear any claims that are part of a petition for 
writ of habeas corpus. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully submits that, because of Stuart's failure to comply with 
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the requirements of Idaho Code 5 19-271 9(5), this court must summarily dismiss his 
successive petition for post-conviction relief. That all other filings be considered as 
under I.C. 6 19-2719 and the UPCPA, not as a Rule 35 Motion or Habeas Corpus 
proceeding. 
Dated this d a y  of August, 2002 
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STATE OF IDAHO 1 
1 SS. 
County of Cleawater ) 
COMES NOW, JOHN A. SWAYNE, Prosecuting Attorney for Clearwater County, 
Idaho, and upon oath deposes and says: 
I. That he is the duly elected prosecuting attorney for Clearwater County 
and has served as prosecutor since April, 1987. 
2. That he is familiar with the above entitled cases and the record thereof. 
3. That he believes that there exists a transcribed record for the pertinent 
proceedings herein, specifically in Clearwater County Case No. 8495 and 
all appeals, post conviction proceedings subsequent thereto and that it 
would be appropriate for the court to take judicial notice thereof. That 
because of the volume of the transcribed record that the court allow state 
to attach or provide at a later date any portion thereof determined to be 
necessary or supplementary to that provided by Petitioner in his affidavit. 
4. That your affiant believes the existing record in Clearwater County Case 
No. 8495, State vs. Gene F. Stuart, would be true and accurate as would 
be the existing record in Stuart v. State 801 P. 2d 121 6; Stuart v. State 
801 P. 2d 1283; Stuart v. State 907 P. 2d 783; Stuart v. State, 914 P. 2d 
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933; and Stuart v. State, 36 P. 3"' 1278. 
DATED this 30th day of August, 2002. - 
Pros cuting ttor ey 'd L C I A a t e r  
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 30th day of August, 2002. ; 
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Residing at Orofino 
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Deputy: Denise L. Rosen 
ISBN: 4 163 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
GENE FRANCIS STUART, CASE NO. SP02-00 109 
1 
Petitioner, 1 MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL 
1 
VS. 





STATE OF IDAHO, CASE NO. 8495 
1 
Plaintiff, MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL 
VS. 
1 




COMES NOW THE STATE OF IDAHO, by and through JOHN A. SWAYNE, 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL - 1 
Prosecuting Attorney, Clearwater County, and based upon the accompanying asdavi t  moves 
pursuant to I.C. $5  19-2719(5), (1 1) and 19-4906(c) for summary dismissal of the Petition for 
Post-Conviction Relief and/or Writ of Habeas Corpus and Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence, to 
Vacate Sentence of Death and for New Sentencing Trial filed by Petitioner on August 2,2002. 
This motion is based upon the record and transcripts in: [State v. Stuart, 1 10 ID 163, 7 15 
P.2d 833, (1985); Stuart v. State, 118 ID 865, 801 P.2d 1216 (1990); Stuart v. State, 118 ID 
932, 801 P.2d 1283 (1990); Stuart v. State, 127 ID 806,907 P.2d 783, (1995); Stuart v. State, 
128 ID 436,914 P. 2d 933 ((1996); Stuart v. State, 136 ID 490,36 P. 3d 1278 (2001). The state 
specifically asks the court to take judicial notice thereof, the state's brief for summary dismissal 
filed contemporaneously with this motion, and any supporting affidavits and documents that may 
be subsequently filed by the state. 
Dated this %? day of August, 2002. 
f : , ~  -2\-j " day ek ~ i i  (- (7 +,
A.D., 20 
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JOHN A. SWAYNE ISBN: 1985 
Prosecuting Attorney 
County of Clearwater 
Post Office Box 2627 
Orofino, Idaho 83544 
Telephone: (208) 476-561 1 
Fax: (208) 476-97 10 
Deputy: Denise L. Rosen 
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STATE OF IDAHO 1 
)ss. 
County of Cleanvater 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING - 1 
IN TWE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the AFFIDAVIT TN SUPPORT 
FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL, MOTION FOR S U M M Y  DISMISSAL, and BRIEF IN 
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL in Clearwater County Case No. SP02- 
00109 and the AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF SUMMARY DISMISSAL, MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY DISMISSAL, and BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMAP,Y DISMISSAL 
in Clearwater County Case No. 8495, were mailed first class postage prepaid, via the United States 
Postal Service, to the following on the 3rd day of September, 2002. 
CAPITAL HABEAS UNIT 
Federal Defenders of 
Eastern Washington and Idaho 
Joan M. Fisher, ID Bar #2854 
20 1 North Main 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING - 2 
CAPITAL HABEAS UNIT 
Federal Defenders of 
Eastern Washington and Idaho 
Joan M. Fisher, ID Bar #2854 
20 1 North Main 
Moscow ID 83843 
Telephone: 208-883-01 80 
Facsimile: 208-883- 1472 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
GENE FRANCIS STUART, ) 
) CASE NO. SP02-00109 
Petitioner, 1 
) 
VS. 1 NOTICE OF INTENT TO FILE 
) OPPOSITION AND SUPPORTING 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) MEMORANDUM, AND 
) FWQUEST FOR HEARING 
Respondent. ) 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that in this action, Mr. Gene Stuart, Petitioner, intends to 
exercise his statutory and constitutional rights by filing an opposition to Respondent's Motion for 
Summarv Dismissal, which was filed with this Court on or about August 30, 2002, and first 
received by undersigned counsel yesterday, September 4, 2002. Additionally, Petitioner requests 
oral argument on the matters at issue. This Notice of Intent to File O ~ ~ o s i t i o n  a d Sun~orting 
Memorandum, and Request for Hearing is brought pursuant to the Idaho Code $4 19-27 19(5) 
[Special Appellate and Postconviction Proceedings in Capital Cases], 19-4907(a) [Applicability 
NOTICE OF INTENT TO FILE OPPOSITION AND SUPPORTING 
MEMORANDUM, AND REQUEST FOR HEARING - 1 
of civil statutes and rules of procedure], Idaho Criminal Rule 57(b) [post conviction proceedings 
governed by Rules of Civil Procedure] and Rule 56(c) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 
[Motion for Summary Judgment and Proceedings thereon]. It is also brought pursuant to Mr. 
Stuart's right to due process as guaranteed by the Idaho Constitution art. 1, $13, and the United 
States Constitution, amend. XIV. It is, as well, brought pursuant to Mr. Stuart's Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment which mandates that greater 
safeguards be applied to capital than non-capital guilt-innocence and sentencing proceedings. 
See, e.g., Woodson V. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) ("because death is qualitatively 
different from imprisonment, "there is a corresponding idfference in the need for reliability in the 
determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case"), and Beck v. 
Alabama, 447 U.S. 625,638 (1980)("'To insure that the death penalty is indeed imposed on the 
basis of 'reason rather than caprice or emotion,' we have invalidated procedural rules that tended 
to diminish the reliability of the sentencing determination. The same reasoning must apply to 








NOTICE OF INTENT TO FILE OPPOSITION AND SUPPORTING 
MEMORANDUM, AND REQUEST FOR A HEARING - 2 
DATED this 5 9 a y  of September, 2002. 
ESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
Attorney for Petitioner 
NOTICE OF INTENT TO FILE OPPOSITION AND SUPPORTING 
MEMORANDUM, AND REQUEST FOR A HEARING - 3 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the@ay of September, 2002, I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing document by mailing it via the United States Postal Service in 
an envelope, first class postage affixed, addressed to: 
John A. Swayne 
Prosecuting Attorney 
County of Clearwater 
P.O. Box 2627 
Orofino, Idaho 83544 
NOTICE OF INTENT TO FILE OPPOSITION AND SUPPORTLNG 
MEMORANDUM, AND REQUEST FOR A HEARING - 4 
CAPITAL HABEAS UNIT 
Federal Defenders of 
Eastern Washington and Idaho 
1 
(4 
-1 i i 4 h 
Joan M. Fisher, ID Bar #2854 ? L;?< - )..t ,i (4 , 
20 1 North Main , "-. I -' 
Moscow ID 83843 -I 
Telephone: 208-883-0 180 I . , - p b  i: 3 
Facsimile: 208-883- 1472 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
STATE OF IDAHO, 1 
) CASE NO. 8495 
Plaintiff, ) 
) 
VS. ) NOTICE OF INTENT TO FILE 
) OPPOSITION AND SUPPORTING 
GENE FRANCIS STUART, ) MEMORANDUM, AND 
) mQUEST FOR HEARING 
Defendant. 1 
1 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that in this action, Mr, Gene Stuart, Defendant, intends to 
exercise his statutory and constitutional rights by filing an opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for 
Summary Dismissal which was filed with this Court on or about August 30,2002, and received 
by undersigned counsel yesterday, September 4,2002. Additionally, Defendant requests oral 
argument on the matters at issue. This Notice of Intent to File O~position and Supporting 
Memorandum, and Reauest for Hearing is brought pursuant to the Idaho Code $5 19-2719(5) 
[Special Appellate and Postconviction Proceedings in Capital Cases], 19-4907(a) [Applicability 
NOTICE OF INTENT TO FILE OPPOSITION AND SUPPORTING 
MEMORANDUM, AND REQUEST FOR A HEARING - 1 
of civil statutes and rules of procedure], Idaho Criminal Rule 57(b) [post conviction proceedings 
governed by Rules of Civil Procedure] and Rule 56(c) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure 
[Motion for Summary Judgment and Proceedings thereon]. It is also brought pursuant to Mr. 
Stuart's right to due process as guaranteed by the Idaho Constitution art. I, 9 13, and the United 
States Constitution, amend. XIV. It is, as well, brought pursuant to Mr. Stuart's Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment which mandates that greater 
safeguards be applied to capital than non-capital guilt-innocence and sentencing proceedings. 
See, e.g., Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,305 (1976) ("because death is qualitatively -
different fiom imprisonment, "there is a corresponding idfference in the need for reliability in the 
determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific case"), and Beck v. 
Alabama, 447 U.S. 625,638 (1980)rTo insure that the death penalty is indeed imposed on the 
basis of 'reason rather than caprice or emotion,' we have invalidated procedural rules that tended 
to diminish the reliability of the sentencing determination. The same reasoning must apply to 








NOTICE OF INTENT TO FILE OPPOSITION AND SUPPORTING 





DATED t h i s 5  day of September, 2002. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
Attorney for Petitioner 
NOTICE OF INTENT TO FILE OPPOSITION AND SUPPORTING 
MEMORANDUM, AND REQUEST FOR HEARING - 3 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certifj that on the hd day of September, 2002,I caused to be served a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing document by mailing it via the United States Postal Service in 
an envelope, first class postage affixed, addressed to: 
John A. Swayne 
Prosecuting Attorney 
County of Clearwater 
P.O. Box 2627 
Orofino, Idaho 83544 
NOTICE OF INTENT TO FILE OPPOSITION AND SUPPORTING 
MEMORANDUM, AND REQUEST FOR HlEARING - 4 
IN TI-IE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAI, DISTRICT OF 
TI-IE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
GENE FRANCIS STUART. 
Petitioner-Appellant, 
VS. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
1 (;&@ 
1 Case No.: 8495 
1 






IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the fees in this matter in the amount of $521.44 at 
the rate of $100.00 per hour be and the same hereby are approved and payable to Randall, 
Blake & Cox, P.A. 
DATED THIS 3 6 %ay of December, 2002. 
- 
DISTRICT JUDGE 
ORDER FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES - 1 -  
I HEMBY CERTIFY that 
a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing was on 





to the follotving: 
Scott Chapman 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 446 
Lewiston, ID 83 501 
ORDER FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES 
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JOAN M. FXSmR , 
Idaho State Bat NO. 2854 I 
Cqitd Habeas Unit b 
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OLrVER w. L O E W  
lllkmis Statc Bar No. 6197093 
Cdpital Wabcas Unit 
Fcderd Defendem of Eastern Washirmn & Idaho 
20 1 North Maia Street 
Itfoscow, U3 83843 
208-883-0 180 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECONIl &BICLAL DISTFUCT OF THE I/ I 
STATE OF EIAEXO, IN AND M)R TBE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER jj 
GENE FRANCIS STUART, 
Petitioner, 
1 
1 Case No. SP02-00109 
V. 1 MOTION FOR LEMMXX) ADmSIOPd 







STATE OF IODAKO, 
Plsintiff, , ) Case No. M95 
1 
) MOTION FOR LIMITE:D ADMISSION 
) 
GENE FIRANCIS S'IWART, 1 
Defendant. 
Udersigxled load camel, Joan M. Fisher, moves pursuant to Idaho B.u Commission 
Motion For Limited Admission -I 
WE 222, for tbt limited aclmission of the mdersigned qlmg counsel, Oli\er W. h w y ,  to // 
I 
11 
allow him to appear for Petitioner in the above-captioned m a r  pro hac vice and to &ow hirn to 
do so without payment of any fee. 
Applying counsel, Oliver W: Loewy, certifies that he is an activc member, in good 
standing, ofrbe bar of the State of Minois; that he main- thc regular practi x of law at &e 
above-noted address as aa Assistant Federal Dcfcnder; that his practice is  limited exclusively to 
represenxiag indigent clients; and that hc is a resideut of the State of Idaho bux is not licensed to 
practice law in thc state courts of Idaho. Mr. Loewy c e ~ e s  that he has nevet previously been 
admitted under Idaho Bar Commission Rule 222 or appeared as counsel in the Idaho state courts. 
Both urulersigned cowel cWi@ that a copy of this motion hos been x:rved on all other 
pcuties to this matter and that a copy of  tfve motion ha3 been provided to the M&o State Bar. 
Local counsel, Joan M Fisher, certifies that the above i&ormation is true to the best of 
her howledge, &ex reasonable investigation, h c a l  counsel acknotyiedges that her attendmcc 
shall be required at all court p r m w  in which applying counsel appears, udess specifically 
excused by the trial judge. 
Applying counsel also moves that tht court waive the two hundred dollar ($200) fee 
g e n d l y  required for a limited. appearme. Petitioner is an indigent death row inmate w b  faa~ 
I 
previously been granted infirma pauperis status by the Idaho state courts aud tfie United States 
District Cowt for ?he District o f  Idaho. Applying counsei, Oliver W. Loesvy, generates ECI fees as 1, I/ 
l 
a result of his represm&tion of petitioner and is an attorney employed by the Capital Habeas Unit I 
of the Federal Defenders of &tern Washingtort & id ah^ ("Federal F)ehdcrs' ), which lvac, 
appointed to represent Petitioner m f edad  wurt. The Federal Defenders will trot seek payment I 
Motiorc For Limited Admi&sloa -2 
J$D M. Fisher 
Appl3kg Counsel 
, 7 J ' )I I 
t 7 - 
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I 
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CERTmCATE OF SERVICE 
hereby certify that on the -day of February, 2003, I 
d to be served a tnte and correct copy of the foregokg document by the method indicated 
bclovv, &st clarrs postage prepaid where applicable, addressed to: 
John A, Swayne U.S. Mail 
Clmater  County Prosecuting Attorney Hand Delivery 
P.O. Box 2627 - Facsimile 
Oroho,  ID 83544 - Oved&t Mail 
JOAN M. FISHER 
Idaho State Bar No. 2854 
Capital Habeas Unit 
Federal Defenders of Emtern Washington & Idaho 
20 1 N. Main 
Moscow. ID 83843 
Telephone: (208) 883-0 180 
Facsimile: (208) 883- 1472 
Attorney for Petitioner Gene F. Stuart 
IN THE BISTMCT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN ANT) FOR CLEARWATER COUNTY 
GENE F U N C I S  STUART, 1 Case No. SP02-00109 
Petitioner, 
1 
1 PETITIONER'S RESPONSE IN 
v. 1 OPPOSITION TO MOTION 
1 FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL OF 
STATE OF IDAHO, 1 PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION 
Respondent. 1 RELIEF AND/OR WRIT OF HABEAS 
) CORPUS 
Gene Francis Stuart ("Petitioner"), through counsel, files this opposition to Respondent's 
Motion For S u m a r y  Dismissal of Mr. Stuart's August 2, 2002, Petition For Post-Conviction 
Relief And/or Writ Of Habeas Corpus. Together with this Response, Mr. Stuart is filing a 
response to Respondent's motion to summarily dismiss Mr. Stuart's August 2,2002, Motion To 
Correct Illegal Sentence, To Vacate Sentence Of Death And For New Sentencing Trial. See 
Petitioner's Response In Opposition To Motion For Summary Dismissal Of Rule 35 Motion. For 
the reasons set forth below, this Court should deny Respondent's motion to summarily dismiss 
Mr. Stuart's Idaho Code Section 19-27 19 petition. 
PETITIONER'S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY DISMISSAL OF PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION 
RELIEF AND/OR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS- 1 
BACKGROUND 
Mr. Stuart has been held in prison under sentence of death for nearly a quarter century, much of it 
in isolation, even though he has never been convicted by a jury of an offense for which death is a 
permissible sentence. Far from hyperbole, this flows directly from recent United States Supreme 
Court decisions clarifLing that because aggravating circumstances must be found to exist before a 
defendant may be sentenced to death, they are elements of the offense for which death is an 
allowable penalty and must, therefore, be found to exist (or not) by a jury. In Mr. Stuart's case, a 
jury did not find any aggravating circumstance to exist. Consequently, Mr. Stuart's jury did not 
convict him of an offense for which death was an allowable penalty. 
There are several related reasons why this Court should grant Mr. Stuart relief: the 
charging document, a prosecutor's information, failed to include the aggravating factor elements 
relied on at trial; no preliminary hearing determination was made that there was substantial 
evidence upon the aggravating factor elements relied on at trial; at trial, the jury did not 
determine that Mr. Stuart had the requisite mens rea, Eizmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 477 (198 l), a 
fact necessary to death being an allowable penalty; the jury did not determine that any 
aggravating circumstance outweighed the mitigating circumstances; and the jury did not 
determine that the mitigating circumstances did not make the imposition of death unjust.' 
'For each of these reasons, considered cumulatively and severally, the trial court was 
without subject matter jurisdiction to impose a death sentence. Hays v. State, 1 13 Idaho 736, 739, 
747 P.2d 758, 761 (Ct.App. 1987)("A jurisdictional defect exists when the alleged facts are not 
made criminal by statute, or where there is a failure to state facts essential to establish the offense 
charged. State v. Grady, 89 Idaho 204,404 P.2d 347 (1 965); State v. Cole, 3 1 Idaho 603, 174 
P. 13 1 (198 1); I.C.R. 7(b)."), a r d ,  1 15 Idaho 3 15,3 16 766 P.2d 785, 786 (Idaho 1988)("we 
PETITIONER'S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY DISMISSAL OF PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION 
RELIEF AND/OR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS- 2 
Mr. Stuart raised each of these claims in the petition commencing this case. Shortly 
before hk. Stuart filed the petition, the United States Supreme Court held that "[clapital 
defendants, no less than non-capital defendants . . . are entitled to a jury determination of any fact 
on which the legislature conditions an increase in their maximum punishment." Ring v. Arizona, 
122 S. Ct. 2428,2432 (2002). Before Ring, the Idaho Supreme Court consistently rejected the 
claim that the federal and state constitutions require that capital sentencing in Idaho involve a 
jury. See, e.g., State v. Charboneau, 1 16 Idaho 129, 774 P.2d 299, reh'g denied (1989). Ring 
compelled the Idaho Supreme Court to reverse course, demonstrating that its earlier position was 
mistaken because grounded in a misreading of United States Supreme Court precedent. State v. 
Fetterly, 137 Idaho 729, 730, 52 P.3d 874, 875 (2002)(vacating death sentence and remanding 
concur with the decision of the Court of Appeals"). Since Mr. Stuart was sentenced to a penalty 
greater than authorized for non-capital first degree murder, his sentence "is void as to the excess 
if the valid portion is severable from that portion which is void." State v. Jeppesen, 138 Idaho 
71, -, 57 P.3d 782,787 (Idaho 2002). "The issue of whether a court has exceeded its subject 
matter jurisdiction is never waived and purported judgments entered by that court, acting without 
subject matter jurisdiction, are void and subject to collateral attack. Sierra Life Inszrrance Co. v. 
Granata, 99 Idaho 624,626,586 P.2d 1068, 1070 (1978); see Andre v. Morrow, 106 Idaho 455, 
459, 680 P.2d 1355, 1359 (1 984)[void judgment is nullity and "can be collaterally attacked at any 
time"]." State v. Heyrend, 129 Idaho 568, 571, 929 P.2d 744, 747 (Ct. App. 1996). Even where 
the Uniform Post Conviction Act, Idaho Code Section 4901 -491 1, is generally unavailable as an 
avenue to relief, "it is available to cure fundamental errors occurring at the trial which affect 
either the jurisdiction of the court or the validity of the judgment, even though these errors could 
have been raised on appeal." Smith v. State, 94 Idaho 469,474,491 P.2d 733, 738 (Idaho 1971). 
In any event, where jury instructions omit an essential element of a crime, a guilty verdict is not a 
conviction for that oBense. State v. Nunez, 133 Idaho 13,20,981 P.2d 738, 745, reh'g denied 
(Idaho 1999). If the instructions include all the elements of a lesser crime, the defendant must be 
sentenced within the range of penalties for that offense. Id. 
PETITIONER'S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY DISMISSAL OF PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION 
RELIEF AND/OR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS- 3 
for resentencing on ground that Ring requires that a jury "make factual findings of the 
aggravating factors necessary to the imposition of a death sentence"). 
Years ago, on direct appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court rejected Mr. Stuart's argument that 
his sentencing proceedings were constitutionally defective. State v. Stuart, 1 10 Idaho 163, 7 15 
P.2d 833, reh 'g denied (Idaho 1986). Vindicated in principle by Ring and Fetterly, Mr. Stuart 
now seeks vindication in practice. 
W i l e  Ring most obviously affects sentencing proceedings, it plainly reaches further. For 
together with its companion case, Hurris v. Unitedstates, 122 S.Ct 2406 (2002), Ring makes 
clear that any facts necessary to increase the maximum allowable sentence are elements of the 
offense. Ring, 122 S.Ct. at 2443 (because aggravating factors necessary to the imposition of a 
death sentence "operate as 'the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense' the Sixth 
Amendment requires that they be found a jurym)(citation omitted).; Harris v. United States, 122 
S.Ct. at 2409 (Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and O'Connor & Scalia, JJ.)("those facts 
setting the outer limits of a sentence, and of the judicial power to impose it, are the elements of 
the crime for the purposes of the constitutional analysis") and at 2323-24 ("[Ilf the legislature, 
rather than creating grades of crimes, llas provided for setting the punishment of a crime based on 
some fact ... that fact is also an element")(Thomas, J., joined by Stevens, Souter, & Ginsberg, 
JJ.). As Justices Scalia, Rehnquist, and Thomas very recently agreed: 
Our decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), 
clarified what constitutes an "element" of an offense for purposes 
of the Sixth Amendment's jury-trial guarantee. Put simply, if the 
existence of any fact (other than a prior conviction) increases the 
maximum punishment that may be imposed on a defendant, that 
PETITIONER'S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR 
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fact ... constitutes an clement, and must be found by a jury beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Id., at 482-484,490. 
[Flor purposes of the Sixth Amendment's jury-trial guarantee, the 
underlying oEense of "murder7' is a distinct, lesser included 
offense of "murder plus one or more aggravating circumstances": 
Whereas the former exposes a defendant to a maximum penalty of 
life imprisoment, the latter increases the maximum permissible 
sentence to death. Accordingly, we held that the Sixth Amendment 
requires that a jury, and not a judge, find the existence of any 
aggravating circumstances, and that they be found, not by a mere 
preponderance of the evidence, but beyond a reasonable doubt. 
[Ring], at [2443] (slip op. at 22-23). 
Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 123 S.Ct. 732, 739 (2003)(Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., & 
Thomas, J.). 
Just as Ring reaches beyond sentencing proceedings, so do Mr. Stuart's claims. For 
example, Mr. Stuart's jury was not instructed on and did not find any of the aggravating factor 
elements of capital first-degree murder. Instead, the jury was instructed on and found only the 
elements of non-capital first degree murder. Mr. Stuart, then, must be resentenced for non- 
capital first degree murder. See State v. Nunez, 133 Idaho 13,20, 98 1 P.2d 738, 745, reh'g 
denied (Idaho 1999)(where jury instructions omitted essential element of felony but included 
elements of misdemeanor, conviction was for misdemeanor; "accordingly, Nunez should have 
been sentenced only for misdemeanor convictions [and] [tlhe case will be remanded for this 
purpose."); State v. Roll, 1 18 Idaho 936, 801 P.2d 1287 (Ct.App. 1990)(judgment of conviction 
reversed without any harmlessness analysis where essential element of offense omitted from jury 
PETITIONER'S RESPONSE I N  OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR 
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instructions). Because the jury did not convict Mr. Stuart of capital murder, the trial court was 
without jurisdiction to impose a death sentence on Mr. Stuart. See supra at 2 n. 1 
Ring demonstrates that Mr. Stuart was correct and should have been granted relief nearly 
twenty years ago because his jury did not find beyond a reasonable doubt that any aggravating 
circumstance necessary to the imposition of a death sentence existed. Despite the Idaho Supreme 
Court's recognition of this fact, Fetterly, Respondent nevertheless seeks to prevent Mr. Stuart 
from obtaining relief. It does so by inviting the Court to improperly apply two technical 
procedural rules to deny Mr. Stuart the statutorily provided right to seek postconviction remedies 
(I.C. $319-4201 et seq. & 19-2719)." 
First Respondent argues that because Mr. Stuart's claims were known or reasonably -9 
could have been known when he filed his initial postconviction petition, Idaho Code Section 19- 
271 9(5) bars this Court from considering those claims. See Brief in Support of Motion for 
Summary Dismissal at 3-9. Respondent's argument fails because it is based on an interpretation 
of Idaho Code Section 19-27 19(5) which is plainly wrong: It (I) yields "absurd" results, (2) 
violates the Idaho Constitution's separation of powers requirement, (3) violates the Idaho and 
2 Mr. Stuart's petition is styled, "Petition For Post-Conviction Relief And/or Writ Of 
Habeas Corpus." In enacting Idaho Code Section1 9-4901, the Idaho legislature expressly 
provided that the Uniform Post-Conviction Act ("UPCPA") "takes the place of all other common 
law, statutory, or other remedies heretofore available for challenging the validity of the 
conviction or sentence." Id. at (b)(italics added). Mr. Stuart's Petition for Writ of Habeas 
Corpus, therefore, is effective only to the extent that the UPCPA restricts the constitutionally 
guaranteed right of habeas corpus. Respondent nowhere suggests that its arguments against Mr. 
Stuart's Idaho Code Section 19-2719 petition extend to his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. 
With regard to the latter petition, Respondent relies exclusively on its specious assertion that 
Idaho Code Section 19-4202 applies to the instant claims. See inpa at Section 111. 
PETITIONER'S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR 
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federal constitutional prohibition against expostfacto laws, and (4) violates state and federal due 
process and equal protection guarantees. 
Second, Respondent argues, because Mr. Stuart seeks the retroactive application of a new 
rule of law, his pending petition is Eacially insufficient under Idaho Code Section 19-27 19(5)(c). 
Id. at 9, et seg. This argument fails, too. Mr. Stuart asks only that the long settled legal rule on 
which Ring relies be applied to his case, not any purported new rule of law, so Idaho Code 
Section 19-271 9(5 )(c) has no application. Even if Ring did announce a new rule of law relevant 
here, it must be applied to Mr. Stuart's case because (1) Idaho Code Section 19-271 9(5)(c) 
violates the Idaho Constitution separation of powers requirement; (2) Idaho law prohibits 
retroactively applying Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5)(c); (3) applying Idaho Code Section 19- 
2719(5)(c) in the instant case would violate the United States Constitution's Supremacy Clause 
(U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2); (4) applying Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5)(c) here would violate 
Petitioner's due process and equal protection rights as guaranteed by the United States 
Constitution and Idaho Constitution; (5) applying Idaho Code Section 19-27 19(5)(c) to Mr. 
Stuart's case would violate the United States Constitution's and Idaho Constitution's 
prohibitions against expost facto laws; and ( 6 )  equity requires applying Ring to the iustant case. 
Even if Mr. Stuart's claims do rest on a new rule of law and even if the state procedural 
bars Respondent invokes are otherwise applicablk and constitutionally valid, those bars do not 
apply where, as here, the rule in question is a federal constitutional requirement and substantive, 
not procedural, in nature. 
PETITIONER'S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR 
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In addition to urging the Court to deny Mr. Stuart relief by improperly invoking 
inapplicable and unconstitutional technical procedural rules to preclude reaching the merits of the 
claims raised pursuant to Idaho Code Sections 19-490 1-49 1 1 & 19-27 19, Respondent urges the 
Court to dismiss those same claims broughtpursuant to his constitutionally guaranteed right to 
habeas corpus. See Idaho Const., art. I, 95. Specifically, Respondent asserts that Idaho Code 
Section 19-4202 provides that this Court is without jurisdiction to consider the claims brought as 
a habeas petition and that, therefore, the Court should dismiss Mr. Stuart's Petition For Writ Of 
Habeas Corpus. See Brief In Support Of Motion For Summary Dismissal at 12. This argument 
fails, however, because Section 19-4202 has no application to the instant matter. See inpa at 
Section 111. 
The remainder of this response addresses each of the State's arguments, taking them out 
of order to more easily show why they are wrong. In particular, Section I, explicates Ring and, 
along the way, shows why that case did not announce any relevant new rule and, therefore, why 
Idaho Code Section 19-27 19(5)(c)'s anti-retroactivity rule has no application to the instant case. 
Section I1 shows the various flaws in Respondent's argument that Idaho Code Section 19- 
2719(5) bars Mr. Stuart's claims. Section 111 demonstrates that Respondent's argument is wrong 
that the Court is without jurisdiction to consider claims brought by Mr. Stuart pursuant to I s  
constitutional right to habeas corpus. 
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I. BECAUSE MR. STUART SEEKS TO H A l T  A LONG EXISTING 
CONSTITUTIONAL mQUImMENT,  NOT A NEW RULE OF LAW, 
APPLIED TO HIS CASE, IDAHO CODE $19-2719(5)(~) DOES NOT BAR 
HIS CLAIM. 
From its earliest days, this nation has stood constant in requiring that juries decide 
whether the prosecution has proved beyond a reasonable doubt each element of a charged 
offense. It has long been the law, as well, that any fact which must be found to exist for death to 
be within the range of permissible sentences is an element of the offense. See in@a 10-20. Mr. 
Stuart seeks the application of these long established legal rules to his case. 
Respondent, however, argues that the Court should dismiss Mr. Stuart's petition because 
it purportedly seeks retroactive application of a new rule of law supposedly announced in Ring. 
To reach this conclusion, Respondent relies on Idaho Code Section 19-271 9's anti-retroactivity 
subsection: 
A successive post-conviction pleading asserting the exception shall 
be deemed facially insufficient to the extent it seeks retroactive 
application of new rules of law. 
Id. at 5(c). Respondent's argument fails for two reasons. &t, Mr. Stuart seeks to have long 
settled, not new, law applied to his case. Ring is helpful to Mr. Stuart's argument because it 
demonstrates that the Idaho Supreme Court's earlier rejection of Mr. Stuart's claim was based on 
a misreading of United States Supreme Court precedent. It is not Ring, though, but the 
constitutional requirement on which Ring relies-that a criminal defendant is entitled to have a 
jury determine whether the prosecution has proved beyond a reasonable doubt each element of 
the charged offense-which shows that the Idaho Supreme Court's earlier rejection of Mr. Stuart's 
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claim was wrong and which Mr. Stuart seeks to have applied to his case. Because the relevant 
rule of law is not new, it falls outside the prohbition against "retroactive application of new rules 
of law." IC 19-271 9(5)(c) (italics added). Second, Idaho Code Section 19-27 19's application 
here would violate various Idaho constitutional and statutory requirements. 
A. Idaho Code Section 2719(5)(c) Has No Application To The Instant Case 
Because Ring Did Not Announce A New Rule of Law. 
This subsection demonstrates that Ring did not announce a new rule of law. Along the 
way, it shows that the Idaho Supreme Court misread United States Supreme Court precedent and, 
therefore, mistakenly rejected Mr. Stuart's claim that he was entitled to jury involvement in his 
sentencing proceedings. The subsection concludes that because Mr. Stuart seeks the application 
of long settled law to his case, Section 19-2719(5)(c)'s prohibition does not apply and this Court 
should, therefore, reject it as a ground for summary dismissal. 
The same constitutional requirement driving Ring has driven thiB nation's criminal law 
jurisprudence since it adopted the Bill of Rights in 1791 and has played a similarly vital role in 
Idaho criminal law.) In particular, criminal defendants are entitled to have a jury determine 
3See, e.g., Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,478 (2000) ("As we have, unanimously, 
explained, . . . the historical foundation for our recognition of [the principle that a defendant is 
constitutionally entitled to a jury determination of whether he is guilty of every element of the 
charged offense] extends down centuries into the common law.")(citing to United States v. 
Gaudin, 5 15 U.S. 506,5 10-1 1 (1995))' and State v. Bennion, 112 Idaho 32, 37, 730 P.2d 952, 
957 (Idaho 1986)(noting that "[tlhis Court has long and often. . .stated that Article 1, 97 
preserves the right to jury trial as it existed at the common law and under the territorial statutes 
when the Idaho Constitution was adopted"). 
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whether the prosecution has proved beyond a reasonable doubt each element of the charged 
oRense. Excepting the mechanical application of that principle to the Supreme Court's corrected 
understmding of Arizona's capital sentencing scheme, Ring contained nothing new. 
Respondent asserts that Ring is "new" because it oversules Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 
639 (1990). Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Dismissal at 10. At issue in Walton was 
whether Arizona capital defendants were entitled to a jury decision on whether sentencing 
aggravating factors were proved. The Wallon court answered in the negative, but it did so based 
on its erroneous understanding that under Arizona state law "the aggravating factors [were not] 
'elements of the offense [but, rather,] 'sentencing considerations' guiding the choice between life 
and death. [ Walton,] 497 U.S., at 648, 1 1 0 S.Ct. 3047 (internal quotation marks omitted)." Ring, 
122 S.Ct. at 2437. 
The issue in Walton was not whether the existence of aggravating circumstances per se 
must be decided by a jury, but, instead, whether aggravating circumstances "in Arizona [were] 
'elements of the offense."' WaZton, 497 U.S. at 648. The Supreme Court decided the question by 
looking to whether the aggravating circumstances were a prerequisite to death being a 
permissible sentence or, alternatively, whether they were mere considerations in choosing which 
sentence to impose within a range including death. The Walton Court misinterpreted the Arizona 
statutory scheme as assigning aggravating circumstances to the sentencing considerations role. 
Specifically, the Court misconstrued the Arizona scheme as making aggravating circumstances 
mere "'standards to guide the making of [the] choice' between the alternative verdicts of death 
and life imprisonment." Walton, 497 U.S. at 648 (quoting Poland v. Arizona, 476 U.S. 147, 156 
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(1 986)). Ten year later, the Arizona Supreme Court expressly rejected the Walton court's 
understanding of Arizona law and held that under that state's law and absent a finding of an 
aggravating circumsmce, death and life imprisoment were not "the alternative verdicts." In 
particular, the Arizona Supreme Court held that under state law at the time of Walton and at the 
time of its decision, capital defendants may not be sentenced to death absent a finding of at least 
one aggravating circumstance. Slate v. Ring, 200 Ariz. 267,279,25 P.3d 1139, 1 151 (Ariz. 
2001)('Tn Arizona, a defendant cannot be put to death solely on the basis of a jury's [guilty] 
verdict[.] . . . [Tlhe death sentence becomes possible only after the trial judge makes a factual 
finding that at least one aggravating factor is present."). 
In reviewing the state court decision in Ring, the United States Supreme Court 
acknowledged that it had misconstrued Arizona state law in Walton. Ring, 122 S.Ct. at 2436. 
With its corrected understanding of Arizona state law, the United States Supreme Court 
necessarily reached a different result than it had in Walton. Specifically, the court held that "we 
overrule Walton to the extent that it allows a sentencing judge, sitting without a jury, to find an 
aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of the death penalty." Ring, 122 S.Ct. at 
2443. But Ring did not create a new legal rule. Rather, it merely applied the same constitutional 
requirement relied on in Walton-that criminal defendants are entitled to a jury determination 
whether the elements of the charged offense have been proved- to the correct understanding of 
Arizona state law. CJ Harris v. United States, 122 S.Ct. 2406,2419 & 2423-24 
(2002)(Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., 0' Connor & Scalia, JJ.)(Thomas, J., dissenting, 
joined by Stevens, Souter, & Ginsberg, JJ.)(facts necessary to render a defendant eligible for a 
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particular sentence are elements of the offense). These same reasons demonstrate that Ring's 
holding that Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), applies to capital cases was not a new 
legal rule. For in excluding capital cases from the scope of its primary holding (that in non- 
capital eases any fact necessary to increasing the maximum permissible sentence must be found 
by a jury), Apprendi explicitly assumed that a finding of an aggravating circumstance was not a 
prerequisite to a sentence of death. Id. at 496-97. 
Nor did Walton break new ground by noting that any fact which must be found to exist 
for death to be within the range of permissible sentences is an element, not merely a sentencing 
consideration. Indeed, it employed this point of distinction in reliance on (and quoting fiom) 
Poland v. Arizona, 476 U.S. 147 (1986), which, in turn, invoked Bullington v. Missouri, 45 1 U.S. 
430 (1 98 1). In Bullington, the Court had used the same point of distinction to hold that the 
defendant there could not be sentenced to death on retrial because he had received a life sentence 
at his initial trial. The point of distinction d r a m  in Poland between elements and sentencing 
considerations, then, reached back to at least 198 1 when Bullingkon was decided and was not a 
new rule of law. Consequently, the rule that, in capital schemes like Idaho's, a jury must 
determine the existence of aggravating circumstances was not a new rule of law at the time Mr. 
Stuart's conviction became final and should, therefore, be applied to the instant case. 
The Idaho Supreme Court bas long misunderstood the constitutional mandate on which 
Ring is based as not including the right to a jury decision on whether aggravating circumstances 
exist. Respondent acknowledges, "[tlhe issue was one that was routinely raised in death penalty 
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cases. State v. Creech, 105 Idaho 362,670 P.2d 463 (1983)." In addition to being routinely 
raised, it was uniformly rejected in decisions short on analysis and long on conclusions. 
In Creech, the first Idaho case to address the issue, the court concluded that no jury 
participation whatsoever in sentencing proceedings was constitutionally required. At first blush, 
this holding appears to have nothing to do with a jury's findings on whether the prosecution has 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt the elements of the offense. After all, those findings are 
generally made prior to the jury verdict and before sentencing proceedings commence. 
Nevertheless, because Idaho's capital statutory scheme provided that the determination whether 
aggravating circumstances existed be made during sentencing proceedings, Creech's holding 
directly implicates the constitutional mandate driving Ring.4 The Creech court reached its 
sweeping conclusion based, first, on its "deem[ing sentencing] consistency . . . a key 
requirement" and, second, on language from Profitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242,252 (1976), to the 
effect that the United States Supreme Court has never suggested that jury sentencing is 
constitutionally required and that judicial sentencing should lead to greater consistency in capital 
sentencing. Based on this consistency discussion alone, the court held "that there is no federal 
4 However "capital sentencing proceedings" is defined, the legal principle remains that the 
United States Constitution guarantees a jury finding of any fact necessary to death being a 
permissible sentence. As Ring and Harris make clear, legal principles are what matter, not 
labels. Ring, 122 S.Ct. at 2439 ("If a State makes an increase in a defendant's authorized 
punishment contingent on the finding of a fact, that fact-no matter how the State labels it-must 
be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt."); Harris, 122 S.Ct. at 2414 ("certain types of 
facts, though labeled sentencing factors by the legislature [may] nevertheless fbe] 'traditional 
elements' to which these constitutional safeguards were intended to applyn)(quoting Patterson v. 
New York, 432 U.S. 197,211 n. 12 (1977)). 
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constitutional requirement of jury participation in the sentencing process and that the decision to 
have jury participation . . . is within the policy determination of the individual states." Creech, 
105 Idaho at 373,670 P.2d at 474.5 
Creech took a logical misstep by inferring that no jury participation in sentencing is 
constitutionally required from ProfJitt's suggestion that jury sentencing has never been held to be 
constitutionally required. The inference is flawed because it assumes that jury participation 
cannot be required unless jury sentencing is required as well. Of course, this assumption is 
mistaken and there was no legal precedent suggesting otherwise. Creech effectively threw out 
the baby with the bath water. 
Until recently, however, the Idaho Supreme Court consistently relied on its error in 
Creech to hold that there was no federal constitutional right to any jury participation in Idaho 
capital sentencing proceedings.6 It continued to do so even after Adamson v. Rickefls, 865 F.2d 
101 1 (9' Cir. 1988)(en banc). There, the Ninth Circuit held that because, in the Arizona capital 
sentencing scheme under review, proving an aggravating circumstance was a prerequisite to 
' ~ r e e c h  also rejected the contention that judicial sentencing results in sentences whch do 
not reflect community norms. Id. 
6See State v. Sivak, 105 Idaho 900, 902, 674 P.2d 396, 398 reh'g denied (1983)("The 
specific question of the constitutionality of a scheme not involving a jury in the sentencing 
process has never been decided by [the United States Supreme Court]. Indeed, the Supreme 
Court has recognized, in dicta, that judge sentencing should lead to greater consistency in 
sentencing[.]"); State v. Beam, 109 Idaho 6 16, 620, 71 0 P.2d 526,530 (1 985)(citing to Creech, 
Sivak, and Spaziano for the proposition that neither the federal nor state constitutions require "the 
participation of a jury in the sentencing process in a capital case"); State v. Fetterly, 109 Idaho 
766, 772, 7 10 P.2d 1202, 1208 reh'g denied (1 986)(citing to Creech and Sivak for proposition 
that jury-imposed death sentences not constitutionally required). 
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death as an allowable penalty, the aggravating circumstance is an element of the offense and, 
therefore, a jury must determine whether it exists. The Ninth Circuit based its holding in part on 
McMllan v. Penn.sylvmia, 477 U.S. 79 (1986). At issue there was whether a Pennsylvania 
defendant's visibly possessing a firearn1 was an element or a sentencing factor. The Supreme 
Court held that it was a sentencing factor. The court repeatedly noted that an important 
consideration in deciding the question was that, under Pennsylvania Law, the visible possession 
finding effected no change in the maximum possible sentence. This lent strong support to the 
Ninth Circuit's conclusion in Adamson, because in stark contrast to the role "visible possession" 
played in the Pennsylvania sentencing scheme at issue in McMillan, Arizona's capital sentencing 
scheme provided that an aggravating circumstance had to be found to exist before a sentencing 
judge could consider imposing a death sentence. 
When Adamson was decided and until very recently, Idaho's capital sentencing scheme 
was structurally identical to Ari~ona 's .~  Idaho Code Section 19-25 15 provided that unless the 
prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of an aggravating circumstance, a 
capital defendant could not be sentenced to death.' If the prosecution failed to meet its burden in 
that regard, the defendant had to be sentenced to a penalty less than death. Id. As with the 
Arizona sentencing scheme examined by the Ninth Circuit in Adamson, in Idaho a finding that an 
7After the United States Supreme Court decision in Ring, Arizona amended its capital 
scheme to bring it into compliance with federal constitutional requirements. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. 
$13-703.01. Just last week, Idaho amended its death penalty statutory scheme in response to 
Fetterly and Ring. See Idaho Code $9 18-4004, 19-2 126, 19-25 15, and 19-25 15A (2003). 
'This requirement is retained in Idaho's amended statute. I.C. $ 19-25 15(3)(b). 
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aggravating circumstance existed increased the maximum sentence to which the defendant was 
exposed. I.C. tj 19-25 15(c) ("a sentence of death shall not be imposed unless . . . the court finds 
at least one (1) aggravating circumstance").' Consequently, like Arizona's, Idaho's capital 
sentencing scheme stood (and continues to stand) in stark contrast to the sentencing scheme at 
issue in McMillan. 
With such striking similarities between Arizona's and Idaho's sentencing schemes, 
Adamson might have seemed the end of the story. But in State v. Charboneau, 1 16 Idaho 129, 
774 P.2d 299. reh'g denied (1989), the Idaho Supreme Court rejected the Ninth Circuit's analysis 
and continued to uphold without modification Idaho's capital murder statutory scheme. In 
particular, the Charboneau Court misread Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984), as 
implicitly holding that the federal constitution did not require jury participation in capital 
sentencing proceedings even though Spaziano did not consider that question: 
[In Spaziano,] the United States Supreme Court held: 
. . . [Dlespite its unique aspects, a capital sentencing 
proceeding involves the same fundamental issue 
involved in any other sentencing proceeding-a 
determination of the appropriate punishment to be 
imposed on an individual. The Sixth Amendment 
never has been thought to guarantee a right to a jury 
determination of that issue. 
[Id., 468 U.S.] at 454 [citations omitted]. 
These comments were made by the Court in considering death 
penalty sentencing by a judge under a statute substantially similar 
'Though another version of that statute was in effect during Mr. Stuart's 1982 trial, it 
contained the same requirement. I.C. tj 19-25 15(1977)("a sentence of death shall not be imposed 
unless the court finds at least one ( I )  statutory aggravating circumstance"). 
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to our statute and with findings of aggravating circumstances 
similar to those here. This convinces us that the Court inherently 
considered and rejected the premise of the Ninth Circuit in 
Adamson: that a capital sentencing statute that requires the judge to 
determine aggravating circumstances takes this factual element out 
of the jury's hands in violation of the sixth amendment [sic]. 
Charboneau, 1 16 Idaho at 147,774 P.2d at 3 17. 
In reaching this conclusion, the Charboneau court painted with much too broad a brush. 
Spaziano held that in capital proceedings, a jury need not determine the sentence. Nowhere did 
the Spaziano court address whether there is a right in capital proceedings to a jury determining 
the existence of "aggravating circumstances," which are in fact elements of the crime of the 
greater offense of capital murder. 
In the course of rejecting Adamson, the Idaho Supreme Court did not address the Ninth 
Circuit's observations regarding McMillarz. It thereby declined to confront the inconsistency 
between its own and United States Supreme Court decisions on the jury's constitutionally 
mandated role in capital proceedings. This allowed the Idaho Supreme Court to continue 
ignoring the distinction between jury sentencing and jury participation in sentencing 
proceedings. ' 0 ~ '  
''The right at issue here is the right to have a jury determine whether the prosecution has 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt that one or more aggravating circumstances exists. Mr. Stuart 
has already noted that even though it may initially seem that a jury's finding aggravating 
circumstances (elements of the offense) has nothing to do with sentencing proceedings, Idaho's 
statutory scheme compels a different conclusion. See supra, at 14 n.4 & accompanying text. 
"In State v. Paz, 1 18 Idaho 542,798 P.2d 1, reh'g denied (l990), the Idaho Supreme 
Court relied on Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 636 (1 989), for its purported additional support. 
Specifically, the court held that Hildwin "upheld judge finding [ofl aggravating circumstances 
authorizing [the] death penalty." Paz, 118 Idaho at 553, 798 P.2d at 12 n. 2. In Hildwin, 
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In short, fiom the first time it confronted the issue until Ring, the Idaho Supreme Court 
has misread relevant United States Supreme Court authority. Ring did not announce any new 
rule of law. Rather, it clarified that in jurisdictions with capital schemes providing that death is a 
permissible sentence only after an aggravating circumstance is found to exist-the right to a jury 
determination beyond a reasonable doubt of each element of a charged offense means that there 
is a right to a jury decision on whether an aggravating circumstance exists. 
Mr. Stuart seeks the application to his case of the long settled constitutional mandate that 
a jury decide whether the prosecution has proved beyond a reasonable doubt each element of the 
charged offense, including the aggravating circumstances which are prerequisite to death being a 
however, the Supreme Court interpreted the relevant state law to provide that a defendant 
convicted of first degree murder was eligible for a death sentence even before any finding of an 
aggravating circumstance. Id. at 638 ("Under Florida law, that offense is a capital felony 
punishable by death or life imprisonment."). Thus, Hildwin analogized the Florida aggravating 
circumstance to the Pennsylvania visible possession of a firearm at issue in McMilEan: neither 
fact increased the maximum penalty for the offense of conviction. Therefore, neither "is . . . an 
element of the offense [and each] is 'a sentencing factor that comes into play only after the 
defendant has been found guilty.' Id. at 86." Hildwin at 640. 
In State v. Rhoades, 12 1 Idaho 63, 822 P.2d 960 (1 991), the court relied on Clemons v. 
Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738 (1 990), for the proposition that "[alny argument that the constitution 
requires that a jury impose the sentence of death or make the findings prerequisite to imposition 
of such a sentence has been soundly rejected by prior decisions of this Court." JcJ. at 79, 976. 
Whether a jury is required to (a) impose a sentence or (b) make the factual findings necessary to 
imposing a death sentence are much broader questions than whether a jury is required to make 
factual findings necessary to death being within the range of permissible sentences. 
Consistent with its finding support in its overly broad interpretation of the Supreme Court 
cases discussed supra, the Idaho Supreme Court later found support in Walton for its continuing 
to hold that jury participation is never constitutionally required in capital sentencing proceedings. 
See, e.g., State v. Pizzuto, 1 19 Idaho 742, 769, 8 10 P.2d 680, 707, reh g denied (1 99 1); State v. 
Rhoades, 120 Idaho 795, 8 10, 820 P.2d 665, 680 reh g denied (Idaho 199 1); State v. Rhoades, 
121 Idaho 63,79, 822 P.2d 960,976 second reh g denied (1992). 
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permissible sentence and, therefore, in fact are elements of the greater offense of capital murder. 
Until F e ~ e r l y ,  ldaho courts have declined to apply this mandate based on their misreading of 
United States Supreme Court precedent. Because Mr. Stuart is not seeking the retroactive 
application of some new rule of law, ldaho Code Section 19-27 19(5)'s purported bar to such 
applications cannot bar this Court fiom entertaining his petition. Consequently, the Court should 
deny the State's request to summarily dismiss Petitioner's application. 
B. Even If Ring Does Announce a New Rule of Law, It Must Be Applied to 
Mr. Stuart's Case. 
Even if the Court rejects Mr. Stuart's argument in Section A, there are four reasons why 
Idaho Code 5 19-271 9(5)(c) may not be applied to block Mr. Stuart's claims. First, that statutory 
provision violates the Idaho Constitution's separation of power requirement. Second, Idaho law 
prohibits retroactively applying Idaho Code 5 19-27 19(5)(c), to this case. Third, that statutory 
provision's application in the instant case would violate the United States Constitution's 
Supremacy Clause. Fourth, equity requires granting relief to Mr. Stuart. 
Of course, determining that Idaho Code 5 19-27 19(5)(c) can not be applied to prevent the 
retroactive application of the rule-that under Idaho's capital scllen~e juries must determine 
whether aggravating circumstances exist-to this case does not end the inquiry. Rather, the 
question remains whether the rule should be retroactively applied to the case at bar as a matter of 
state law. Section 111, inJFa, at 46-50, applying the test first articulated in State v. Whitman, 96 
Idaho 489, 53 1 P.2d 579 (1 975), and long adhered to by the Idaho Supreme Court, shows that the 
rule should be applied to this case. 
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1. Idaho Code Section 1 9-27 19(5)1c) violates the Idaho Constitution 
separation of powers requirement. 
Idaho Code Section 19-27 19(5) provides: 
(5) If the defendant fails to apply for relief as provided in this 
section and within the time limits specified . . . [tlhe courts of 
Idaho shall have no power to consider any such claims[.] 
(a) An allegation that a successive post-conviction petition may be 
heard because of the applicability of the exception for issues that 
were not known or could not reasonably have been known shall not 
be considered unless the applicant [meets certain other enumerated 
requirements]. 
(c) A successive post-conviction pleading asserting the exception 
shall be deemed facially insufficient to the extent it seeks 
retroactive application of new rules of law. 
I.C. 5 19-27 19(5). This provision plainly aims to limit the jurisdiction of district courts. 
However, legislative efforts to restrict the district court's jurisdiction violate the Idaho 
Constitution. 
The Idaho Constitution, Article V, Section 20, confers original jurisdiction on the district 
court to hear all cases. Idaho Constitution, Article 11, Section 1, mandates that the powers of the 
three governmental branches remain separate, and, more particularly, Article V, Section 13, 
specifically prohibits legislative restriction of judicial jurisdiction: 
The legislature shall have no power to deprive the judicial 
department of any power or jurisdiction which rightly pertains to it 
as a coordinate department of the government; but the legislature 
shall provide a proper system of appeals, and regulate by law, 
when necessary, the methods of proceeding in the exercise of their 
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powers of all the courts below the Supreme Court, sofar as the 
same may he done without conflict with the Constitution[.] 
Id (italics added). Of course, as the Supreme Court has long held, a Section 19-27 19 petition "is 
a proceeding entirely new and independent from the criminal action which led to the conviction." 
P'aradis 11. Sfate, 1 1 0 Idaho 534, 636, 71 6 P.2d 1306. 1308 (1 986). Thus, Article V, 9 13's 
reservation of power to the legislature has no application to Section 19-27 19 proceedings since 
they are not appeals. 
Idaho Code Section 19-271 9(5)(c)'s removing district court jurisdiction to consider 
postconviction claims seeking retroactive application of new rules of law violates the Idaho 
Constitution's separation of power mandate. In State v. Interest oflindsey, 78 Idaho 24 1, 246, 
300 P.2d 491, 494 (1 956), the Idaho Supreme Court struck a statute purporting to transform 
previously criminal matters of juveniles into civil matters because "[tlhe legislature, by denoting 
as a civil matter what the law has previously regarded as a felony, attemptred] to take away 
jurisdiction vested in the district court by the constitution itself, and . . . attempted to render that 
court powerless to do anything about the prosecution of such persons." Similarly, in Boise City 
v. Better Homes, Inc., 72 Idaho 441,444-45,243 P.2d 303,304 (1952), the Supreme Court held 
that "[tlhe original jurisdiction conferred upon the district court by the constitution, Art. 5, 920, 
cannot be diminished by the legislature. Const.Art. 5, §13[.]" Again, in Clemons v. Kinsley, 72 
Idaho 25 1, 256-57,239 P.2d 266,269 (1 95 1), the Court held that "[tlhe broad jurisdiction 
[created by Art. 5, 5 131 is not subject to diminution by legislative act.". The Court held the 
same thing in Robinson v. Robinson, 70 Idaho 122, 127,212 P.2d 103 1, 1033-34 (1 949). Finally, 
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in Mcklnight v. Grant, 13 Idaho 629, 637,92 P. 989,990 (1907), the Court held that, "We think 
[art. 5, 5 131 was . . . intended to preserve to the judicial department of the state government the 
right and power to finally determine controversies between parties involving their rights and 
upon whose claims some decision or judgment must be rendered or determination made." In 
short, the Idaho Supreme Court has consistently and long held that the legislature may not 
directly or otherwise restrict the district court's jurisdiction. Consequently, even if Ring does 
announce some new rule of law which Mr. Stuart seeks to have applied to his case, Idaho Code 
Section 19-27 19(5)(c) cannot stand as a bar. 
2. Idaho law prohibits retroactively aupl~inrr Idaho Code Section 19- 
27 19(5)(G). 
It is long settled "that an amendment to an existing statute will not, absent an express 
legislative statement to the contrary, be held to be retroactive in application. Johnson v. 
Stoddard, 96 Idaho 230, 526 P.2d 835 (1 974)E.l" Nebeker v. Piper Aircraft Corporation, 1 13 
Idaho 609, 614,747 P.2d 18,23 (Idaho 1987)(citations omitted). See Idaho Code Section 73-101 
("No part of these compiled laws is retroactive, unless expressly so declared.") 
Though the instant petition was filed af3er Idaho Code Section 19-27 19(5) was amended 
to include subsection (c)12, applying that statutory provision in this case would constitute a 
retroactive application. Paradis v. State, 128 Idaho 223,9 12 P.2d 1 10 (Idaho 1996), illustrates 
why. There, the lower court applied a statute enacted af3er the trial arid direct appeal were 
'*subsection (c) was amended into Section 19-27 19(5) in 1 995. 
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concluded. The Supreme Court held that the statute's application was prospective, not 
retroactive, because (1) the statute changed postconviction procedures and did not materially 
affect any substantive rights of the appellant and (2) "the statutory limitations period [for filing 
the postconviction petition] had not yet run." Id. at 227, 1 14. 
The statutory provision at issue in this case stands in dramatic contrast to the one at issue 
in Paradis. In particular, Paradis merely prescribed a procedural requirement available to every 
postconviction petitioner-that the petition be filed within a statutorily specified time. Far fiom 
prescribing a procedure available to all seeking relief, Idaho Code Section 5 19-27 19(5)(c) 
purports to raise an absolute bar to relief on any claim based on the retroactive application of a 
new rule of law. The distinction is critical. The procedural requirement at issue in Paradis 
affected no substantive rights because all postconviction petitioners could comply with it. By 
contrast, Section 1 9-27 19(5)(c) does not create mere procedural requirements. Rather, it 
precludes an entire class of substantive claims, leaving postconviction petitioners with no 
mechanism by which to assert those claims. Put another way, Section 19-27 19(5) does not 
merely "affect" this class of substantive rights, it purports to destroy them. For this same reason, 
the second ground for the Paradis court's holding has no application here. Consequently, 
applying Idaho Code Section 19-271 9(5)(c) to Mr. Stuart would constitute a retroactive 
application. 
Federal courts have noted that this same question may arise with regard to the 
Antiterrorism And Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"). While the United States 
Supreme Court has held that, as a general rule, AEDPA applies to petitions filed af3er the act's 
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enactment, it has also noted that specific AEDPA provisions may not be applied if doing so 
would have a retroactive effect. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 327-28 (1997). As the Fourth 
Circuit concluded: 
We agree with petitioner and those courts that having had cause to 
consider the question in full, have concluded that the Supreme 
court did not hold in Lindh that courts are necessnrily to apply the 
new provisions of chapter 153 to all habeas petitions filed after 
April 24, 1996 [i.e.- AEDPA's enactment date]. More particularly, 
we hold that Lindh did not foreclose-and indeed contemplated- 
continuing resort to Landgraf [i.e.-retroactivity of statutes] 
analysis in order to ensure that application of chapter 153's new 
provisions is not impermissibly retroactive in such cases. 
Mueller v. Angelone, 1 8 1 F.3d 557, 567 (4Ih Cir. 1999)(citing to In re Hansard, 123 F.3d 922, 
933 n.22 (6" Cir. 1997), and citing to In re Minarik, 166 F.3d 591 (3"' Cir. 1999), and Brown v. 
Angelone, 150 F.3d 370 (4th Cir. 1998)). See Scott v. Boos, 2 15 F.3d 940, 949 (9" Cir. 
2000)(federal prohibition against retroactive application of statute absent clear Congressional 
statement of intent looks to "parties' actions, not the date of filing"). 
Though Idaho Code Section 19-27 19(5)(c) expressly purports to absolutely bar 
postconviction petitioners' claims dependent on retroactively applying a new rule of law, it 
contains no express legislative statement that it should itself be retroactively applied. It cannot, 
then, be applied to the case at bar. 
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3. Idaho Code Section 19-27 19(5)(c)'s application would violate the United 
States Constitution's supremacy clause. 
Applying Idaho Code Section 19-27 19(5)(c) here would violate the Supremacy Clause of 
the United States Constitution. U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2. 
The Supremacy Clause . . . does not allow federal retroactivity 
doctrine to be supplanted by the invocation of a contrary approach 
to retroactivity under state law. Whatever freedom state courts 
may enjoy to limit the retroactive operation of their own 
interpretations of state law cannot extend to their interpretation of 
federal law. 
Harper v. Virginia Department ofTaxation, 509 U.S. 86, 100 (1993)(citations omitted). See 
Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 71 9, 733 (1966)(States are "entirely free to" apply a new rule 
"in a broader range of cases" than federal retroactivity doctrine allows); State v. Guzman, 122 
Idaho 98 1, 987, 842 P.2d 660,666 (Idaho 1992)("It is by now beyond dispute that this Court is 
fiee to interpret our state constitution as more protective of the rights of Idaho citizens than the 
United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the federal constitution."); Colwell v. Nevada, 59 
P.3d 463, 470 (Nev. 2002)("Teague is not controlliilg on this court other than in the n~ininlunl 
constitutional protections established by its two exceptions."); Oregon v. Fair, 502 P.2d 1 150, 
1 152 (Or. 1972)(states may decide what degree of retroactivity to give new rules, "so long as 
[they] give federal constitutional rights at least as broad a scope as the United States Supreme 
Court requires"); and Cowell v. Leapley, 458 N.W.2d 5 14, 5 17-1 8 (S.D. 1990)(rejecting Teague 
as unduly narrow for state collateral review). Federal retroactivity doctrine requires that Ring 
and Fefterly be applied to Mr. Stuart's case. 
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Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), is the seminal modern case regarding how to 
determine whether a constitutional rule of criminal procedure should be retroactively applied to 
cases already final. In Teague, a plurality of justices announced-and, later, a majority of justices 
adopted-a general rule of retroactivity with two exceptions: 
Unless they fall within an exception to the general rule, new 
constitutional rules of criminal procedure will not be applicable to 
those cases which have become final before the new rules are 
announced. 
Id. at 3 1 1. The Teague plurality described the two exceptions as follows: 
First, a new rule should be applied retroactively if it places certain 
kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of 
the criminal law-making authority to proscribe. Second, a new rule 
should be applied retroactively if it requires the observance of 
those procedures that are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. 
Id. at 307 (quotation marks and citations omitted). 
The anti-retroactivity rule and its exceptions have turned out to be complex in theory and 
difficult in application. Nevertheless, three clear principles demonstrate that the rule at issue in 
t h s  case nlust be retroactively applied to cases already final when Ring was announced. 
First, by its terns, the Teague anti-retroactivity rule applies solely to new rules. As 
shown supra, at 10-20, Ring clarified but did not announce the rule Mr. Stuart seeks to have 
applied here. That rule is long settled, not new, and the result in Ring followed inexorably from 
applying it to the Supreme Court's corrected understanding of Arizona state law. 
Second, the Teague anti-retroactivity rule applies only to constitutional rules of criminal 
procedure, not to substantive rules. Bousley v. Unitedstates, 523 U.S. 614 (1 998). This much 
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was clear long before Teague. Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333 (1974). The Ring rule is 
substantive, not procedural in nature for federal retroactivity analysis purposes. In some 
contexts the substance/procedure distinction has proved elusive, however, it is clear that for 
Teague purposes rules that "make conduct criminal" are substantive. Bousley, 523 U.S. at 621. 
Thus, where the meaning of a statute defining a criminal offense or penalty changes, Teague 
raises no bar and the statute's new meaning must be applied to all cases. Consequently, 
postconviction petitioners are entitled to relief where the meaning of the statutes under which 
they were convicted and sentenced has changed favorably for defendants. 
Bousley, a decision written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, is illustrative. There, a habeas 
petitioner sought relief from his guilty plea because, after his conviction had been affirmed on 
appeal, the statute defining the offense was held to require an element which had not been found 
by the petitioner's jury. The Supreme Court found that because the intervening decision was 
substantive, Teague did not apply and the intervening decision was retroactively applicable. 
Like the intervening decision in Bousley, Ring makes clear that capital murder in Idaho includes 
elements for which no finding of guilt was ever made in Mr. Stuart's case. See supra, at 4-6. 
Consequently, the Teague anti-retroactivity rule does not apply to cases in this posture. See Luke 
v. Battle, 565 S.E.2d 81 6 (Ga. 2002)(relying in part on Bousley, grants relief to habeas petitioner 
where, after petitioner's conviction was final, state's high court held that offense of conviction 
included new element); Montana v. Whitehorn, 50 P.3d 12 1, 127- 129 (Mont. 2002)(relying in 
part on Bousley, holds that substantive change in state law must be applied retroactively); Agee 
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v. RuL~selE, 751 N.E.2d 1043, 1047 (Ohio 2001)(relying in part on Bowley for holding that "there 
is no retroactivity issue" where case dcterrllines meaning of statute defining criminal offense). 
Third, where the new rule requires the observance of some procedure implicit in the 
concept of ordered liberty, it is fully retroactive. Even if the Ring rule-that in capital schemes 
where a finding of an aggravating factor is necessary to render a defendant eligible for a death 
sentence, a jury must determine whether the aggravating factor has been proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt-is new and procedural in nature, it requires the observance of a procedure 
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. and must be given full retroactive effect. The Supreme 
Court has clarified that this exception requires both that the rule contribute to factfinding 
reliability and that it be a watershed rule of criminal procedure. See, e.g., 0 'Dell v. Netherland, 
521 U.S. 15 1, 167 (1997), and Lamhrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 5 18, 539 (1997). 
How to discern a factfinding's reliability depends on the kind of fact at issue. Some 
findings are purely mechanical and, therefore, easily seen as correct or incorrect. For example, 
whether the weight of seized drugs or number of seized plants was correctly assessed is easily 
tested. Other findings, indeed most13, are not susceptible to straightforward testing for 
correctness. Scales exist to determine weight, but there is no "truthometer" which can be applied 
to, for example, witness' testimony to see whether the jury got the facts right.14 It is precisely 
13Some findings which appear easily tested for accuracy turn out to be otherwise. See, 
e.g., United States v. Robinson, 35 F.3d 442 (9th Cir. 1994)(discussing the subtleties of what 
constitutes a marijuana plant). 
l 4  It is for this reason that jurors are typically advised to assess a witness' credibility 
based on multiple considerations. For example, the standard jury instructions in Idaho charges 
that jurors are to use in their deliberations the "same considerations that you use in your everyday 
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because most trials involve questions of a non-mechanical factual nature that jury deliberations 
are critical. Deliberation requires discussion and consideration of contrary views, not mere vote 
counting. See, e.g., ICJI 204 ("'As jurors you have a duty to consult with one another and to 
deliberate before making your individual decisions . . . . Consult with one another. Consider 
each other's views, and deliberate . . . . Each of you must decide this case for yourself [I but . . . 
only afier a discussion and consideration of the case with your fellow jurors.") "[Olne of the 
most important functions [the] jury can perform . . . is to maintain a link between contemporary 
community values and the penal system." Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 5 10, 520 n. 15 
(1 968). See Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 23 1,237 (1 988)('"The very object of the jury system 
is to secure unanimity by a comparison of views, and by arguments among the jurors 
themselves.'")(quoting Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492, 501 (1896)); Atkins v. Virginia, 122 
S.Ct. 2242,2253 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting, joined by Scalia and Thomas, JJ)("Our opinions. . 
.recognize[] that data concerning the actions of sentencing juries . . . 'is a significant and reliable 
index of contemporary values[]' . . . because of the jury's intimate involvement in the case and 
its function of 'maintain[ing] a link between contemporary community values and the penal 
system[]"')(quoting from Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 (1977), Gregg v. Georgia, 428 
U.S. 153, 181 (1976), and Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 520 n.15). In short, determining whether a 
jury's findings of non-mechanical facts were correct is, to say the least, hard. This difficulty is 
acknowledged and reflected in blackletter law immunizing jurors from penalty for reaching 
dealings" to decide matters of credibility. Idaho Criminal Jury Instructions, No. 104. 
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factual determinations with which others may disagree, Bushell's Case, Vaughn 135, Z 24 
Eng.Rep. 1006 (C.P. 16701, and insulating jury verdicts from impeachment. See, e.g., State v. 
DeGrat, 128 Idaho 352,913 P.2d 568 (Idaho 1996)(common law and I.R.E. 606(b) exclude 
testimony impeaching jury verdict). 
Because it is, at a minimum, difficult to determine whether a jury's findings of non- 
mechanical facts are correct, it is similarly difficult to know whether a rule contributes to the 
reliability of such factfindings. What is clear, however, is that the reliability turns on 
deliberations among multiple jurors who necessarily contribute diverse perspectives to the 
discussion. Thus, with regard to non-mechanical facts, juries and judges are not 
interchangeable.'' 
Aggravating circumstances-the elements of the greater offense of capital murder which 
Ring clarified must be found by a jury-are non-mechanical facts. In Mr. Stuart's case, for 
example, the aggravating factor elements found by the court were that (1) the offense was 
"especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel," and (2) Mr. Stuart "by prior conduct or conduct in the 
commission of the murder at hand has exhibited a propensity to commit murder which will 
probably constitute a continuing threat to society." Findings Of The Court In Considering Death 
Penalty Under Section 19-2515, Idaho Code at 5, 6 (uppercase characters in original). Each of 
"See, e.g., Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U .  S. 275, 280 (1 993)("The Sixth Amendment 
requires more than appellate speculation about a hypothetical jury's action, or else directed 
verdicts for the State would be sustainable on appeal; it requires an actual jury finding of guilt."). 
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these elements is non-mechanical. Consequently, requiring that they be found by a jury 
contributes to the reliability of the factfinding. 
In addition to contributing to the reliability of factfinding, requiring that aggravating 
factor elements be found by a jury is a watershed rule on a par with the rule cited as an exemplar 
of the sort falling within the second exception, Gideon's counsel guarantee. See, e.g., 0 'Dell v. 
Netherland, 521 U.S. 15 1, 167 ( I  997)("we have cited [Gideon] as an example of the sort of rule 
falling within Teague's second exception, see Saffle [v. Parks], 494 U.S. [484,] 495 [1990In). 
The right to "trial by jury in criminal cases is fundamental to the American scheme of justice." 
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968). Indeed, that scheme's "most important 
element" is "the right to have the jury, rather than the judge, reach the requisite finding of 
'guilty."' Sullivun v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275,277 (1993)(citing Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 
5 1, 105-06 (1 895)).16 Because the Ring rule both contributes to factfinding reliability and is 
l 6  See also Blackstone's Commentaries, $ 5  349-350 (Lewis ed. 1897): 
[Tlhe founders of the English law have with excellent forecast contrived . . . that the truth 
of every accusation . . . should afterwards be confirmed by the unanimous sufiage of 
twelve of his equals and neighbors. . . . So that the liberties of England cannot but subsist, 
so long as this palladium remains sacred and inviolate; not only from all open attacks, 
(which none will be so hardy as to make) but also from all secret machinations, which 
may sap and undermine it. . . . 
Id. See also Rex v. Poole, Cases Tempore Hardwicke 23,27 (1734), quoted in Sparf v. United 
States, 156 U.S. 51,94 (1 895): 
[Ilt is of the greatest consequence to the law of England, and to the subject, that these 
powers of the judge and the jury are kept distinct; that the judge determines the law, and 
the jury the fact; and, if ever they come to be confounded, it will prove the confusion and 
destruction of the law of England. 
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fimdamental, it falls within Teague's second exception and is fully retroactive. O'Dell, 521 U.S. 
at 167 (1997), and Lambrix, 520 U.S. at 539 (1997). 
Though Ring reiterates an established rule of substantive law, even if the argument that it 
is a new procedural rule were considered, it is clear that the rule requires a procedure implicit in 
the concept of ordered liberty and, thus, falls within Teague's second exception. For these 
reasons, federal retroactivity doctrine requires that the Ring rule be applied to all cases. To the 
extent that Idaho Code Section 19-27 19(5)(c) forbids the retroactive application of Ring, it 
violates the United States Supremacy Clause. 
4. Idaho Code Section 19-25 19(5)(c) violates Petitioner's rights to due 
process and equal protection guaranteed under the United States and Idaho 
Constitutions. 
If Mr. Stuart did not stand under sentence of death, Idaho Code 19-27 19(5)(c)'s anti- 
retroactivity provision would not apply.I7 "I.C. § 19-2719 does not eliminate the applicability of 
the UPCPA to capital cases, but it supersedes the UPCPA to the extent that their provisions 
conflict." McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695, 700, 992 P.2d 144, 149 (Idaho 1999). Because of 
this difference, I.C. 19-2719(5)(c) violates Mr. Stuart's due process and equal protection rights. 
Id. 
17Under the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act ("UPCPA"), "post-conviction relief 
is not barred where new evidence is discovered, or where later case law suggests a conviction is 
unlawful." Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 766 n.12, 760 P.2d, 1174, 1182 n.12 (Idaho 1988) 
(citing I.C.5 19-4901) (emphasis added). Also, under the UPCPA, I.C. 19-4908, a claim can 
only be waived ifthe waiver is knowing, voluntary and intelligent. McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 
695, 700-01, 922 P.2d 144, 149-50 (Idaho 1999). As noted in the text, to the extent that Idaho 
Code Section 19-271 9 coliflicts with the UPCPA, the Section 19-271 9 provision governs. 
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To the extent Idaho Code section1 9-27 19(5)(c) is construed to preclude review of 
petitioner's claims, the statute is unconstitutional. It would violate Mr. Stuart's rights to equal 
protection and due process under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, 
and Article 1, Sections 2 and 13 of the Idaho Constitution, in that there is no rational basis, for 
the disparate treatment of non-capital prisoners who do not need to demonstrate the "heightened 
burden" for postconviction relief which capital petitioners must meet, e.g., Paz v. State, 123 
Idaho 758,760,852 P.2d 1355, 1357 (Idaho 1993), or meet the limitations imposed by I.C. 5 19- 
27 19(5), see, e.g., Sivak v. State, 134 Idaho 64 1, 648-49, 8 P.3d 636, 643-44 (Idaho 2000); 
Pizzuto v. State, 134 Idaho 793, 796-97, 10 P.3d 742,745-46 (Idaho 1995). Romer v. Evans, 
517 U.S. 620,631-36 (1995); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432,446-51 
(1985); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 61-63 (1982); U.S.D.A. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 535 
(1 973); Sterling H. Nelson & Sons, Inc. v. Bender, 95 Idaho 8 13, 8 15-16, 520 P.2d 860, 86 1-62 
(Idaho 1974). 
Moreover, because Idaho's statutory postconviction scheme makes available different 
mechanisms for enforcing fundamental rights-here, the right to a jury trial-depending on whether 
the petitioner stands sentenced to death, that discriminatory scheme must be assessed with strict 
scrutiny. See Van Valkenburgh v. Citizens for Term Limits, 135 Idaho 121, 126, 15 P.3d 1129, 
1 134 (Idaho 2000) (if a fundamental right is at issue, appropriate standard of review of law 
infringing on that right is strict scrutiny); Newlan v. State, 96 Idaho 71 1, 714, 535 P.2d 1348, 
13 5 1 (Idaho 1975) (strict scrutiny when statute's classification infringes upon a fundamental 
right); State v. Breed, 11 1 Idaho 497, 500, 725 P.2d 202,205 (Idaho Ct. App. 1986) (strict 
PETITIONER'S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY DISMISSAL OF PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION 
RELIEF AND/OR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS- 34 
scmtiny of statutory schemes that infringe upon a '"fmdmental right'such as voting, 
procreation, or constitutional safeguards for persons accused of crimes"). See generally Ronald 
D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak, Treatise On Constitutional Law $ 18.41 at 800-01(3rd ed. 1999) 
(''When the government takes actions that burden the rights of a classification of persons in terms 
of their treatment in a criminal justice system it is proper to review these laws under the strict 
scrutiny standard for equal protection.") 
Idaho's disparate treatment of capital as compared to non-capital postconviction 
petitioners fails under a rational basis analysis. Necessarily, then, it fails under strict scrutiny 
analysis, too. "A law which infringes on a fundamental right will be upheld only where the State 
can demonstrate the law is necessary to promote a compelling state interest." Id. The state's 
interest in expeditious handling of capital cases, the purpose of the offending provision, Idaho 
Code Section 19-271 9(5)(c), is not a sufficiently compelling interest to justify the violation of 
petitioner's fundamental right to trial by jury. 
5. Applying Idaho Code 6 19-27 19(5)(c) would violate the state and federal 
constitutional prohibitions against ex post-facto laws. 
Petitioner seeks relief from a 1982 death sentence. Idaho Code Section 19-2719 did not 
yet exist. That statute was first enacted in 1984. The state and federal constitutions each prohibit 
expost facto laws. U.S.Const. art. I, $10, cl. 1. Idaho Const. art. I, $16. Applying a law enacted 
after the commission of the crime to "make more burdensome the punishment" violates the ex 
post facto clause. Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 52 (1990). For example, in Garner v. 
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Jotzes, 529 U,S, 244 (2000), the United States Supreme Court held that increasing the interval 
between parole reconsiderations may violate the expost facto clause. Whether it does depends, 
the Court held, on whether the change "creates a significant risk" of making the punishment 
more burdensome -there, by prolonging the respondent's incarceration. Cf: Quinlan v. Idaho 
Commission For Pardons And Parole, slip op. at 5 (Ct.App. 8119102)(doctrine that Idaho 
Commission For Pardons And Parole rules are not subject to attack on expost facto grounds, 
Freeman v. Commission of Pardons And Parole, 1 19 Idaho 692, 809 P.2d 1 17 1 (Ct.App. 1991), 
cannot survive Garner). 
Here, applying Idaho Code Section 19-27 19(5)(c) to Petitioner's case would 
unquestionably make, not merely risk making, Mr. Stuart's sentence more burdensome. For 
while applying Ring would require vacating his death sentence, Fetterly, 137 Idaho at 730, 52 
P.3d at 875, blocking Ring's application would leave Mr. Stuart's death sentence in place. Death 
is a more burdensome penalty than life: "[E]xecution is the most irremediable and unfathomable 
of penalties; . . . death is different." Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399,411 (1986)Cplurality 
opinion). See Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390,405 (1993)("We have, of course, held that the 
Eighth Amendment requires increased reliability of the process by which capital punishment 
mayh be imposed."); Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1989)Cplurality op. of Rehnquist, 
C.J.)(collecting cases); id. at 21-22 nn.9-10 (Stevens J., dissenting)(collecting cases); Strickland 
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686-87 (1984); Gardner v. Floridu, 430 U.S. 349, 357, 97 S.Ct. 
1 197, 1204, 5 1 L.Ed.2d 393 (1977) Cplurality opinion); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 
280, 305, 96 S.Ct. 2978,2992,49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976) (plurality opinion); see also Furman v. 
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Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 306,92 S.Ct. 2726,2760,33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972) (Stewart, J., 
concurring). 
6. Equity requires application of Ring to Mr. Stuart's case. 
Even if the Court rejects Mr. Stuart's assertion that be is asking for the application of old 
law, Ring is a new development in support of an old claim. Under Sivak v. State, 134 Idaho 641, 
8 P.3d 636 (Idaho 2000) (Sivak V), the Idaho Supreme Court has rejected the argument that a 
previously raised claim is waived when supported by new evidence. "We must be vigilant 
against imposing a rule of law that will work injustice in the name of judicial efficiency." Id. at 
642,s P.3d at 647. C$ Coleman v. Jaggers, 12 Idaho 125, 132, 85 P. 894, 896-97 (Idaho 
1906)("Under our Constitution and statutes equitable jurisdiction exists and will be exercised in 
all cases and under all circumstances where the remedy at law is not adequate, complete, and 
certain, so as to meet all the requirements of justice."), and Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 3 19 
(1995)("the Court has adhered to the principle that habeas corpus is, at its core, an equitable 
remedy"). Here, rejecting the "new" rule under Ring would create the same sort of injustice, for 
in Fetterly the Idaho Supreme Court acknowledged that allowing a judge to determine whether 
the aggravating factor elements exist is unconstitutional under Ring. State Y. Fetterly, 52 P.3d at 
875. Equitable principles alone demand that petitioner's death sentence be vacated, as he raised 
the very point addressed in Ring in his direct appeal case years ago. 
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If the State succeeds in killing Mr. Stuart despite the fact that he previously raised the 
claim in his direct appeal, it will have achieved a gross miscarriage of justice and not merely an 
inequitable result. 
Conclusion 
For all these reasons, Idaho Code 9 19-27 19(5)(c)'s prohibition against retroactively 
applying new rules should not bar Mr. Stuart's claims. 
11. IDAHO CODE $19-2719(5)'~ UNTIMELY CLAIMS BAR HAS NO 
APPLICATION HERE. 
Respondent argues not only that Idaho Code Section 19-27 19's anti-retroactivity 
provisions bar Mr. Stuart's claims, but that they are barred by that statute's current prohibition 
against claims which were known or reasonably should have been known but were not raised in a 
timely filed initial postconviction petition. Id. at (5). Specifically, Respondent argues that 
because Mr. Stuart claimed on direct appeal that his sentencing proceedings were constitutionally 
defective, he "knew" that claim for Idaho Code Section 19-271 9(5) purposes, failed to raise it in 
his first postconviction petition, and thereby waived it. See Brief In Support Of Motion For 
Summary Dismissal at 6-7. Respondent makes this argument even as it concedes that the Idaho 
Supreme Court considered and rejected the claim on Mr. Stuart's direct appeal and considered 
such claims "routinely" in other cases. Id. In short, the State contends that because Mr. Stuart 
did not frivolously re-raise the already rejected claim in his first post-conviction petition, Idaho 
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Code Section 19-271 9(5) bars him from raising it now -his first and earliest opportunity to raise 
it after the United States Supreme Court clarified in Ring that whether aggravating circumstances 
exist is a jury question in capital schemes like Idaho's. 
As a matter of constitutional law, Respondent's position fails for several reasons. First, 
Idaho Code Section 19-4901 (a) prohibited Mr. Stuart from relitigating in postconviction claims 
already considered on direct appeal. Second, Respondent's interpretation of Idaho Code Section 
19-271 9(5) leads to absurd results and cannot, therefore, be employed to preclude the instant 
claim. Third, the amended provision on which Respondent relies, Idaho Code Section 19- 
27 19(5), cannot be retroactively applied to the instant case. Fourth, Idaho Code Section 10- 
271 9(5) violates the Idaho Constitution's separation of powers mandate. Fifth, the provision 
violates the United States Constitution's prohibition against ex post facto laws. Sixth, the 
provision violates Mr. Stuart's rights to due process and equal protection as guaranteed by the 
United States and Idaho constitutions. 
A. Idaho Code Section 4901 (a) Prohibits Relitigating In Postconviction 
Proceedings Claims Already Addressed On Direct Appeal. 
Settled Idaho law prohibits relitigating in postconviction proceedings claims already 
addressed on direct appeal. Sivak v. Sfate,143 Idaho 641, 647, 8 P.3d 636, 642 (Idaho 
2002)(exception exists to general prohibition against post-conviction claim already litigated 
where previously unavailable evidence supports the claim); Paradis v. State, 1 10 Idaho 534, 537, 
7 1 6 P.2d 1306, 13 10 (Idaho 1986)(Idaho Code Section 19-490 1 precludes claims based on 
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material facts previously presented and heard); Parsons v. State, 11 3 Idaho 421,425, 745 P.2d 
300, 304 (Ct.App. 1987)(claims which were raised on direct appeal may not be raised in 
postconviction unless based on material facts not previously available); and I.C. $19-490 1 (a)(4) 
(claims rejected on direct appeal may not be relitigated in postconviction proceedings unless 
'"here exists evidence of material facts, not previously presented and heard, that requires 
vacation of the conviction or sentence in the interest ofjustice")(italics added); and I.C. § 19- 
490 1 (b) (making plain that claims rejected on direct appeal may not be relitigated absent new 
supporting facts: "This remedy is not a substitute for. . . any appeal fiom the sentence or 
conviction."). 
Respondent concedes that the Idaho Supreme Court considered and rejected Mr. Stuart's 
claim on direct appeal. See Brief in Support Of Motion For Summary Dismissal at 6-7. 
Respondent's contention, then, that Mr. Stuart should have raised the same claim with no new 
legal or historical supporting facts contradicts settled Idaho law.'' 
B. The State's Interpretation Of Section 19-271 9(5) Fails Because It Leads 
To "Absurd" Results. 
The State asserts that Section 19-2719(5) bars Mr. Stuart's claim because he did not raise 
it in earlier postconviction proceedings. If the State's gloss is correct, Section 19-27 19 precludes 
Idaho courts from ever correcting an erroneous decision afier the judgment is final. This 
"Further, even had Mr. Stuart earlier raised the claim in postconviction proceedings, 
there is every reason to believe that the Idaho Supreme Court would have rejected it like it had 
and continued to in all the other cases raising the claim until Ring and Fetterly. 
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interpretation is plainly contrary to the legislature's express intent and its directive to interpret the 
statute so that its purpose is accomplished: "The following special procedures shall be interpreted 
to accomplish the purpose of eliminating unnecessary delay in carrying out a valid death 
sentence."I.C. $19-27 19 (italics added). By preventing courts &om correcting their earlier 
mistakes, the State's proposed construction would expedite carrying out invalid death sentences. 
Consequently, the Court should reject the State's proposed construction. 
It is true, of course, that Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5) currently provides that a 
defendant "waive[s] . . . claims for relief as were known or reasonably should have been known" 
within the time in which the statute allows for filing an initial postconviction petition. The State 
correctly notes that Mr. Stuart was aware of his claim but did not raise it in his initial 
postconviction petition. It fixther argues that to have preserved the opportunity to raise his claim 
in a successive postconviction petition, Mr. Stuart should have raised it in his initial petition. 
Yet, as the State concedes, the Idaho Supreme Court had already denied direct appeal relief on 
that claim. Consequently, on the State's interpretation, to preserve an opportunity to raise his 
claim in successive postconviction proceedings, Mr. Stuart was required to raise a frivolous 
claim in his initial postconviction petition. See I.R.C.P. 1 1 (a)(l) ("The signature of an attorney 
. . . constitutes a certificate that ... the pleading, motion or other paper . . . is warranted by existing 
law or good faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law[.] If a 
pleading, motion or other paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court upon motion or upon 
its own initiative, shall impose ...an appropriate sanction."); McKinney v. State, 992 P.2d 144, 
148, 133 Idaho 695, 699 (Idaho 1999)(state moved for sanctions for filing of allegedly frivolous 
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pleading). The State's proposed construction is, therefore, absurd and must be rejected. CJ: 
Gavica 17. lihnson, 101 Idaho 58,60,608 P.2d 861, 863 (Idaho 1980)f'In effectuating the 
legislative intent behind an ambiguous statute, the Court should, if possible, avoid indulging in a 
statutory construction which would cause absurd or unduly harsh results."). 
The State argues by analogy to Fetterly v. State, 12 1 Idaho 4 17, 825 P.2d 1073, reh'g 
denied (1 992), that Idaho Code Section 19-27 19 purports to preclude Idaho district courts fiom 
ever considering whether, in a case whose judgment is final, one of their earlier rulings was 
legally mistaken in light of recent clari&ing and higher court authority on point. In Fetterly, the 
appellant argued that his claim was not known and could not have been known when he filed his 
initial postconviction petition. The Supreme Court said in dicta that appellant waived his claim 
because he failed to raise it in his first postconviction petition even though it had been reasonably 
knowable immediately after trial and could have been raised in that earlier petition. 
Even were the Fetterly dicta a holding, it would have no application here. As the State 
points out, Mr. Stuart raised the claim but was denied relief on direct appeal. See BriefIn 
Support of Motion for Summary Dismissal at 6-7. Thus, far &om waiving the claim, Mr. Stuart 
timely raised it and the Supreme Court considered and denied it on the merits. See State v. 
Stuart, 1 10 Idaho 163, 175,7 1 5 P.2d 833, 845, reh'g denied (Idaho 1985). Idaho law precluded 
his relitigating the claim absent new material facts. Supra at 40-41. Until this past summer's 
Ring and Fettlery decisions, then, Idaho law precluded Mr. Stuart from relitigating his 
constitutionally defective sentencing proceedings claim. Id 
PETITIONER'S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY DISMISSAL OF PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION 
RELIEF AND/OR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS- 42 
By contrast, in the 1992 Fetterly decision on which Respondent relies, the appellant 
waived his claim which was reasonably knowable immediately after trial by failing to raise it on 
direct appeal or in his initial postconviction petition. There, the appellant raised his claim for the 
first time in a successive postconviction petition. In light of this difference in procedural posture, 
Fetterly is inapposite. 
The State's interpretation of Idaho Code Section 19-27 19 is wrong not only because it ( 1 )  
requires a postconviction petitioner to violate the Idaho prohibition against postconviction 
petitioners relitigating claims raised and decided on direct appeal and (2) leads ineluctably to 
absurd results, but also because (3) it so obviously fails to capture the legislature's intent to 
create expedited procedural mechanisms to carry out only valid death sentences. See I.C. 9 19- 
27 19 (purpose is to eliminate "unnecessary delay in carrying out a valid death sentencen)(italics 
added). Arguably, of course, death sentences may be valid for Idaho Code Section 19-271 9 
purposes even though imposed on the basis of constitutional errors, for defendants may fail to 
timely object and, thereby, waive their right to relief. But the legislature could not have intended 
to require that in order to preserve the right to later raise claims should the courts at some future 
time acknowledge earlier legal errors, a postconviction petitioner must raise those claims in their 
initial petitions even though the courts must then dismiss them as previously raised and decided. 
For this extraordinarily narrow set of claims, then, Idaho Code Section 19-27 19 waiver 
provisions have no application. Mr. Stuart raises just such a claim here. 
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C. Idaho Code Section 19-271 9(5)'s Bar Against Claims Already JLnown Or 
Which Should Reasonably Have Been Known Cannot Be Retroactively 
Applied Here. 
For the same reasons that Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5)'s anti-retroactivity provision 
cannot be retroactively applied, its "known, or reasonably should have been known" provision 
cannot be retroactively applied. See supra a t  23-25, incorporated herein. It is long settled "that 
an amendment to an existing statute will not, absent an express legislative statement to the 
contrary, be held to be retroactive in application. Johnson v. Stoddard, 96 Idaho 230, 526 P.2d 
835 ( 1  974)L.l" Nebeker v. Piper Aircraft Corporation, 113 Idaho 609, 614, 747 P.2d 18,23 
(Idaho 1 987)(citations omitted). See Idaho Code Section 73- 10 1 ("No part of these compiled 
laws is retroactive, unless expressly so declared.") The amendment to Idaho Code Section 19- 
271 9(5) adopting the bar to claims which were "known, or reasonably should have been known" 
when a timely initial postconviction petition was or should have been filed contains no express 
legislative statement that it should itself be retroactively applied. It cannot, then, be applied to 
the case at bar. 
D. Idaho Code Section 19-2719 Invades the Judiciary's Province, In Violation 
Of The Idaho Constitution's Separation Of Powers Requirement. 
The State asserts that Idaho Code Section 19-271 9(5) bars Mr. Stuart's claim because he 
did not raise it in earlier postconviction proceedings. That statute provides that if a petitioner 
"fails to apply for relief. . . within the time limits specified, . . . [tlhe courts of Idaho shall have 
no power to consider any such claims for reliefl.]" I.C. $19-27 19(5). This violates the Idaho 
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Constitution's separation of powers requirement by limiting the constitutionally defined original 
jurisdiction of the district court. See supra at 21-23, incorporated herein. 
E. Applying Idaho Code Section 19-271 9(5) Would Violate The State And 
Federal Provisions Against Ex Past Facto Laws. 
Petitioner seeks relief from sentences for his 1982 convictions. Applying Idaho Code 
Section 1 9-271 9(5)'s time limitations provision to this case would violates the federal and state 
constitutional prohibitions against exposf,facto laws for the same reasons that applying Section 
19-27 19(5)'s anti-retroactivity provisions would. See supra, at 35-37, incorporated herein. 
F. Idaho Code Section 19-2519(5) Violates Petitioner's Rights To Due 
Process And Equal Protection Guaranteed Under The United States And 
Idaho Constitutions. 
If Mr. Stuart did not stand under sentence of death, Idaho Code Section 19-271 9(5)'s time 
limitations bar would not apply. Applying this provision to Mr. Stuart's case would violate his 
due process and equal protection rights as guaranteed by the United States Constitution and Idaho 
Constitution for the same reasons that applying Section 19-271 9(5)'s anti-retroactivity provision 
would. See supra, at 33-35, incorporated herein. 
Additionally, to preclude Mr. Stuart's claims would violate his state and federal 
constitutional rights to equal protection inasmuch it would deny him the ability to obtain relief 
for the violation of his constitutional rights solely because his judgment is final. See, e,g., James 
Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 540 (1 99 1) ("there remains even now the 
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dispmate treatment of those cases that come to the Court directly and those that come here in 
collateral proceedings"). 
111. UNDER THIS COURT'S RETROACTIVITY RULES, THE RULE AT 
ISSUE SHOULD BE APPLIED RETROACTIVELY TO ALL CASES. 
Federal retroactivity doctrine is the floor, not the ceiling. While the Supremacy Clause 
requires that states give new federal law at least as great a retroactive effect as federal 
retroactivity doctrine would give it, states may provide greater retroactive effect than federal 
retroactivity doctrine. United States Const. art. I, Section VI, cl. 2. (the Supremacy Clause); 
supra, at 26 (quoting, e.g., Elarper and Guzrnan). In 1975 this Court adopted a three prong test 
for whether a decision should be retroactively applied. State v. FVhitman, 96 Idaho 489, 53 1 P.2d 
579 (Idaho 1975). The Court has never wavered from the Whitman test. 
While the Idaho Supreme Court discussed Teague once in dicta, In the Matter ofthe 
Appfication of Gafford, 127 Idaho 472,903 P.2d 61 reh'g denied (1995), it did not suggest let 
alone adopt Teague or federal retroactivity law generally as Idaho state retroactivity law.19 
19Because federal retroactivity law is itself constantly evolving, see Hertz & Liebman, 
Federal EIabeas Corpus Practice and Procedure ch. 25 (4th ed. 2001), the Idaho Supreme Court 
could not make a "discretionary determination of judicial policy" whether that body of law in its 
future evolved form ought to be adopted as state law. While the Supreme Court may exercise its 
discretion to adopt bodies of law from other jurisdictions, to do so it must first know what those 
bodies of law are. See, e.g., Stein v. Morrison, 9 Idaho 426, 75 P. 246,257 (Idaho 1904)("When 
a statutory or constitutional provision is adopted from another state, where the courts of that state 
have placed a construction upon the language of such statute or constitution, it is to be presumed 
that it was taken in view of such judicial interpretation, and with the purpose of adopting the 
language as the same had been interpreted and construed by the courts of the state from which it 
was taken."). Without knowing what it is in particular that is being considered for adoption, a 
court cannot exercise discretion in its decision making. See Roberts v. Roberts, slip op. at 3 
(Idaho 2/10/03)(exercise of reason is necessary to court's non-abusive exercise of discretion). Of 
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Specifically, the Court found that the rule announced in Foucha v. Lozci,~iana, 504 U.S. 71 
(1 992)-that due process entitles an insanity acquittee to release when the original basis for 
acquittal and commitment no longer exists or the person is no longer dangerous-fell within the 
second exception to the Teague anti-retroactivity rule and was, therefore, retroactive. Id. at 476, 
65. Given the Supremacy Clause rule that state courts must give new federal law at least as 
much retroactive effect as federal courts would, see supra, at 26, and given that the Idaho 
Supreme Court did apply the federal rule retroactively, there was no reason for that Court to 
reach state law retroactivity questions. State law retroactivity rules may not restrict a new federal 
decision's retroactive effect, so there would be no occasion to employ or discuss those rules 
unless the decision was not retroactively applicable under federal retroactivity rules. 
Consequently, State v. Whitman remains good law and the test there adopted must be applied in 
the instant case. 
course, the Idaho Supreme Court has adopted federal constructions of United States Constitution 
provisions identical or similar to Idaho Constitutional provisions, but in doing so it has engaged 
in construction of constitutional language and only defined the floor and not the ceiling. Guzman, 
122 Idaho at 987, 842 P.2d at 666. By contrast, in determining state retroactivity doctrine, the 
Idaho Supreme Court would not be construing constitutional or statutory language nor merely 
taking steps to comply with federal constitutional requirements. Instead, it would be determining 
what retroactivity law within federal constitutional constraints is best for the Idaho citizenry. 
The Idaho Supreme Court at some future time could determine that federal law is best, but to do 
so it would first need to know what that law is. This it cannot do in advance of the federal courts 
saying what that law is. Because the Idaho Supreme Court has not adopted federal retroactivity 
law, this court must apply the Whitman test to determine whether the rules at issue in the instant 
case should be retroactively applied here. 
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WI-irzirma~ held that: 
The prospective or retrospective application of a decision is a 
discretionw detemination of judicial policy made by the Court 
after balancing certain criteria. The court must weigh: 
(1) The purpose of the new rule; 
(2) Reliance on the prior decisions of this Court; and 
(3) The effect of the new rule on the administration of justice. 
id., 96 Idaho at 49 1 ,  53 1 p.2d at 58 1 (citations and footnote omitted). The Supreme Court has 
explained each of these three factors. 
If retroactive application fwhers the purpose of the new rule, then the first factor favors 
retroactively applying the rule. Baker v. 'Thavers, 1 17 Idaho 696, 697, 791 P.2d 1275, 1276 
(Idaho 1990). The purpose of the rule at issue here-that an Idaho death sentence passes 
constitutional muster only if a jury determined that aggravating circumstances existed-is to 
accord defendants their right to jury trial under the federal and state constitutions. Applying it 
retroactively in this case would further that purpose because it is the only way to ensure that 
extant death sentences were imposed without violating the federal and state constitutions. The 
first factor clearly favors retroactively applying the rule in question. 
The second factor also favors retroactive application. Of course, reliance on prior 
decisions is the very definition of stare decisis, one of our legal system's most important 
principles. Thus, to disfavor retroactive application, there must have been more than merely 
some reliance on the old law. The Court, however, need not decide how much reliance would be 
needed for this factor to disfavor retroactive application because in the instant case the reliance 
was clearly insufficient. For while Idaho courts and prosecutors have relied on the old law, 
nevertheless, it affected only a very small number of cases-only thirteen to be exact. 
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There are eighteen death sentenced individuals in Idaho. See hltp:llcorrections.st~- 
.id.usldeathrowl .htm (Idaho Department of Corrections website detailing current death row 
p a p ~ l a t i o n ) . ~ ~  Of these, five are still on direct appeal from their original trials, and Ring must be 
applied to them. Cf. Fetterly.2' Subtracting these cases from the total number of death row 
prisoners leaves only thirteen whose cases might be affected by retroactively applying the rule. 
The Idaho Department of Correction reports that as of July, 2002, there were three 
hundred thirty-six inmates in Idaho incarcerated for murder and manslaughter convictions. See 
Idaho Department of Correction Standard Reports For July 2002 (reproduced on the World Wide 
Web at h~p:llcorrections.state.id.us/monthly%20statslStandReportPDF Jul02.pdfin). The 
thirteen who might be affected by the retroactive application at issue constitute 3.8% of the total 
number of Idaho inmates incarcerated for murder and manslaughter. 
"The Idaho Department of Correction website puts the number at twenty-one. This is 
inaccurate, however, because three of the twenty-one individuals listed are no longer under 
sentence of death, Maxwell Hoffinan, Richard Leavitt, and Timothy Dunlap. The Federal 
District Court for the District of Idaho granted relief in Messrs. Hoffman's and Leavitt's cases. 
The court entered its amended judgment granting guilt phase and sentencing relief in Mr. 
Leavitt's case, Civil Case No. 93-CV-0024-S-BLW, on December 14,2000. It entered its 
judgment granting sentencing relief in Mr. Hoffman's case, Civil Case No. 94-CV-0200-S-BLW, 
on April 1, 2002. The orders may be viewed at the Federal District Court's website, 
http:llwwvii.id.uscourts.govl. On January 11, 2002, the Caribou County District Court (Sixth 
Judicial District) entered an order in Dunlap v. State, Case No. SP-94-863, granting in part Mr. 
Dunlap's postconviction petition. Specifically, noting that "the State of Idaho has concurred in 
this granting the Petition to the extent of a new sentencing[,]" that court ordered new sentencing 
proceedings. Order, Case No. SP-94-863 (Caribou Cty. D.Ct. 111 1102) at 2. 
*'The five death row prisoners whose cases are on direct appeal from their original trials 
are: Faron Lovelace, Jimrnie Thomas, Michael Jauhola, Dale Shackelford, and Darrell Payne. 
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Thus, while there may have been reliance on the old law, it would have been minimal in 
its affect on prosecutors, courts, and the Department of Corrections. Of course, even had the 
reliance been greater, that should not count against retroactive application of a constitutionally 
required rule. This is true, especially where, as here, the defendant has argued from early on for 
the benefit of the rule. 
The third Whitman factor also favors retroactive application for similar reasons. Because 
there are only eighteen individuals sentenced to death in Idaho, at most only that small number of 
cases will be affected (fewer in fact, as the above analysis shows). Consequently, assuming that 
the rule at issue here is new, the Supreme Court finding in Baker applies with equal force: 
[W]e are confident that our efficient and hardworking trial judges 
will be able to accommodate the relatively few cases that must be 
retried because of the change in the law[.] 
Id. at 698, 1277. 
For all these reasons, then, the rule that juries must determine the existence of 
aggravating factors should be applied to all cases, including this one, as a matter of state law. 
IV. THIS COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO CONSIDER CLAIMS BROUGHT 
BY MR. STUART PURSUANT TO HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO 
HABEAS CORPUS. 
Mr. Stuart styled his August 2, 2002, petition in the instant matter as "Petition For Post- 
Conviction Relief And/or Writ Of Habeas Corpus." Respondent correctly notes that the petition 
raises claims in alternative procedural vehicles, (1) a postconviction petition pursuant to Idaho 
Code Sections 19-4901 & 19-271 9 and (2) a petition for writ of habeas corpus. Brief In Support 
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OfMotion For Summary Dismissal at 12. Respondent argues that the Court is without 
ju~sdiction to consider Mr. Stuart's claims as habeas claims because Idaho Code Section 19- 
4202 does not invest the Court with jurisdiction to consider petitions for writ of habeas corpus. 
Because Section 19-4202 has no application in the instant matter, Respondent's argument fails. 
Section 19-4202 is part of the Idaho Habeas Corpus and Institutional Litigation 
Procedures Act ("Act"). I.C. 5919-4201 - 19-4226. That Act expressly excludes from its scope 
the precise kind of claims Mr. Stuart asserts, viz, those brought via a petition of habeas corpus 
"as a substitute for, or in addition to, . . . . proceedings under Idaho Criminal Rule 35 or the 
Uniform Post-Conviction Procedures Act, chapter 49, title 19[.]" I.C. Ij 19-4203(4). Also, the 
legislature enumerated the kind of individuals who may bring claims pursuant to the Act as well 
as the sorts of claims covered by the Act. Neither list covers Mr. Stuart or his claims. Finally, 
the UPCPA "comprehends and takes the place of all other common law, statutory, or other 
remedies heretofore available for challenging the validity of the conviction of sentence." I.C. 
9 19-4901 (b). Consequently, Respondent's reliance on Idaho Code Section 19-4202 is misplaced 
and its argument that this Court is without jurisdiction to consider Mr. Stuart's claims for a writ 
of habeas corpus fails. 
Of course, the Section 19-490 1 (b) language quoted in the last paragraph suggests that Mr. 
Stuart's claims for a writ of habeas corpus may be permitted only as claims for UPCPA relief. 
This interpretation fails to capture the important difference between writs of habeas corpus 
petitions and UPCPA relief. Whereas writs of habeas corpus are constitutionally guaranteed 
(Idaho Const., art. I, 95), the UPCPA petition is a statutory creature. I.C. 99 19-4901 & 271 9. 
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Consequently, Section 19-4901(b)'s provision that the UPCPA takes the place of all other 
previously available mechanisms for challenging the validity of convictions and sentences is 
valid only to the extent that the UPCPA does not in any way suspend the writ of habeas corpus. 
Statutes which do not conform to constitutional requirements are invalid. ldctho Schools For 
Equal Educational Opportunity v. Evans, 123 Idaho 573, 583, 850 P.2d 724,734, reh'g denied 
(1993)(allowing other branches of government "to interpret the constitution for us . . . would be 
an abject abdication of our role in the American system of government"). Therefore, to the 
extent that the UPCPA does suspend the writ of habeas corpus, it is constitutionally deficient and 
may not be enforced. Id. 
The Idaho Constitution, Article I, Section 5 ,  provides: 
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, 
unless in case of rebellion or invasion, the public safety requires it, 
and then only in such manner as shall be prescribed by law. 
The privilege to the writ of habeas corpus is guaranteed without any provision for possible 
waiver by potential claimants. Idaho Code Section 19-27 19's waiver provisions, therefore, have 
no application to habeas claims. 
For these reasons, if this Court does not reach Mr. Stuart's claims for UPCPA relief, it 
must reach them for writ of habeas corpus relief. 
CONCLUSION 
For all these reasons and for all the reasons in Mr. Stuart's previously filed pleadings in 
the instant matter, the Court should deny Respondent's Motion For Summary Dismissal. 
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Dated this3&ay of March, 2003. 
&an M. ~ i s k r  
Attorney for Petitioner Gene F. Stuart 
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) PETITIONER'S RESPONSE IN 
v. ) OPPOSITION TO MOTION 
1 FOR SUMMAFtY DISlMISSAL OF 
GENE FRANCIS STUART, ) IDAHO CRIMINAL RULE 35 
1 PETITION 
Defendant. ) 
Gene Francis Stuart ("Petitioner"), through counsel, files this opposition to Respondent's 
Motion for Summary Dismissal of Mr. Stuart's motion filed pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 35 
["Rule 35 motion"]. Together with this Response, Mr. Stuart is filing a response to Respondent's 
motion to summarily dismiss the August 2, 2002, Petition For Post Conviction Relief And/or 
Petition For Writ Of Habeas Corpus. See Petitioner's Response In Opposition To Motion For 
Summary Dismissal of Petition For Post-Conviction Relief And/or Writ Of Habeas Corpus. For 
the reasons set forth below Respondent's motion to summarily dismiss Mr. Stuart's Rule 35 
motion should be denied. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. BACKGROUND. 
Mr. Stuart was convicted by a jury of first degree murder. The jury was not instructed on 
and did not find that the prosecution had proved beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of any 
aggravating factor included in Idaho Code Section 19-25 15. After the jury returned its verdict, 
the trial court conducted sentencing proceedings and determined beyond a reasonable doubt that 
two aggravating circumstances existed and sentenced Mr. Stuart to death.' 
Shortly before Mr. Stuart filed his Rule 35 motion, the United States Supreme Court 
overruled its holding in Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990), that Arizona capital defendants 
were not entitled to a jury decision on whether sentencing aggravating factors existed beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Ring v. Arizona, 122 S.Ct. 2428,2432 (2002). The court clarified that 
"[clapital defendants, no less than non-capital defendants . . . are entitled to a jury determination 
of any fact on which the legislature conditions an increase in their maximum punishment." Id. at 
2432. Before Ring, the Idaho Supreme Court consistently rejected the claim that the federal and 
state constitutions require that Idaho capital sentencing involve a jury. See, e.g., Stute v. 
Charboneau, 1 16 Idaho 129,774 P.2d 299, reh'g denied (1 989). Ring compelled the Idaho 
Supreme Court to reverse course, demonstrating that its earlier position was mistaken because 
grounded in a misreading of United States Supreme Court precedent. State v. Fetterly, 137 Idaho 
'The trial court found two aggravating circumstances, (1) that the offense was "especially 
heinous, atrocious, or cruel," and (2) that Mr. Stuart "by prior conduct or conduct in the 
commission of the murder at hand has exhibited a propensity to cornmit murder which will 
probably constitute a continuing threat to society." Findings Of The Court In Considering Death 
Penalty Under Section 19-25 1 5, Idaho Code, at 5,6. 
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729, 730, 52 P.3d 874, 875 (2002)(vacating death senence and remanding for resentenciilg on 
ground that Ring requires juries to ""make factual findings of the aggravating factors necessary to 
the imposition of a death sentence"). 
In Ring, the United States Supreme Court at&ibuted its erroneous holding in Walion to its 
misundersbnding that under Arizona state law,"the aggravating kctors [were not] 'elements of 
the offensevbut, rather, were] "sentencing considerations"uiding the choice between life and 
death. [Walton,] 497 U.S. at 648 (internal quotation marks omitted)." Ring, 122 S.Ct. at 2437. 
This was mistaken because under Arizona law, absent a finding of an aggravating circumstance, 
death and life imprisonment were not "the alternative verdicts." WaIton at 648. Ten years later, 
the Arizona Supreme Court clarified that under its state law in effect from at least the time of 
Walton, capital defendants are not eligible for a death sentence absent a finding of at least one 
aggravating circumstan~e.~ State v. Ring, 200 Ariz. 267,279,25 P.3d 1 139, 1 15 1 (Ariz. 
2001)("In Arizona, a defendant cannot be put to death solely on the basis of a jury's [guilty] 
verdict[.] . . . [Tlhe death sentence becomes possible only after the trial judge makes a factual 
finding that at least one aggravating factor is present."); see Ring, 122 S.Ct. at 2436. 
With this corrected understanding, the United States Supreme Court necessarily reached a 
different result than it had in Walton. In particular, the court held that "we overrule Walton to the 
extent that it allows a sentencing judge, sitting without a jury, to find an aggravating 
circumstance necessary for imposition of the death penalty." Ring, 122 S.Ct at 2443. Put 
2Later, after the United States Supreme Court's Ring opinion, Arizona amended its capital 
scheme in an effort to bring it into compliance with federal constitutional requirements. See 
Ariz.Rev.Stat. $1 3-703.1. Very recently, too, Idaho amended its capital scheme in response to 
Fetterly and Ring. See, Idaho Code Sections 18-4004, 19-2 126, 1 9-25 1 5, and 19-25 1 5A (2003 ). 
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another way, Ring made clear that any facts necessary to increase the maximum allowable 
sentence are elements of the offense. Ring, 122 S.Ct. at 2443 (because aggravating factors 
necessary to the imposition of a death sentence "operate as 'the hc t iona l  equivalent of an 
element of a greater offense' the Sixth Amendment requires that they be found a jury")(citation 
omined); see Harris v. Unitedstales, 122 S.Ct. at 2409 (Kennedy, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., 
and O'Connor & Scalia, JJ.)("'those facts setting the outer limits of a sentence, and of the judicial 
power to impose it, are the elements of the crime for the purposes of the constitutional analysis") 
and at 2323-24 ("[Ilf the legislature, rather than creating grades of crimes, has provided for 
setting the punishment of a crime based on some fact ... that fact is also an element")(Thomas, J., 
joined by Stevens, Souter, & Cinsberg, JJ.). As Justices Scalia, Rehnquist, and Thomas very 
recently agreed: 
Our decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), 
clarified what constitutes an "element" of an offense for purposes 
ofthe Sixth Amendment's jury-trial guarantee. Put simply, if the 
existence of any fact (other than a prior conviction) increases the 
maximum punishment that may be imposed on a defendant, that 
fact ... constitutes an element, and must be found by a jury beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Id., at 482-484,490. 
[Flor purposes of the Sixth Amendment's jury-trial guarantee, the 
underlying offense of "murder" is a distinct, lesser included 
offense of "murder plus one or more aggravating circumstances": 
Whereas the former exposes a defendant to a maximum penalty of 
life imprisonment, the latter increases the maximum permissible 
sentence to death. Accordingly, we held that the Sixth Amendment 
requires that a jury, and not a judge, find the existence of any 
aggravating circumstances, and that they be found, not by a mere 
preponderance of the evidence, but beyond a reasonable doubt. 
[Ring], at [2443] (slip op. at 22-23). 
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Sattazahn v. Pennsvlvania, 123 S.Ct. 732,739 (2003)(Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., & 
Thomas, J.). 
Applied to the instant case, this means that Mr. Stuart was convicted of non-capital first 
degree murder, a lesser included offense of first degree murder "plus one or more aggravating 
circmstances[,]'Y.e.-capilal first degree murder. For this reason, Mr. Stuart's death sentence 
was outside the range of sentences lawhlly available for his offense of conviction. Mr. Stuart, 
then, must be resentenced for non-capital first degree murder. See People v. Nunez, 133 Idaho 
13,20, 981 P.2d 738, 745, reh'g denied (Idaho 1999)(where jury instructions omitted essential 
element of felony but included elements of misdemeanor, conviction was for misdemeanor; 
"accordingly, Nunez should have been sentenced only for misdemeanor convictions [and] [tlhe 
case will be remanded for this purpose."); State v. Roll, 118 Idaho 936, 801 P.2d 1287 (Ct.App. 
1990)Cjudgment of conviction reversed without any harmlessness analysis where essential 
element of offense omitted from jury instructions). 
Indeed, because the jury did not convict Mr. Stuart of capital first degree murder, the trial 
court was without jurisdiction to impose a death sentence on him.3 It was without this 
3Mr. Stuart's claim that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to sentence him to death is 
timely. "The issue of whether a court has exceeded its subject matter jurisdiction is never waived 
and purported judgments entered by that court, acting without subject matter jurisdiction, are 
void and subject to collateral attack. Sierra Life Insurance Co. v. Granata, 99 Idaho 624, 626, 
586 P.2d 1068, 1070 (1 978); see Andre v. Morrow, 106 Idaho 455,459,680 P.2d 1355, 1359 
(1984)[void judgment is nullity and "can be collaterally attacked at any time"]." State v. 
Heyrend, 129 Idaho 568, 57 1, 929 P.2d 744,747 (Ct. App. 1996). Even where the Uniforrn Post 
Conviction Act, Idaho Code Section 4901-491 1, is generally unavailable as an avenue to relief, 
"it is available to cure fundamental errors occurring at the trial which affect either the jurisdiction 
of the court or the validity of the judgment, even though these errors could have been raised on 
appeal." Smith v. Stale, 94 Idaho 469,474,491 P.2d 733,738 (Idaho 1971). 
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jurisdiction for other reasons, too: the charging document, a prosecutor's information, did not 
include the aggravating factor elements relied on at trial; no preliminary hearing determination 
was made that there was substantial evidence supporting the existence of the aggravating factor 
elements relied on at trial; the jury did not determine that Mr. Stuart had the requisite mens rea, 
E~mund v. fyorida, 458 U.S. 477 (1981), a fact necessary to death being an allowable penalty; 
the jury did not determine that any aggravating circumstance outweighed the mitigating 
circumstances; and the jury did not determine that the mitigating circumstances did not make the 
imposition of death ~ n j u s t . ~  Hays v. State, 11 3 Idaho 736,739, 747 P.2d 758, 761 (Ct.App. 
1987)("A jurisdictional defect exists when the alleged facts are not made criminal by statute, or 
where there is a failure to state facts essential to establish the offense charged. Slate v. Grady, 89 
Idaho 204,404 P.2d 347 (1965); State v. Cole, 3 1 Idaho 603, 174 P. 13 1 (1981); I.C.R. 7(b)."), 
a r d ,  1 15 Idaho 3 15,3 16 766 P.2d 785,786 (Idaho 1988)("we concur with the decision of the 
Court of Appeals"). Since Mr. Stuart was sentenced to a penalty greater than authorized for non- 
capital first degree murder, his sentence "is void as to the excess if the valid portion is severable 
from that portion which is void." State v. Jeppesen, 138 Idaho 71, -, 57 P.3d 782, 787 (Idaho 
2002). In any event, where a jury charge omits an essential element of a greater crime, but fully 
instructs on a lesser crime, a guilty verdict is a conviction for the lesser offense. State v. Nunez, 
133 Idaho 13,20,98 1 P.2d 738,745, reh'g denied (Idaho 1999). The sentence must, therefore, 
be within the range of penalties for that lesser offense. Id. 
4 Mr. Stuart raised each of these claims in his pending Rule 35 motion. 
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11, THE STATE'S ARGUMENTS PAIL. 
Respondent argues that Idaho Code Section 19-2719's time limihtion bars Mr. Stuart's 
Rule 35 motion. Noting that Idaho Criminal Rule 35 allows a court to correct an illegal sentence 
at any t h e ,  Respondent contends that this provision is trumped by Idaho Code Section 19-27 19's 
tirne limitation. This argument fails because, as already noted, the trial court was without 
jurisdiction to impose a death sentence, and jurisdictional claims may be raised at any tirne. 
Supra, at 5 n.3 and accompanying text. Even if this Court disagrees, though, the State's 
argument fails for several other reasons. First, Section 19-27 19 does not apply because Mr. 
Stuart's sentence of death was outside the range of permissible sentences for the offense of 
conviction. Second, Section 19-2719's time limitation jurisdictional bar violates the Idaho 
Constitution's separation of powers requirement. Third, applying Section 19-2719's time 
limitation jurisdictional bar to Mr. Stuart's case would violate his rights to due process and equal 
protection as guaranteed by the United States Constitution and Idaho Constitution. 
A. Idaho Code Section 19-2719 Does Not Apply Because Mr. Stuart's 
Sentence Of Death Was Outside The Range Of Permissible Sentences For 
His Offense Of Conviction, Non-Capital First Degree Murder. 
In support of its position, Respondent relies on State v. Beam, 121 Idaho 862, 828 P.2d 
89 1 (1 992). There, the Idaho Supreme Court held "that the forty-two (42) day time limitation of 
1.C. tj 19-271 9(3) applies to claims of illegality of a sentence of death." Id. at 864, 893. The 
petitioner in Beam asserted that his sentence was illegal because the trial judge failed to weigh 
each aggravating circumstance against all mitigating circumstances as required by State v. 
Charboneau, 1 16 Idaho 129, 774 P.2d 299 (Idaho 1989). Thus, the petitioner complained that 
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the trial judge employed an illegal process to determine the otherwise permissible sentence not 
that death was an impermissible sentence. By contrast, Mr. Stuart contends here that his 
sentence was outside the range of permissible sentences for his offense of conviction. Beam is 
inapposite. 
B. Idaho Code Section 19-27 19's Time Limitation Jurisdictional Bar Violates 
The Idaho Constitution's Separation Of Powers Requirement. 
Idaho Code Section 1 9-27 19(5) provides: 
( 5 )  If the defendant fails to apply for relief as provided in this 
section and within the time limits specified ...[ t]he courts of Idaho 
shall have no power to consider any such claims[.] 
(a) An allegation that a successive post-conviction petition may be 
heard because of the applicability of the exception for issues that 
were not known or could not reasonably have been known shall not 
be considered unless the applicant [meets certain other enumerated 
requirements]. 
(c) A suceessive post-conviction pleading asserting the exception 
shall be deemed facially insufficient to the extent it seeks 
retroactive application of new rules of law. 
I.C. 3 19-271 9(5). This provision plainly aims to limit the jurisdiction of district courts. 
However, legislative efforts to restrict the district court's jurisdiction violate the Idaho 
Constitution. 
The Idaho Constitution, Article V, Section 20, confers original jurisdiction on the district 
court to hear all cases. Idaho Constitution Article 11, Section 1, mandates that the powers of the 
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t h e e  govemenla l  branches remain separate and, more p ~ i c u l a r l y ,  Article V, Section 13, 
specifically prohibits legislative abrogation of judicial jurisdiction: 
The legislature shall have no power to deprive the judicial 
department of any power or jurisdiction which rightly pertains to it 
as a coordinate department of the government; but the legislature 
shall provide a proper system of appeals, and regulate by law, 
when necessary, the methods of proceeding in the exercise of their 
powers of all the courts below the Supreme Court, so.far as the 
same may be done without conJ;Eicf with the Constitution[.] 
Id. (italics added). Of course, as the Supreme Court has long held, a Section 19-271 9 petition "is 
a proceeding entirely new and independent fiom the criminal action which led to the conviction." 
Paradis v. State, 1 10 ldaho 534, 636, 7 16 P.2d 1306, 1308 (1 986). Thus, Article V, Section 13's 
reservation of power to the legislature has no application to fj 19-271 9 proceedings since they are 
not appeals. 
Idaho Code Section 19-27 19(5)(c)'s removing district court jurisdiction to consider 
postconviction claims seeking retroactive application of new rules of law violates the Idaho 
Constitution's separation of power mandate. In Stale v. Interest of Lindsey, 78 Idaho 241, 246, 
300 P.2d 491,494 (1 956), the Idaho Supreme Court struck a statute purporting to transform 
previously criminal matters of juveniles into civil matters because "[tlhe legislature, by denoting 
as a civil matter what the law has previously regarded as a felony, attemptfed] to take away 
jurisdiction vested in the district court by the constitution itself, and . . . attempted to render that 
court powerless to do anything about the prosecution of such persons." Similarly, in Boise City 
v. Better Homes, Inc., 72 Idaho 441,444-45,243 P.2d 303, 304 (1952), the Supreme Court held 
that "[tlhe original jurisdiction conferred upon the district court by the constitution, Art. 5, 920, 
cannot be diminished by the legislature. Const. Art. 5, 91 3[.]" Again, in Clemons v. Kinsley, 72 
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ldaho 251, 256-57,239 P.2d 266,269 (1951), the Court held that "[tlhe broad jurisdiction 
[created by Article 5, Section 131 is not subject to diminution by legislative act.". The Court 
held the same thing in Robinson v. Robinson, 70 Idaho 122, 127,212 P.2d 103 1, 1033-34 (1949). 
Finally, in McKnight v. Grant, 13 Idaho 629, 637, 92 P. 989, 990 (1907), the Court held that, 
"We think [Article 5, Section 131 was . . . intended to preserve to the judicial department of the 
state government the right and power to finally determine controversies between parties 
involving their rights and upon whose claims some decision or judgment must be rendered or 
determination made." In short, the Idaho Supreme Court has consistently and long held that the 
legislature may not directly or otherwise restrict the district court's jurisdiction. Consequently, 
even if Ring does announce some new rule of law which Mr. Stuart seeks to have applied to his 
case, Idaho Code Section 19-27 19(5)(c) cannot stand as a bar. 
C. Idaho Code Section 19-25 19(5) Violates Petitioner's Rights To Due 
Process and Equal Protection Guaranteed Under The United States And 
Idaho Constitutions. 
If Mr. Stuart did not stand under sentence of death, Idaho Code Section 19-27 19(5)'s time 
limitation jurisdictional bar would not apply.' "I.C. 3 19-27 19 does not eliminate the applicability 
of the UPCPA to capital cases, but it supersedes the UPCPA to the extent that their provisions 
'Under the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act ("UPCPA"), "post-conviction relief 
is not barred where new evidence is discovered, or where later case law suggests a conviction is 
unlawful." Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 766 n.12, 760 P.2d, 1174, 1 182 n.12 (Idaho 1988) 
(citing I.C.3 19-4901) (emphasis added). Also, under the UPCPA, I.C. 3 19-4908, a claim can 
only be waived ifthe waiver is knowing, voluntary and intelligent. McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 
695, 700-01, 922 P.2d 144, 149-50 (Idaho 1999). As noted in the text, to the extent that Idaho 
Code Section 19-27 19 conflicts with the UPCPA, the Section 19-27 19 provision governs. 
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conflict." McKinnr;v v. Sto&, 133 Idaho 695,700,992 P.2d 144, 149 (Idaho 1999). Because of 
this difference, applying that bar in the instant case would violate Mr. Stuart's due process and 
equal protection rights. 
TO the extent Idaho Code Section 19-2719's time limitation jurisdictional bar is construed 
to preclude review of petitioner's claims, the statute is unconstitutional. It would violate Mr. 
Stuart's rights to equal protection and due process under the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution, and Article 1, Sections 2 and 13 of the Idaho Constitution, in that 
there is no rational basis, for the disparate treatment of xsois-capital prisoners who do not need to 
demonstrate the "heightened burden" for postconviction relief which capital petitioners must 
meet, e.g., P z  v. State, 123 Idaho 758, 760, 852 P.2d 1355, 1357 (Idaho 1993), or meet the 
limitations imposed by Idaho Code Section 19-27 19(5), see, e.g., Sivak v. State, 134 Idaho 64 1, 
648-49, 8 P.3d 636, 643-44 (Idaho 2000); Pizzufo v. State, 134 Idaho 793, 796-97, 10 P.3d 742, 
745-46 (Idaho 1995). Romer v. Evans, 5 17 U.S. 620, 63 1-36 (1 995); Cily of Cleburne v. 
Clehurne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432,446-5 1 (1985); Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 6 1-63 
(1982); U.S.D.A. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 535 (1973); Sterling N. Nelson & Sons, Inc. v. 
Bender, 95 Idaho 813,815-16,520 P.2d 860,861-62 (Idaho 1974). 
Moreover, because Idaho's statutory postconvietion scheme makes available different 
mechanisms for enforcing hdarnental rights-here, the right to a jury trial-depending on whether 
the petitioner stands sentenced to death, that discriminatory scheme must be assessed with strict 
scrutiny. See Van Valkcnburgh v. Citizens for Term Limits, 135 Idaho 12 1, 126, 15 P.3d 1 129, 
1 134 (Idaho 2000) (if a hdarnental right is at issue, appropriate standard of review of law 
infringing on that right is strict scrutiny); Newlan v. State, 96 Idaho 71 1, 714, 535 P.2d 1348, 
PETITIONER'S RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY DISMISSAL OF IDAHO CRIMINAL RULE 35 PETITION- 11 
135 1 (Idaho 1975) (strict scrutiny when statute's classification infringes upon a fimdamental 
right); State v. Breed, 11 1 Idaho 497, 500, 725 P.2d 202,205 (Idaho Ct. App. 1986) (strict 
scrutiny of statutory schemes that infringe upon a '"fundamental right' such as voting, 
procreation, or constitutional safeguards for persons accused of crimes"). See genera& Ronald 
D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak, Treatise On Constitutional Law 3 18.41 at 800-01(3'~ ed. 1999) 
("When the government takes actions that burden the rights of a classification of persons in terms 
of their treatment in a criminal justice system it is proper to review these laws under the strict 
scrutiny standard for equal protection.") 
Idaho's disparate treatment of capital as compared to non-capital postconviction 
petitioners fails under a rational basis analysis. Necessarily, then, it fails under strict scrutiny 
analysis, too. "A law which infi-inges on a fimdamental right will be upheld only where the State 
can demonstrate the law is necessary to promote a compelling state interest." Id. The state's 
interest in expeditious handling of capital cases, the purpose of the offending provision, Idaho 
Code Section 19-271 9(5)(c), is not a sufficiently compelling interest to justify the violation of 
petitioner's fundamental right to trial by jwy. 
111. THE ANTICIPATED ARGUMENT TI-IIAT IDAHO CODE SECTION 19- 
2719(5)(c)'S PROHIBITION AGAINST RETROACTIVE APPLICATION 
OF NEW RULES OF LAW PRECLUDES RELIEF IN THIS CASE FAILS. 
Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5)(c) provides in pertinent part that "[a] successive post- 
conviction pleading asserting the exception [to the statute's time limitation on filing petitions] 
shall be deemed facially insufficient to the extent it seeks retroactive application of new rules of 
law." I.C. 3 19-27 19(5)(c). Mr. Stuart anticipates the argument that this provision bars relief. 
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Ring is new, the argument goes, because it overrules Walion v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990), 
and, therefore, Mr. Stuart's claims purportedly depend on retroactively applying Ring. 
The argument fails for three reasons. First, Mr. Stuart seeks to have long settled, not new, 
law applied to his case. Ring is helpful to Mr. Stuart's argument because it demonstrates that the 
Idaho Supreme Court's earlier rejection of Mr. Stuart's claim was based on a misreading of 
United States Supreme Court precedent. It is not Ring, though, but the constitutional 
requirement on which Ring relies-that a criminal defendant is entitled to have a jury determine 
whether the prosecution has proved beyond a reasonable doubt each element of the charged 
offense-which shows that the Idaho Supreme Court's earlier rejection of Mr. Stuart's claim was 
wrong and which Mr. Stuart seeks to have applied to his case. Because the relevant rule of law is 
not new, it falls outside the prohibition against "retroactive application of new rules of law." IC 
3 19-27 19(5)(c) (italics added). Second, Idaho Code Section 19-27 19's application here would 
violate various Idaho constitutional and statutory requirements. Third, applying Idaho Code 
Sectioil 19-271 9(5)(c) would violate the United States Constitution's Supremacy Clause 
requirement that states apply federal retroactivity doctrine to determine the application of federal 
law. Finally, fourth, under the Idaho Supreme Court's retroactivity rules, the rule at issue-that an 
Idaho death sentence passes constitutional muster only if a jury determined that aggravating 
circumstance elements existed-must be applied retroactively to all cases. 
Even if Mr. Stuart's claims do rest on a new rule of law and even if the state procedural 
prohibition the anticipated argument invokes is otherwise applicable and constitutionally valid, 
that prohibition does not apply where, as here, the rule in question is a federal constitutional 
requirement and substantive, not procedural, in nature. 
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A. Idaho Code Section 271 9(5)(c) Has No Application To The Instant Case 
Because Ring Did Not Announce A New Rule of Law. 
This subsection demonstrates that Ring did not announce a new rule of law. Along the 
way, it shows that the Idaho Supreme Court misread United States Supreme Court precedent and, 
therefore, mistakenly rejected Mr. Stuart's claim that he was entitled to jury involvement in his 
sentencing proceedings. The subsection concludes that because Mr. Stuart seeks the application 
of long settled law to his case, Section 19-2719(5)(c)'s prohibition does not apply and this Court 
should, therefore, reject it as a ground for summary dismissal. 
The same constitutional requirement driving Ring has driven this nation's criminal law 
jurisprudence since it adopted the Bill of Rights in 1791 and has played a similarly vital role in 
Idaho criminal law."n particular, criminal defendants are entitled to have a jury determine 
whether the prosecution has proved beyond a reasonable doubt each element of the charged 
offense. Excepting the mechanical application of that principle to the Supreme Court's corrected 
understanding of Arizona's capital sentencing scheme, Ring contained nothing new. 
The anticipated argument suggests that Ring is "new" because it overrules Walton v. 
Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1990). Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Dismissal at 10. At 
issue in Walton was whether Arizona capital defendants were entitled to a jury decision on 
6See, e.g., Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,478 (2000) ("As we have, unanimously, 
explained, . . . the historical foundation for our recognition of [the principle that a defendant is 
constitutionally entitled to a jury determination of whether he is guilty of every element of the 
charged offense] extends down centuries into the common law.")(citing to United States v. 
Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 510-1 1 (1995)), and State v. Bennion, 112 Idaho 32, 37, 730 P.2d 952, 
957 (Idaho 1986)(noting that "[tlhis Court has long and often. . .stated that Article 1, $7 
preserves the right to jury trial as it existed at the common law and under the territorial statutes 
when the Idaho Constitution was adopted"). 
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whether sentencing aggravating factors were proved. The Walton court answered in the negative, 
but it did so based on its erroneous understanding that under Arizona state law "the aggravating 
factors [were not] 'elements of the offense [but, rather,] 'sentencing considerations' guiding the 
choice between life and death. [MJalton,] 497 U.S., at 648, 110 S.Ct. 3047 (internal quotation 
marks omitted)." Ring, 122 S.Ct. at 2437. 
The issue in Wallon was not whether the existence of aggravating circumstances per  se 
must be decided by a jury, but, instead, whether aggravating circumstances "in Arizona [were] 
'elements of the offense."' Wulton, 497 I1.S. at 648. The Supreme Court decided the question by 
looking to whether the aggravating circumstances were a prerequisite to death being a 
permissible sentence or, alternatively, whether they were mere considerations in choosing which 
sentence to impose within a range including death. The Walton Court misinterpreted the Arizona 
statutory scheme as assigning aggravating circumstances to the sentencing considerations role. 
Specifically, the Court misconstrued the Arizona scheme as making aggravating circumstances 
mere '"sta~~dards to guide the making of [the] choicc' between the alternative verdicts of death 
and life imprisonment." Walton, 497 U.S. at 648 (quoting Polund v. Arizona, 476 U.S. 147, 156 
(1 986)). Ten year later, the Arizona Supreme Court expressly rejected the Walton court's 
understanding of Arizona law and held that under that state's law and absent a finding of an 
aggravating circumstance, death and life imprisonment were not "the alternative verdicts." In 
particular, the Arizona Supreme Court held that under state law at the time of Walton and at the 
time of its decision, capital defendants may not be sentenced to death absent a finding of at least 
one aggravating circumstance. State v. Ring, 200 Ariz. 267, 279,25 P.3d 1139, 1151 (Ariz. 
2001)("In Arizona, a defendant cannot be put to death solely on the basis of a jury's [guilty] 
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verdict[.] . . . [Tlhe death sentence becomes possible only after the trial judge makes a factual 
finding that at least one aggravating factor is present."). 
In reviewing the state court decision in Ring, the United States Supreme Court 
acknowledged that it had misconstrued Arizona state law in Walton. Ring, 122 S .Ct. at 2436. 
With its corrected understanding of Arizona state law, the United States Supreme Court 
necessarily reached a different result than it had in Walton. Specifically, the court held that "we 
overrule Walton to the extent that it allows a sentencing judge, sitting without a jury, to find an 
aggravating circumstance necessary for imposition of the death penalty." Xing, 122 S.Ct. at 
2443. But Ring did not create a new legal rule. Rather, it merely applied the same constitutional 
requirement relied on in Walton-that criminal defendants are entitled to a jury determination 
whether the elements of the charged offense have been proved- to the correct understanding of 
Arizona state law. CJ: Harris v. Unitedstates, 122 S.Ct. 2406,2419 & 2423-24 
(2OO2)(KennedyY J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., OYConnor & Scalia, JJ.)(Thomas, J., dissenting, 
joined by Stevens, Souter, & Ginsberg, JJ.)(facts iiecessary to render a defendant cligiblc for a 
particular sentence are elements of the offense). These same reasons demonstrate that Ring's 
holding that Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), applies to capital cases was not a new 
legal rule. For in excluding capital cases from the scope of its primary holding (that in non- 
capital cases any fact necessary to increasing the maximum permissible sentence must be found 
by a jury), Apprendi explicitly assumed that a finding of an aggravating circumstance was not a 
prerequisite to a sentence of death. id. at 496-97. 
Nor did Walton break new ground by noting that any fact which must be found to exist 
for death to be within the range of permissible sentences is an element, not merely a sentencing 
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consideration. Indeed, it employed this point of distinction in reliance on (and quoting from) 
Poland v. Arizonu, 476 U.S. 147 (1 986), which, in turn, invoked Bullington v. Missouri, 45 1 U.S. 
430 (1981). In Bulfirzgton, the Court had used the same point of distinction to hold that the 
defendant there could not be sentenced to death on retrial because he had received a life sentence 
at his initial trial. The point of distinction drawn in Poland between elements and sentencing 
considerations, then, reached back to at least 198 1 when Bullington was decided and was not a 
new rule of law. Consequently, the rule that, in capital schemes like Idaho's, a jury must 
determine the existence of aggravating circumstances was not a new rule of law at the time Mr. 
Stuart's conviction became final and should, therefore, be applied to the instant case. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has long misunderstood the constitutional mandate on which 
Ring is based as not including the right to a jury decision on whether aggravating circumstances 
exist. The issue was frequently raised in and uniformly rejected by that Court. 
In Creech, the first Idaho case to address the issue, the court concluded that no jury - 
participation whatsoever in sentencing proceedings was coilstitutionally required. At first blush, 
this holding appears to have nothing to do with a jury's findings on whether the prosecution has 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt the elements of the offense. After all, those findings are 
generally made prior to the jury verdict and before sentencing proceedings commence. 
Nevertheless, because Idaho's capital statutory scheme provided that the determination whether 
aggravating circumstances existed be made during sentencing proceedings, Creech's holding 
directly implicates the constitutional mandate driving Ring. The Creech court reached its 
7However "capital sentencing proceedings" is defined, the legal principle remains that the 
United States Constitution guarantees a jury finding of any fact necessary to death being a 
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sweeping concIusion based, first, on its "deemling sentencing] consistency . . . a key 
requirementw and, second, on language from ProJYitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 252 (1 976), to the 
effect that the United States Supreme Court has never suggested that jury sentencing is 
constitutionally required and that judicial sentencing should lead to greater consistency in capital 
sentencing. Based on this consistency discussion alone, the court held "that there is no federal 
constitutional requirement of jury participation in the sentencing process and that the decision to 
have jury participation . . . is within the policy determination of the individual states." Creech, 
105 Idaho at 373,670 P.2d at 474.8 
Creech took a logical misstep by inferring that no jury participation in sentencing is 
constitutionally required Gom Profltt's suggestion that jury sentencing has never been held to be 
constitutionally required. The inference is flawed because it assumes that jury participation 
cannot be required unless jury sentencing is required as well. Of course, this assumption is 
mistaken and there was no legal precedent suggesting otherwise. Creech effectively threw out 
the baby with the bath water. 
Until recently, however, the Idaho Supreme Court consistently relied on its error in 
Creech to hold that there was no federal constitutional right to any jury participation in Idaho 
permissible sentence. As Ring and Harris make clear, legal principles are what matter, not 
labels. Ring, 122 S.Ct. at 2439 ("If a State makes an increase in a defendant's authorized 
punishment contingent on the finding of a fact, that fact-no matter how the State labels it-must 
be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt."); Harris, 122 S.Ct. at 2414 ("certain types of 
facts, though labeled sentencing factors by the legislature [may] nevertheless roe] 'traditional 
elements' to which these constitutional safeguards were intended to apply")(quoting Patterson v. 
New York, 432 U.S. 197, 21 1 n.12 (1977)). 
'Creech also rejected the contention that judicial sentencing results in sentences which do 
not reflect community norms. Id. 
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capital sentencing proceedings.9 It continued to do so even after Adamson v. Ricketts, 865 F.2d 
10 1 1 (9" Cir. 1988)(en banc). There, the Ninth Circuit held that because, in the Arizona capital 
sentencing scheme under review, proving an aggravating circumstance was a prerequisite to 
death as an allowable penalty, the aggravating circumstance is an element of the offense and, 
therefore, a jury must determine whether it exists. The Ninth Circuit based its holding in part on 
McMillarz v. Pennsylvuniu, 477 U.S. 79 (1986). At issue there was whether a Pennsylvania 
defendant's visibly possessing a firearm was an element or a sentencing factor. The Supreme 
Court held that it was a sentencing factor. The court repeatedly noted that an important 
consideration in deciding the question was that, under Pennsylvania Law, the visible possession 
finding effected no change in the maximum possible sentence. This lent strong support to the 
Ninth Circuit's conclusion in Adamson, because in stark contrast to the role "visible possession" 
played in the Pennsylvania sentencing scheme at issue in McMillan, Arizona's capital sentencing 
scheme provided that an aggravating circumstance had to be found to exist before a sentencing 
judge could consider imposing a death sentence. 
'See State v. Sivak, 105 Idaho 900, 902, 674 P.2d 396, 398 reh'g denied (1983)("The 
specific question of the constitutionality of a scheme not involving a jury in the sentencing 
process has never been decided by [the United States Supreme Court]. Indeed, the Supreme 
Court has recognized, in dicta, thatjudge sentencing should lead to greater consistency in 
sentencing[.]"); State v. Beam, 109 Idaho 616, 620, 710 P.2d 526, 530 (1985)(citing to Creech, 
Sivak, and Spaziano for the proposition that neither the federal nor state constitutions require "the 
participation of a jury in the sentencing process in a capital case"); State v. Fetterly, 109 Idaho 
766, 772, 71 0 P.2d 1202, 1208 reh'g denied (1986)(citing to Creech and Sivak for proposition 
that jury-imposed death sentences not constitutionally required). 
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W e n  Adarnson was decided and until very recently, Idaho's capital sentencing scheme 
was structurally identical to ~ r i z o n a ' s . ' ~  Idaho Code Section 19-25 15 provided that unless the 
prosecution proved beyond a reasonable doubt the existence of an aggravating circumstance, a 
capital defendant could not be sentenced to death." If the prosecution failed to meet its burden 
in that regard, the defendant had to be sentenced to a penalty less than death. Id. As with the 
Arizona sentencing scheme examined by the Ninth Circuit in Adurnson, in Idaho a finding that an 
aggravating circumstance existed increased the maximum sentence to which the defendant was 
exposed. I.C. $19-25 15(c) ("'a sentence of death shall not be imposed unless . . . the court finds 
at least one (1) aggravating circ~mstance").'~ Consequently, like Arizona's, Idaho's capital 
sentencing scheme stood (and continues to stand) in stark contrast to the sentencing scheme at 
issue in McMillun. 
With such striking similarities between Arizona's and Idaho's sentencing schemes, 
Adamson might have seemed the end of the story. But in State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 
774 P.2d 299, reh'g denied (1989), the Idaho Supreme Court rejected the Ninth Circuit's analysis 
and continued to uphold without modification Idaho's capital murder statutory scheme. In 
particular, the Charboneau Court misread Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984), as 
''After the United States Supreme Court decision in Ring, Arizona amended its capital 
scheme to bring it into compliance with federal constitutional requirements. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. 
$13-703.01. Very recently, Idaho amended its death penalty statutory scheme in response to 
Fetterly and Ring. See Idaho Code $ 5  18-4004, 19-2126,19-25 15, and 19-25 15A (2003). 
 his requirement is retained in Idaho'i amended statute. I.C. $ 19-25 15(3)(b). 
' 2~hough  another version of that statute was in effect during Mr. Stuart's 1982 trial, it 
contained the same requirement. I.C. $19-25 15(1977)("a sentence of death shall not be imposed 
unless the court finds at least one (I) statutory aggravating circumstance"). 
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implicitly holding that the federal constitution did not require jury participation in capital 
sentencing proceedings even though Spaziano did not consider that question: 
[In Sprrziano, J the United States Suprerne Court held: 
. . . [Ulespite its unique aspects, a capital sentencing 
proceeding involves the same fundamental issue 
involved in any other sentencing proceeding-a 
determination of the appropriate punishment to be 
imposed on an individual. The Sixth Amendment 
never has been thought to guarmtee a right to a jury 
determination of that issue. 
[Id., 468 U.S.] at 454 [citations omitted]. 
These comments were made by the Court in considering death 
penalty sentencing by a judge under a statute substantially similar 
to our statute and with findings of aggravating circumstances 
similar to those here. This convinces us that the Court inherently 
considered and rejected the premise of the Ninth Circuit in 
Adamson: that a capital sentencing statute that requires the judge to 
determine aggravating circumstances takes this factual element out 
of the jury's hands in violation of the sixth amendment [sic]. 
Charboneau, 116 Idaho at 147,774 P.2d at 317. 
In reaching this conclusion, the CIzarboneau court painted with much too broad a brush. 
Spaziano held that in capital proceedings, a jury need not determine the sentence. Nowhere did 
the Spaziano court address whether there is a right in capital proceedings to a jury determining 
the existence of "aggravating circumstances," which are in fact elements of the crime of the 
greater offense of capital murder. 
In the course of rejecting Adamson, the Idaho Supreme Court did not address the Ninth 
Circuit's observations regarding McMillan. It thereby declined to confront the inconsistency 
between its own and United States Supreme Court decisions on the jury's constitutionally 
mandated role in capital proceedings. This allowed the Idaho Supreme Court to continue 
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ignoring the distinction between jury sentencing and jury participation in sentencing 
proceedings. l 3 ~ l 4  
In short, fkom the first time it confionted the issue until Ring, the Idaho Supreme Court 
has misread relevant United States Supreme Court authority. Ring did not announce any new 
rule of law. Rather, it clarified that in jurisdictions with capital schemes providing that death is a 
I37'he right at issue here is the right to have a jury determine whether the prosecution has 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt that one or more aggravating circumstances exists. Mr. Stuart 
has already noted that even though it may initially seem that a jury's finding aggravating 
circumstances (elements of the offense) has nothing to do with sentencing proceedings, Idaho's 
statutory scheme compels a different conclusion. See supra, at 17- 18 n.7 & accompanying text. 
I41n State v. Paz, 11 8 Idaho 542, 798 P.2d 1, reh'g denied (1 990), the Idaho Supreme 
Court relied on Hildwin v. Floridu, 490 U.S. 636 (1989), for its purported additional support. 
Specifically, the court held that HiEdwin "upheld judge finding [ofl aggravating circumstances 
authorizing [the] death penalty." Puz, 118 Idatlo at 553, 798 P.2d at 12 n. 2. In HiEdwin, 
however, the Supreme Court interpreted the relevant state law to provide that a defendant 
convicted of first degree murder was eligible for a death sentence even before any finding of an 
aggravating circumstance. Id. at 638 ("'Under Florida law, that offense is a capital felony 
punishable by death or life imprisonment."). Thus, Hildwin analogized the Florida aggravating 
circumstance to the Pennsylvania visible possession of a fuearm at issue in McMillan: neither 
fact increased the maximum penalty for the offense of conviction. Therefore, neither "is . . . an 
element of the offense [and each] is 'a sentencing factor that comes into play only after the 
defendant has been found guilty.' Id. at 86." HiEdwin at 640. 
In State v. Rhoades, 121 Idaho 63, 822 P.2d 960 (1991), the court relied on CIemons v. 
Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738 (1990), for the proposition that "[alny argument that the constitution 
requires that a jury impose the sentence of death or make the findings prerequisite to imposition 
of such a sentence has been soundly rejected by prior decisions of this Court." ,IcJ. at 79,976. 
Whether a jury is required to (a) impose a sentence or (b) make the factual findings necessary to 
imposing a death sentence are much broader questions than whether a jury is required to make 
factual findings necessary to death being within the range of permissible sentences. 
Consistent with its finding support in its overly broad interpretation of the Supreme Court 
cases discussed supra, the Idaho Supreme Court later found support in Walton for its continuing 
to hold that jury participation is never constitutionally required in capital sentencing proceedings. 
See, e.g., State v. Pizzuto, 119 Idaho 742, 769, 810 P.2d 680, 707, reh g denied (1991); Sfute v. 
Stuart, 120 Idaho 795, 810, 820 P.2d 665, 680 reh g denied (Idaho 1991); State v. Rhoades, 121 
Idaho 63, 79, 822 P.2d 960,976 second reh 'g denied (1992). 
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permissible sentence only afier an aggravating circumstance is found to exist-the right to a jury 
determination beyond a reasonable doubt of each element of a charged offense means that there 
is a right to a jury decision on whether an aggravating circumstance exists. 
Mr. Stuart seeks the application to his case of the long settled constitutional mandate that 
a jury decide whether the prosecution has proved beyond a reasonable doubt each element of the 
charged offense, including the aggravating circumstances which are prerequisite to death being a 
permissible sentence and, therefore, in fact are elements of the greater off'ense of capital murder. 
Until Fetterly, Idaho courts have declined to apply this mandate based on their misreading of 
United States Supreme Court precedent. Because Mr. Stuart is not seeking the retroactive 
application of some new rule of law, Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5)(c)'s purported bar to sucli 
applications cannot bar this Court &om entertaining his petition. Consequently, the Court should 
reject the argument that Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5)(c) prohibition bars considering Mr. 
Stuart's application. 
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B. Even If Ring Does Announce a Mew Rule of Law, It Must Be Applied to 
Mr. Stuart's Case. 
Even if the Court rejects Mr. Stuart's argument in Section A, there are five reasons why 
Idaho Code Ij 19-2719(5)(c) may not be applied to block his claims. First, that statutory provision 
violates the Idaho Constitution's separation of powers requirement. Second, Idaho law prohibits 
retroactively applying Idaho Code Ij 19-27 19(5)(c), to this case. Third, applying Section 19- 
25 19(5)(c) to block Mr. Rhoades' claims would violate his rights to due process and equal 
protection guaranteed under the United States and Idaho Constitutions. Fourth, applying Section 
19-25 19(5)(c) would violate the Idaho Constitution's and United States Constitution's 
prohibitions against expostfacto laws. Finally, equity requires applying Ring to Mr. Rhoades' 
case. 
1. Idaho Code Section 19-27 19(5)(c) violates the Idaho Constitution 
separation of powers requirement. 
Idaho Code Section 19-27 19(5) provides: 
(5) If the defendant fails to apply for relief as provided in this 
section and within the time limits specified . . . [tjhe courts of 
Idaho shall have no power to consider any such claims[.l 
(a) An allegation that a successive post-conviction petition may be 
heard because of the applicability of the exception for issues that 
were not known or could not reasonably have been known shall not 
be considered unless the applicant [meets certain other enumerated 
requirements]. 
(c) A successive post-conviction pleading asserting the exception 
shall be deemed facially insufficient to the extent it seeks 
retroactive application of new rules of law. 
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I.C. tj 1 9-27 1 9(5). This provision clearly aims to limit the jurisdiction of district courts. 
I-fowever, this legislative effort to restrict the district court's jurisdiction violates the Idaho 
Constitution for the s m e  reasons that Idaho Code Section 19-27 19's time limitation 
jurisdictional bar does. See supra at 8-10, incorporated herein by reference. 
2. Idaho t a w  nrohibits retroactively aoplyina Idaho Code Section 19- 
27 19(51t'c). 
It is long settled "that an amendment to an existing statute will not, absent an express 
legislative statement to the contrary, be held to be retroactive in application. Johnson v. 
Stoddard, 96 Idaho 230, 526 P.2d 835 (1 974)C.l" Nebeker v. Piper Aircraft Corporation, 1 13 
Idaho 609,6 14,747 P.2d 18,23 (Idaho 1987)(citations omitted). See Idaho Code Section 73-1 01 
("No part of these compiled laws is retroactive, unless expressly so declared.") 
Though the instant petition was filed after Idaho Code Section 19-271 9(5) was amended 
to include subsection (c)15, applying that statutory provision in this case would constitute a 
retroactive application. Paradis v. State, 128 Idaho 223, 912 P.2d 110 (Idaho 1996), illustrates 
why. There, the lower court applied a statute enacted after the trial and direct appeal were 
concluded. The Supreme Court held that the statute's application was prospective, not 
retroactive, because (1) the statute changed postconviction procedures and did not materially 
affect any substantive rights of the appellant and (2) "the statutory limitations period [for filing 
the postconviction petition] had not yet m." Id. at 227, 114. 
'5Subsection (c) was amended into Section 19-27 19(5) in 1995. 
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The statutory provision at issue in this case stands in dramatic contrast to the one at issue 
in Paradis. In particular, Paradis merely prescribed a procedural requirement available to every 
postconviction petitioner-that the petition be filed within a statutorily specified time. Far from 
prescribing a procedure available to all seeking relief, Idaho Code Section 5 19-27 19(5)(c) 
purports to raise an absolute bar to relief on any claim based on the retroactive application of a 
new rule of law. The distinction is critical. The procedural requirement at issue in Paradis 
affected no substantive rights because all postconviction petitioners could comply with it. By 
contrast, Section 19-27 19(5)(c) does not create mere procedural requirements. Rather, it 
precludes an entire class of substantive claims, leaving postconviction petitioners with no 
mechanism by which to assert those claims. Put another way, Section 19-27 19(5) does not 
merely "affect" this class of substantive rights, it purports to destroy them. For this same reason, 
the second ground for the Paradis court's holding has no application here. Consequently, 
applying Idaho Code Section 19-27 19(5)(c) to Mr. Stuart would constitute a retroactive 
application. 
Federal courts have noted that this same question may arise with regard to the 
Antiterrorism And Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"). While the United States 
Supreme Court has held that, as a general rule, AEDPA applies to petitions filed after the act's 
enactment, it has also noted that specific AEDPA provisions may not be applied if doing so 
would have a retroactive effect. Lindh v. Murphy, 52 1 U.S. 320, 327-28 (1 997). As the Fourth 
Circuit concluded: 
We agree with petitioner and those courts that having had cause to 
consider the question in full, have concluded that the Supreme 
court did not hold in Lindh that courts are necessarily to apply the 
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new provisions of chapter 153 to all habeas petitions filed after 
April 24, 1996 [i.e.- AEDPA's enactment date]. More particularly, 
we hold that Lindh did not foreclose-and indeed conternplated- 
continuing resort to Landgraf' [i,e.-retroactivity of statutes] 
analysis in order to ensure that application of chapter 153's new 
provisions is not impermissibly retroactive in such cases. 
Mueller v. Angelone, 1 8 1 F.3d 557, 567 (4th Cir. 1 999)(citing to In re Han.sard, 1 23 F.3d 922, 
933 n.22 (6'h Cir. 19971, and citing to In re Minarik, 166 F.3d 591 (3rd Cir. 1999), and Brown v. 
Ang-elone, 150 F.3d 370 (4th Cir. 1998)). 'See Scott v. Boas, 215 F.3d 940, 949 (9th Cir. 
2000)(federal prohibition against retroactive application of statute absent clear Congressional 
statement of intent looks to "parties' actions, not the date of filing"). 
Though Idaho Code Section 19-27 19(5)(c) expressly purports to absolutely bar 
postconviction petitioners' claims dependent on retroactively applying a new rule of law, it 
contains no express legislative statement that it should itself be retroactively applied. It cannot, 
then, be applied to the case at bar 
3. Idaho Code Section 19-25 19(5)(c) Violates Petitioner's Rights To Due 
Process And Equal Protection Guaranteed Under The United States And 
Idaho Constitutions. 
If Mr. Stuart did not stand under sentence of death, Idaho Code 5 19-27 19(5)(c)'s anti- 
retroactivity provision would not apply.16 "I.C. $19-2719 does not eliminate the applicability of 
16Under the Uniform Post Conviction Procedure Act ("UPCPA"), "post-conviction relief 
is not barred where new evidence is discovered, or where later case law suggests a conviction is 
unlawful." Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758,766 n. 12,760 P.2d, 1174, 11 82 n. 12 (Idaho 1988) 
(citing I.C.5 19-4901) (emphasis added). Also, under the UPCPA, I.C. 5 19-4908, a claim can 
only be waived ifthe waiver is knowing, voluntary and intelligent. McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 
695, 700-01, 922 P.2d 144, 149-50 (Idaho 1999). As noted in the text, to the extent that Idaho 
Code Section 1 9-27 1 9 conflicts with the UPCPA, the Section 19-27 19 provision governs. 
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the UPGPA to capital cases, but it supersedes the UPCPA to the extent that their provisions 
conflict." McKinney v. Slate, 133 Idaho 695,700,992 P.2d 144, 149 (Idaho 1999). Because of 
this difference, I.C. $19-27 19(5)(c) violates Mr. Stuart's due process and equal protection rights. 
See supra at 10- 12, incorporated herein by reference. 
4. Applyin~r, Idaho Code 6 19-27 19(5)(c) Would Violate The State And 
Federal Provisions Against Ex Post Facto Laws. 
Mr. Stuart seeks relief from a 1982 death sentence. Idaho Code Section 19-27 19 did not 
yet exist. That statute was first enacted in 1984, and it was only in 1995 that subsection (5)(c) 
was amended into it. The state and federal constitutions each prohibit ex postfacto laws. 
U.S.Const. art. 1, $10, cl. I .  Idaho Const. art. I, $16. Applying a law enacted after the 
commission of the crime to "make more burdensome the punishment" violates the ex post facto 
clause. Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 52 (1990). For example, in Garner v. Jones, 529 
U.S. 244 (2000), the United States Supreme Court held that increasing the interval between 
parole reconsiderations may violate the expost facto clause. Whether it does depends, the Court 
held, on whether the change "creates a significant risk" of making the punishment more 
burdensome -there, by prolonging the respondent's incarceration. CJC Quinlan v. Idaho 
Commission For Pardons And Parole, slip op. at 5 (Ct.App. 811 9/02)(doctrine that Idaho 
Commission For Pardons And Parole rules are not subject to attack on expost facto grounds, 
Freeman v. Commission of Pardons And Parole, 119 Idaho 692,809 P.2d 1 171 (Ct.App. 1991), 
cannot survive Garner). 
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Here, applying Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5)(c) to Petitioner's case would 
unquestionably make, not rnerely risk making, Mr. Stuart's sentence more burdensome. For 
while applying Ring would require vacating his death sentence, Fetterly, 137 Idaho at 730, 52 
P.3d at 875, blocking Ring's application would leave Mr. Stuart's death sentence in place. Death 
is a more burdensome penalty than life: "[E]xecution is the most irremediable and unfathomable 
of penalties; . . . death is different." Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399,411 (plurality opinion). 
See Nerrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390,405 (1 993)("We have, of course, held that the Eighth 
Amendment requires increased reliability of the process by which capital punishment may be 
imposed."); Murray v. Giarrntano, 492 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1989)(plurality op. of Rehnquist, 
G.J.)(collecting cases); id. at 21-22 nn.9-10 (Stevens J., dissenting)(collecting cases); Strickland 
v. Whshington, 466 U.S. 668,686-87 (1984); Ciardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349,357,97 S.Ct. 
1197, 1204, 51 L.Ed.2d 393 (1 977) (Jdurality opinion); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 
280, 305,96 S.Ct. 2978,2992,49 L.Ed.2d 944 (1976) (Jdurality opinion); see also Furman v. 
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238,306, 92 S.Ct. 2726,2760, 33 L.Ed.2d 346 (1972) (Stewart, J., 
concurring). 
5. Equity Reauires Application Of Ring To Mr. Stuart's Case. 
Even if the Court rejects h4r. Stuart's assertion that he is asking for the application of old 
law, Ring is a new development in support of an old claim. Under Sivak v. State, 134 Idaho 641, 
8 P.3d 636 (Idaho 2000) (Sivak V), the Idaho Supreme Court has rejected the argument that a 
previously raised claim is waived when supported by new evidence. "We must be vigilant 
against imposing a rule of law that will work injustice in the name of judicial efficiency." Id. at 
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642, 8 P.3d at 647. C j  Coleman v. .Jaggem, 12 Idaho 125, 132,85 P. 894, 896-97 (Idaho 
1906)("Under our Constitution and statutes equitable jurisdiction exists and will be exercised in 
all cases and under all circumstances where the remedy at law is not adequate, complete, and 
certain, so as to meet all the requirements of justice."), and Schlup v. Defo, 5 13 U.S. 298, 3 19 
(1 995)("the Court has adhered to the principle that habeas corpus is, at its core, an equitable 
remedy"). Here, rejecting the "new'hle  under Ring would create the same sort of injustice, for 
in Fetterly the Idaho Supreme Court acknowledged that allowing a judge to determine whether 
the aggravating factor elements exist is unconstitutional under Ring. State v. Fefterly, 52 P.3d at 
875. Equitable principles alone demand that petitioner's death sentence be vacated, as he raised 
the very point addressed in Ring in his direct appeal case years ago. 
If the State succeeds in killing Mr. Stuart despite the fact that he previously raised the 
claim in his direct appeal, it will have achieved a gross miscarriage of justice and not merely an 
inequitable result. 
C. Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5)(c)'s Application Would Violate The 
Federal Supremacy Clause. 
Applying Idaho Code Section 19-27 19(5)(c) here would violate the - Supremacy Clause of 
the United States Constitution. U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 2. See also, Idaho Const. art. I, $3 ("the 
Constitution of the United States is the supreme law of the land"). 
The Supremacy Clause . . . does not allow federal retroactivity 
doctrine to be supplanted by the invocation of a contrary approach 
to retroactivity under state law. Whatever freedom state courts 
may enjoy to limit the retroactive operation of their own 
interpretations of state law cannot extend to their interpretation of 
federal law. 
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frlarper v. Cfirginia Department dTmalion, 509 U.S. 86, 100 (1993)(citations omitted). See 
Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719,733 (1966)(States are "entirely free to" apply a new rule 
'5n a broader range of cases" than federal retroactivity doctrine allows); State v. Guzman, 122 
Idaho 98 1, 987, 842 P.2d 660,666 (Idaho 1992)("1t is by now beyond dispute that this Court is 
free to intepret our state constitution as more protective of the rights of Idaho citizens than the 
United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the federal constitution."); Colwell v. Nevada, 59 
P.3d 463,470 (Nev. 2002)("Teagzde is not controlling on this court other than in the minimum 
constitutional protectiolls established by its two exceptions."); Oregon v. Fair, 502 P.2d 1150, 
1 152 (Or. 1972)(states may decide what degree of retroactivity to give new rules, "so long as 
[they] give federal constitutional rights at least as broad a scope as the United States Supreme 
Court requires"); and Cowell v. Leapley, 45 8 N. W.2d 5 14, 5 17- 1 8 (S.D. 1 990)(rejecting Teague 
as unduly narrow for state collateral review). Federal retroactivity doctrine requires that Ring 
and Fetlerly be applied to Mr. Stuart's case. 
Il'eague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), is the seminal modem case regarding how to 
determine whether a constitutional rule of criminal procedure should be retroactively applied to 
cases already final. In Teague, a plurality of justices announced-and, later, a majority of justices 
adopted-a general rule of retroactivity with two exceptions: 
Unless they fall within an exception to the general rule, new 
constitutional rules of criminal procedure will not be applicable to 
those cases which have become final before the new rules are 
announced. 
Id. at 3 1 1. The Teague plurality described the two exceptions as follows: 
First, a new rule should be applied retroactively if it places certain 
kinds of primary, private individual conduct beyond the power of 
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the criminal law-making authority to proscribe. Second, a new rule 
should be applied retroactively if it requires the observance of 
those procedures that are implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. 
Id. at 307 (quotation marks and citations omitted). 
The anti-retroactivity rule and its exceptions have turned out to be complex in theory and 
difficult in application. Nevertheless, three clear principles demonstrate that the rule at issue in 
this case must be retroactively applied to cases already final when Ring was announced. 
First, by its terms, the Teague anti-retroactivity rule applies solely to new rules. As 
shown supra, at 14-23, Ring clarified but did not announce the existence of the rule Mr. Stuart 
seeks to have applied here. That rule is long settled, not new, and the result in Ring followed 
inexorably from applying it to the Supreme Court's corrected understanding of Arizona state law. 
Second the Teague anti-retroactivity rule applies only to constitutional rules of criminal -9 
procedure, not to substantive rules. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614 (1998). This much 
was clear long before ireague. Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333 (1974). The Ring rule is 
substantive, not procedural in nature for federal retroactivity analysis purposes. In some 
contexts the substance/procedure distinction has proved elusive, however, it is clear that for 
Teague purposes rules that "make conduct criminal" are substantive. Bousley, 523 U.S. at 621 
Thus, where the meaning of a statute defining a criminal offense or penalty changes, ireague 
raises no bar and the statute's new meaning must be applied to all cases. Consequently, 
postconviction petitioners are entitled to relief where the meaning of the statutes under which 
they were convicted and sentenced has changed favorably for defendants. 
Bousley, a decision written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, is illustrative. There, a habeas 
petitioner sought relief fiom his guilty plea because, after his conviction had been affirmed on 
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appeal, the statute defining the offense was held to require an element which had not been found 
by the petitioner's jury. The Supreme Court found that because the intervening decision was 
substantive, Teague did not apply and the intervening decision was retroactively applicable. 
Like the intervening decision in Bousley, Ring makes clear that capital murder in Idaho includes 
elements for which no finding of guilt was ever made in Mr. Stuart's case. See supra, at 3-6. 
Consequently, the Teague anti-retroactivity rule does not apply to cases in this posture. See Luke 
v. Battle, 565 S.E.2d 816 (Ga. 2002)(relying in part on Bousley, grants relief to habeas petitioner 
where, after petitioner's conviction was final, state's high court held that offense of conviction 
included new element); Montana v. Whitehorn, 50 P.3d 12 1, 127- 129 (Mont. 2002)(relying in 
part on Bousley, holds that substantive change in state law must be applied retroactively); Agee 
v. Russell, 751 N.E.2d 1043, 1047 (Ohio 2001)(relying in part on Bousley for holding that "there 
is no retroactivity issue" where case determines meaning of statute defining criminal offense). 
Third, where the new rule requires the observance of some procedure implicit in the 
concept of ordered liberty, it is fully retroactive. Even if the Ring rule-that in capital schemes 
where a finding of an aggravating factor is necessary to render a defendant eligible for a death 
sentence, a jury must determine whether the aggravating factor has been proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt-is new and procedural in nature, it requires the observance of a procedure 
implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, and must be given full retroactive effect. The Supreme 
Court has clarified that this exception requires both that the rule contribute to factfinding 
reliability and that it be a watershed rule of criminal procedure. See, e.g., O'Dell v. Netherland, 
521 U.S. 15 1, 167 (1997), and Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518,539 (1997). 
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Flow to discern a factfinding's reliability depends on the kind of fact at issue. Some 
findings are purely mechanical and, therefore, easily seen as correct or incorrect. For example, 
whether the weight of seized drugs or number of seized plants was correctly assessed is easily 
tested. Other findings, indeed mosti7, are not susceptible to straightforward testing for 
correctness. Scales exist to determine weight, but there is no "truthometer" which can be applied 
to, for example, witness' testimony to see whether the jury got the facts right.I8 It is precisely 
because most trials involve questions of a non-mechanical factual nature that jury deliberations 
are critical. Deliberation requires discussion and consideration of contrary views, not mere vote 
counting. See, e.g., ICJI 204 ("As jurors you have a duty to consult with one another and to 
deliberate before making your individual decisions . . . . Consult with one another. Consider 
each other's views, and deliberate . . . . Each of you must decide this case for yourself [I but . . . 
only after a discussion and consideration of the case with your fellow jurors.") "[Olne of the 
most important functions [the] jury can perform . . . is to maintain a link between contemporary 
community values and the penal system." Witherspoon v. Illinois, 39 1 U.S. 5 10, 520 n. 15 
(1 968). See Lowenzeld v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 23 1,237 (1988)('"The very object of the jury system 
is to secure unanimity by a comparison of views, and by arguments among the jurors 
themselves."')(quoting Allen v. United Siaies, 164 U.S. 492, 501 (1896)); Atkins v. Virginia, 122 
"some findings which appear easily tested for accuracy turn out to be otherwise. See, 
e.g., United States v. Robinson, 35 F.3d 442 (9th Cir. 1994)(discussing the subtleties of what 
constitutes a marijuana plant). 
'* It is for this reason that jurors are typically advised to assess a witness' credibility 
based on multiple considerations. For example, the standard jury instructions in Idaho charges 
that jurors are to use in their deliberations the "same considerations that you use in your everyday 
dealings" to decide matters of credibility. Idaho Criminal Jury Instructions, No. 104. 
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S.Ct. 2242,2253 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting, joined by Scalia and Thomas, JJ)("Om opinions. . 
.recognize[] that data concerning the actions of sentencing juries . . . 5 s  a significant and reliable 
index of contemporary values[]' . . . because of the jury's intimate involvement in the case and 
its function of haintain[ing] a link between contemporary community values and the penal 
system[]"'")(quoting from Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 (19771, Gregg v. Georgia, 428 
U.S. 153, 18 1 (1 976), and Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 520 n. 15). In short, determining whether a 
jury's findings of non-mechanical facts were correct is, to say the least, hard. This difficulty is 
acknowledged and reRected in blackletter law immunizing jurors from penalty for reaching 
factual determinations with which others may disagree, Bzshell 's Case, Vaughn 135, 124 
Eng.Rep. 1006 (C.P. 1670), and insulating jury verdicts from impeachment. See, e.g., State v. 
DeGrat, 128 Idaho 3 52,9 13 P.2d 568 (Idaho 1996)(common law and I.R.E. 606(b) exclude 
testimony impeaching jury verdict). 
Because it is, at a minimum, difficult to determine whether a jury's findings of non- 
mechanical facts are correct, it is similarly difficult to know whether a rule contributes to the 
reliability of such factfindings. What is clear, however, is that the reliability turns on 
deliberations among multiple jurors who necessarily contribute diverse perspectives to the 
discussion. Thus, with regard to non-mechanical facts, juries and judges are not 
interchangeable.I9 
19See, e.g., Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275,280 (1993)rThe Sixth Amendment 
requires more than appellate speculation about a hypothetical jury's action, or else directed 
verdicts for the State would be sustainable on appeal; it requires an actual jury finding of guilt."). 
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Aggravating circumstances-the elements of the greater ofFense of capital murder which 
Ring clarified must be found by a jury-are non-mechanical facts. In Mr. Stuart's case, for 
example, the aggravating factor elements found by the court were that (1) the offense was 
"especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel," and (2) Mr. Stuart "by prior conduct or conduct in the 
commission of the murder at hand has exhibited a propensity to commit murder which will 
probably constitute a continuing threat to society." Findings Of The Court In Considering Death 
Penalty Under Section 19-2515, Idaho Code at 5 , 6  (uppercase characters in original). Each of 
these elements is non-mechanical. Consequently, requiring that they be found by a jury 
contributes to the reliability of the factfinding. 
In addition to contributing to the reliability of factfinding, requiring that aggravating 
factor elements be found by a jury is a watershed rule on a par with the rule cited as an exemplar 
L 
of the sort falling within the second exception, Gideonys counsel guarantee. See, e.g., 0 'Dell v. 
Netherland, 52 1 U.S. 15 1, 167 (1 997)("we have cited [Gideon] as an example of the sort of rule 
falling within Teague's second exception, see SafJle [v. Parks], 494 U.S. [484,] 495 [1990]"). 
The right to "trial by jury in criminal cases is flundarnental to the American scheme of justice." 
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968). Indeed, that scheme's "most important 
element" is "the right to have the jury, rather than the judge, reach the requisite finding of 
'guilty."' Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 277 (1993)(citing Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 
5 1, 105-06 (1 895)).20 Because the Ring rule both contributes to factfinding reliability and is 
20 See also Blackstone's Commentaries, $5 349-350 (Lewis ed. 1897): 
[Tlhe founders of the English law have with excellent forecast contrived . . . that the truth 
of every accusation . . . should afterwards be confirmed by the unanimous suffiage of 
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fundamental, it falls within Teagzie's second exception and is fully retroactive. O'Dell, 521 U.S. 
at 167 (1997), and Lambrix, 520 U.S. at 539 (1997). 
Though Ring reiterates an established rule of substantive law, even if the argument that it 
is a new procedural rule were considered, it is clear that the rule requires a procedure implicit in 
the concept of ordered liberty and, thus, falls within Teague's second exception. For these 
reasons, federal retroactivity doctrine requires that the Ring rule be applied to all cases. To the 
extent that Idaho Code Section 19-27 19(5)(c) forbids the retroactive application of Ring, it 
violates the United States Supremacy Clause. 
Conclusion 
For all these reasons, Idaho Code fj 19-271 9(5)(c)'s prohibition against retroactively 
applying new rules should not bar Mr. Stuart's claims. 
twelve of his equals and neighbors. . . . So that the liberties of England cannot but subsist, 
so long as this palladium remains sacred and inviolate; not only fiom all open attacks, 
(which none will be so hardy as to make) but also fiom all secret machinations, which 
may sap and undermine it. . . . 
Id. See also Rex v. Poole, Cases Tempore Hardwicke 23,27 (1734), quoted in Sparf v. United 
States, 156 U.S. 51,94 (1 895): 
[Ilt is of the greatest consequence to the law of England, and to the subject, that these 
powers of the judge and the jury are kept distinct; that the judge determines the law, and 
the jury the fact; and, if ever they come to be confounded, it will prove the confusion and 
destruction of the law of England. 
Id. 
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D. Under The Idaho Supreme Court's Retroactivity Rules, The Rule At Issue Should 
Be Applied Retroactively To All Gases. 
Of course, determining that Idaho Code 5 19-27 19(5)(c) can not be applied to prevent the 
retroactive application of the rule-that under Idaho's capital scheme juries must determine 
whether aggravating circumstances exist-to this case does not end the inquiry. Rather, the 
question remains whether the rule should be retroactively applied to the case at bar as a matter of 
state law. This section, applying the test first articulated in State 11. Whitman, 96 Idaho 489, 53 1 
P.2d 579 (1975), and long adhered to by the Idaho Supreme Court, shows that the rule should be 
applied to this case. 
Federal retroactivity doctrine is the floor, not the ceiling. While the Supremacy Clause 
requires that states give new federal law at least as great a retroactive effect as federal 
retroactivity doctrine would give it, states may provide greater retroactive effect than federal 
retroactivity doctrine. United States Const. art. I, Section VI, cl. 2. (the Supremacy Clause); 
supra at 30-3 1 (quoting, e.g., Nhrper and Gzizman). In 1975 this Court adopted a three prong 
test for whether a decision should be retroactively applied. State v. Whitman, 96 Idaho 489, 53 1 
P.2d 579 (Idaho 1975). The Court has never wavered fiom the Whitman test. 
While the Idaho Supreme Court discussed Teague once in dicta, In the Matter of the 
Application of Gaford, 127 Idaho 472,903 P.2d 61 reh'g denied (1995), it did not suggest let 
alone adopt Teague or federal retroactivity law generally as Idaho state retroactivity law.2' 
21~ecause  f deral retroactivity law is itself constantly evolving, see Hertz & Liebman, 
Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure ch. 25 (4& ed. 2001), the Idaho Supreme Court 
could not make a "discretionary determination of judicial policy" whether that body of law in its 
future evolved form ought to be adopted as state law. While the Supreme Court may exercise its 
discretion to adopt bodies of law fiom other jurisdictions, to do so it must first know what those 
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Specifically, the Court found that the rule announced in Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 
(1 992pthat due process entitles an insanity acquittee to release when the original basis for 
acquittal and commitment no longer exists or the person is no longer dangerous-fell within the 
second exception to the Teague anti-retroactivity rule and was, therefore, retroactive. Id. at 476, 
65. Given the Supremacy Clause rule that state courts must give new federal law at least as 
much retroactive effect as federal courts would, supra at 30-3 1, and given that the Idaho 
Supreme Court did apply the federal rule retroactively, there was no reason for that Court to 
reach state law retroactivity questions. State law retroactivity rules may not restrict a new federal 
decision's retroactive effect, so there would be no occasion to employ or discuss those rules 
unless the decision was not retroactively applicable under federal retroactivity rules. 
bodies of law are. See, e.g., Stein v. Morrison, 9 Idaho 426,75 P. 246,257 (Idaho 1904)("When 
a statutory or constitutional provision is adopted fiom another state, where the courts of that state 
have placed a construction upon the language of such statute or constitution, it is to be presumed 
that it was taken in view of such judicial interpretation, and with the purpose of adopting the 
language as the same had been interpreted and construed by the courts of the state fiom which it 
was taken."). Without knowing what it is in particular that is being considered for adoption, a 
court cannot exercise discretion in its decision making. See Roberts v. Roberts, slip op. at 3 
(Idaho 2/10/03)(exercise of reason is necessary to court's non-abusive exercise of discretion). Of 
course, the Idaho Supreme Court has adopted federal constructions of United States Constitution 
provisions identical or similar to Idaho Constitutional provisions, but in doing so it has engaged 
in construction of constitutional language and only defined the floor and not the ceiling. Guzman, 
122 Idaho at 987, 842 P.2d at 666. By contrast, in determining state retroactivity doctrine, the 
Idaho Supreme Court would not be construing constitutional or statutory language nor merely 
taking steps to comply with federal constitutional requirements. Instead, it would be determining 
what retroactivity law within federal constitutional constraints is best for the Idaho citizenry. 
The Idaho Supreme Court at some future time could determine that federal law is best, but to do 
so it would first need to know what that law is. This it cannot do in advance of the federal courts 
saying what that law is. Because the Idaho Supreme Court has not adopted federal retroactivity 
law, this court must apply the Whitman test to determine whether the rules at issue in the instant 
case should be retroactively applied here. 
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Consequently, State v. Whitman remains good law and the test there adopted must be applied in 
the instant case. 
Whitman held that: 
The prospective or retrospective application of a decision is a 
discretionary determination of judicial policy made by the Court 
after balancing certain criteria. The court must weigh: 
(1) The purpose of the new rule; 
(2) Reliance on the prior decisions of this Court; and 
(3) The effect of the new rule on the administration of justice. 
Id., 96 Idaho at 491, 53 1 p.2d at 581 (citations and footnote omitted). The Supreme Court has 
explained each of these three factors. 
If retroactive application fwrthers the purpose of the new rule, then the first factor favors 
retroactively applying the rule. Baker v. Shavers, 117 Idaho 696, 697, 791 P.2d 1275, 1276 
(Idaho 1990). The purpose of the rule at issue here-that an Idaho death sentence passes 
constitutional muster only if a jury determined that aggravating circumstances existed-is to 
accord defendants their right to jury trial under the federal and state constitutions. Applying it 
retroactively in this case would Eurther that purpose because it is the only way to ensure that 
extant death sentences were imposed without violating the federal and state constitutions. The 
first factor clearly favors retroactively applying the rule in question. 
The second factor also favors retroactive application. Of course, reliance on prior 
decisions is the very definition of stare decisis, one of our legal system's most important 
principles. Thus, to disfavor retroactive application, there must have been more than merely 
some reliance on the old law. The Court, however, need not decide how much reliance would be 
needed for this factor to disfavor retroactive application because in the instant case the reliance 
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was clearly insufficient. For while Idaho courts and prosecutors have relied on the old law, 
nevertheless, it affected only a very small number of cases--only thirteen to be exact. 
There are eighteen death sentenced individuals in Idaho. See http://corrections.state- 
.id.us/deathrow 1 .htrn (Idaho Department of Corrections website detailing current death row 
population).22 Of these, five are still on direct appeal horn their original trials, and Ring must be 
applied to them. Cf. F e t ~ e r l ~ . ~ ~  Subtracting these cases fiom the total number of death row 
prisoners leaves only thirteen whose cases might be affected by retroactively applying the rule. 
The Idaho Department of Correction reports that as of July, 2002, there were three 
hundred thirty-six inmates in Idaho incarcerated for murder and manslaughter convictions. See 
Idaho Department of Correction Standard Reports For July 2002 (reproduced on the World Wide 
Web at http://corrections.state.id.us/monthly%2Osts/StandReportPDF Jul02.pdfin). The 
thirteen who might be affected by the retroactive application at issue constitute 3.8% of the total 
number of Idaho inmates incarcerated for murder and manslaughter. 
2 2 ~ h e  Idaho Department of Correction website puts the number at twenty-one. This is 
inaccurate, however, because three of the twenty-one individuals listed are no longer under 
sentence of death, Maxwell Hoffman, Richard Leavitt, and Timothy Dunlap. The Federal 
District Court for the District of Idaho granted relief in Messrs. Hoffman's and Leavitt's cases. 
The court entered its amended judgment granting guilt phase and sentencing relief in Mr. 
Leavitt's case, Civil Case No. 93-CV-0024-S-BLW, on December 14,2000. It entered its 
judgment granting sentencing relief in Mr. Hoffinan's case, Civil Case No. 94-CV-0200-S-BLW, 
on April 1, 2002. The orders may be viewed at the Federal District Court's website, 
http://www.id.uscourts.gov/. On January 11,2002, the Caribou County District Court (Sixth 
Judicial District) entered an order in Dunlap v. State, Case No. SP-94-863, granting in part Mr. 
Punlap's postconviction petition. Specifically, noting that "the State of Idaho has concurred in 
this granting the Petition to the extent of a new sentencing[,]" that court ordered new sentencing 
proceedings. Order, Case No. SP-94-863 (Caribou Cty. D.Ct. 111 1/02) at 2. 
23The five death row prisoners whose cases are on direct appeal fiom their original trials 
are: Faron Lovelace, Jirnmie Thomas, Michael Jauhola, Dale Shackelford, and Darrell Payne. 
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Thus, while there may have been reliance on the old law, it would have been minimal in 
its affect on prosecutors, courts, and the Department of Corrections. Of course, even had the 
reliance been greater, that should not count against retroactive application of a constitutionally 
required mle. Tl~is is true, especially where, as here, the defendant has argued from early on for 
the benefit of the rule. 
The third Whitman factor also favors retroactive application for similar reasons. Because 
there are only eighteen individuals sentenced to death it1 Idaho, at most only that small number of 
cases will be affected (fewer in fact, as the above analysis shows). Consequently, assuming that 
the rule at issue here is new, the Supreme Court finding in Baker applies with equal force: 
[ y e  are confident that our efficient and hardworking trial judges 
will be able to accommodate the relatively few cases that must be 
retried because of the change in the law[.] 
Id. at 698, 1277. 
For all these reasons, then, the rule that juries must determine the existence of 
aggravating factors should be applied to all cases, including this one, as a matter of state law. 
CONCLUSION 
For all these reasons and for all the reasons in Mr. Stuart's previously filed pleadings in 
the instant matter, the Court should deny Respondent's motion to summarily dismiss the pending 
Rule 35 petition. 
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Dated t h i s s d a y  of March, 2003. 
V Joan M. Fisher 
Attorney for Petitioner Gene F. Stuart 
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GENE FRANCIS STUART, ) COURT MINUTES 
Defendant. ) 
) 
GENE FRANCIS STUART, ) 




STATE OF IDAHO, ) COURT MINUTES 
Respondent. ) 
) 
GENE FRANCIS STUART, ) 
Petitioner, ) CASE NO. SP02-00151 
) 
VS . ) 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) COURT MINUTES 
Respondent. ) 
Presiding Judge: Hon Ron Schilling Date: 04/09/03 
Court Clerk: Vicky F. Edmonson Time: l o l l 5  am 
Attorney for DefendantlPetitioner: Joan M. Fisher & Oliver W. Loewy 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondent: John A. Swayne & L. Lamont Anderson 
Type of Hearing: Schedulinq conference 
Present in court: Honorable Ron Schilling; Joan Fisher, via telephone, attorney for 
DefendantlPetitioner; attorney Oliver Loewy, via telephone, also for 
Defendantlpetitioener; John Swayne, Clearwater County Prosecutor, personally 
present on behalf of Plaintiff/Respondent; Lamont Anderson of Attorney General 
Office present, via telephone. 
Court advises session is for scheduling conference for 3 cases, not being recorded 
but the clerk will take minutes. 
COURT MINUTES - Page 1 of 3 
Ms. Fisher advises court that Mr. Loewy present with her and is representing the 
Federal Court case. 
Court advises the Order Granting Limited Appearance and Waiver not signed yet 
but will sign it now. Court advises clerk will take minutes and provide copies to all 
counsel. 
Court inquires if parties ready for scheduling cases 81-8495, original criminal case, 
and SP02-00109 and SP02-00151, 2 Post Conviction files. 
Ms. Fisher advises ready for pending motion and preliminary matters. 
Court inquires of Mr- Swayne if Motion for Summary Dismissal applies to all cases. 
Mr. Swayne advises applies to both the special cases 109 & 151. 
Court understands a Rule 35 motion is in the original case as well as a Petition for 
Post Conviction and Writ of Habeas Corpus. Inquires if same material as in SP02- 
109. 
Ms. Fisher advises are the same. 
Court inquires if other issues in SP02-151 
Ms. Fisher advises there are. 
Court wants to schedule hearing on Motion for Summary Dismissal and any other 
preliminary matters needing resolved. If evidentiary hearing is required, Court will 
schedule it then. Court inquires of Mr. Swayne if has responded to all briefing from 
PetitionerIDefendant. 
Mr. Swayne advises has not responded and requests additional time. 
Court asks Ms. Fisher what time limits she would like for preliminary matters. 
Ms. Fisher agrees to Mr. Swayne's request for additional time and advises she has 
not filed Brief in Opposition to Motion For Summary Dismissal in SP02-151. 
Court inquires if wants 90 days to file Brief in Opposition to Motion for Summary 
Dismissal. Ms Fisher agrees. 
Court will allow counsel to control time table, will give as much time for briefing as 
needed. 
Court gives Ms. Fisher until 711 1/03 to file responsive brief to the Motion for 
summary Dismissal in SP02-151. Ms. Fisher accepts. 
COURT MINUTES - Page 2 of 3 
Court sets 711 1/03 for filing brief. Mr. Swayne to file all responsive briefs to pending 
briefs of Petitioner on or before 10/10/03. Ms. Fisher to file response to Mr. 
Swayne's briefs by 11/14/03. Court will allow extensions for good reasons. 
Court and counsel agree to have Mr. Stuart present for all arguments. Agree to 
hold hearing in Boise. Court will later on in process look to some date early in 
January/February 2004 and arrange for a courtroom at maximum security facillty in 
Boise. Counsel agree- Court will work with Clearwater County Clerks Office for 
arrangements- 
Court provides contact information for counsel. Requests courtesy copy of 
briefings and important documents provlded to him at his address. 
Ms. Fisher notes Supreme Court appointed Court as judge in 151 case, but no 
order appointing on Rule 35 or the other Post Conviction. 
Court understood he has been appointed to all pending cases, Clerk to check with 
Trial Court Administrator and/or Supreme Court. 
Ms. Fisher also notes no petition or order for Attorney General's office to appear. 
Court inquires of Mr. Anderson if intends to obtain permission from Court to appear 
and participate. 
Mr. Anderson advises just advisory capacity at this point, will discuss with Mr. 
Swayne and make determination and will file appropriate paper work If needed 
Court requests if anything can be done by conference call, if not necessary to have 
minutes on the call, can be set up anytime. If needs minutes, Judge will probably 
come to Clearwater County. 
Court in recess 10:36 a.m 
Vicky F. Edmonson 
Deputy Clerk 
Approved: -1 
COURT MINUTES - Page 3 of 3 
JOAN M. FISHER 
Idaho State Bar No. 2854 
CapiM I-labeas Unit 
Federal Defenders of Eastern Washington & Idaho 
201 N. Main 
Moscow, ID 83843 
Telephone: (208) 883-0180 
Facsimile: (208) 883- 1472 
Attorney for Petitioner Gene F. Stuart 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
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v. 1 SUPPLEMENTAL AUTHORZTY 
1 SUPPORTING PETITION FOR 
STATE OF IDAHO, 1 POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
1 AND/OR WRIT OF HABEAS 
Respondent. 1 CORPUS 
In support of his above-captioned Petition For Post-Conviction Relief Andlor Writ Of 
Habeas Corpus, Petitioner submits a recent decision from this judicial district, Porter v. State, 
Nos. Sp-02-041 & 6053, slip op. (ID 2nd Dist. 4/3/03), a copy of which is attached. While Porter 
merits a fbl l  and carefkl reading, the following language supports Petitioner's arguments that (1) 
Idaho Code Section (5)(c)'s anti-retroactivity provision cannot itself be retroactively applied to 
Petitioner's case;' (2) Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), and State v. Fetterly, 137 Idaho 729, 
' See Petitioner's Response In Opposition To Motion For Summary Dismissal Of Petition 
For Post-Conviction Relief And/or Writ Of Habeas Corpus ("Petitioner's Response") at 23-25. 
52 P.3d 874 (20021, must be retroactively applied because the rule at issue is substantive in 
nature;' and, (3) controlling precedent requires that Defendant-Appellant's death sentence be 
vacated and the case remanded for a resentencing to a penalty within the pemissibie range for 
the offense of convieion, that is, to a sentence less than death3 
[ I ]  Even if Ring had announced a new rule of law, the [Uniform 
Postconviction] Act's ban on its retroactive effect would not apply 
to [Petitioner]. The Act was amended in 1995 to include 
subsection (S)(c). The first inquiry, therefore, is whether its 
constraints against retroactivity apply to [Petitioner], whose 
conviction and death penalty preceded the date of the amendment's 
enactment. The statute itself makes no provision for its retroactive 
effect. Idaho Code 573-101 instructs that "b]o part of these 
compiled laws is retroactive, unless so declared." The Idaho 
Supreme Court has decided the statute means what it says. 
Nebeker v. Piper Aircruff Corporation, 1 13 Idaho 609, 747 P.2d 
18,23 (1 987). 1 conclude therefore, that Idaho Code § 19- 
271 9(S)(c) has no retroactive effect in this case. 
[2] Both the United States Supreme Court in Teague, 489 U.S. 
[288,] 305-3 1 1, 109 S.Ct. [1060,] 1072-75 [1989], and the Idaho 
Supreme Court in In the Matter of Gaffoi-d, 127 Idaho 472,476, 
903 P.2d 61,65 (1995) carve out an exception to the general rule 
that new constitutional rules are not retroactive if the rule is 
"implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." If a right to a jury trial 
is a "fundamental right" and an essential element of due process, as 
the Duncan Court has held it is, then, by definition it is implicit in 
the concept of ordered liberty. 
In Bousley [v. UnitedSlales, 523 U.S. 614 (1998),] the 
Supreme Court held that the actual use of a weapon rather than its 
See Petitioner's Response at 26-33. 
See Petitioner's Response at 5-6. 
mere possession was a necessary element of the crime of 
""knowingly and intentionally [using] . . . firearms during and in 
relation to a drug trafficking crime." 523 U.S. at 616. Because the 
existence or absence of actually using a weapon determined guilt 
or innocence of the crime, the decision establishing that distinction 
was considered substantive, and therefore retroactive. Bousley, 
523 U.S. at 620. 
The Court in Bousley reached that conclusion because of 
the "significant risk that a defendant stands convicted of 'an act 
that the law does not make criminal."' (quoting Davis v. United 
States, 4 17 U.S. at 346), 523 U.S. at 620. Here [Petitioner] stands 
sentenced to death for capital murder, which the Idaho legislature 
had not made a crime and which was not submitted to the jury for 
its decision. 
In sum, [Petitioner] has been sentenced to die for a crime 
for which a jury has not convicted him. His circumstance is 
indistinguishable in principle form Bousley. In Bousley the factual 
question was whether the weapon was being used while drugs were 
being trafficked. 523 U.S. at 620. In Ring, it was whether an 
aggravating factor existed when the murder was committed. 122 
S.Ct. at 2434-37. 
[3] The remedy for that wrong is prescribed by precedent. When a 
person has been convicted for a crime based on an instruction that 
omitted an essential element of that crime, the person can be 
sentenced only for the crime which the instructions defined. State 
v. Jeppersen, 138 Idaho 71, 76, 57 P.3d 782, 787 (2002); State v. 
Nunez, 133 Idaho 13, 19-20, 98 1 P.2d 738,744-45 (1 999). That 
principle is no less applicable here. Since [Petitioner] was 
convicted by the jury on only those elements which define first- 
degree murder, I conclude that it [is] the only crime for which he 
can be sentenced. Id. 
Porter, slip op. at 18-20. 
$57 & 
gs$$ * * 
&F%&* 
Dated this 9 %y of April, 2001. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Attorney for Appellant 
SUPPLEMENTAL A U T W O ~  SUPPORTING PETEION FOR 
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF AND/OR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS - 4 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the day of April, 2003, I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, first class postage 
prepaid where applicable, addressed to: 
John A. Swayne 
Clearwater County Prosecutor's Office 
P.O. Box 2627 
Orofino, Idaho 83544 
3\ US Mail 
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CATHY LARS ON 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE C O W  OF LEWS 
GEORGE JLJNIOR PORTER, ) Case No. SP-02-041 
Petitioner, ) Case No. 6053 
v. 
) 
1 MEMORANDUM DECISION 





George Junior Porter filed a Petition for Post Conviction Relief and/or 
Writ of Habeas Corpus (Lewis County Case No, SP42-042) and a Motion to 
correct Illegal Sentence, To Vacate Sentence of Death and for New Sentencing 
Trial (Lewis County Case No. 6053).' The State responded by filing a Motion for 
Summary Dismissal, The issues have been joined and both Porter's petition and 
the State's motion are now before me for decision, 
It is important at the outset to understand what Porter's petition does not 
involve. It does not involve whether or not he was guilty of first-degree murder. 
A jury of his peers decided beyond a reasonable doubt that he was. Verdict, filed 
s-, ys 6-%. - 
f -: r: ;-fl !-- 
' Porter's wtition and motion are referred to as the ~>etition unless individually identified. 
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Jmuary 26,1990. Nor d m  it involve whether the bid for first-degree murder 
was fair. f i e  Idaho Supreme Court has decided it was. Pmfer v. Slate ofIdaho, 
130 Idaho 772,948 P.2d 127 (1 997) rrh 3. denied Dec. 1% 1997, cert. denied 523 U.S. 
1126,118 S.Ct. 1823 (May 18,1998)(Pmfer I ) .  Nor does it involve whether there is 
a right for a pcrson accused of capital murder to have a jury rather than a judge 
decide the fa& that justify a death sentence. The United States Supreme Court 
has decided there is. Ring v. Arizona, 536 US. 5134j 122 S.Ct. 2428 (2002). 
If. THE ZSSLJE 
The question presented for decision is  whether the right to have a jury 
decide the factors that justify a death sentence applies retmactivelp to Porter. If it 
does, I am obliged to vacate his death sentence and resentence him. If it does 
not, then Porter's death sentence will stand. 
III. PR(3C.EDWL HISTORY 
The State of Idaho charged that Porter murdered Theresa Jones at Kamiah 
on December 21,1988. The information charging Porter with first-degree murder 
did not list as elements of the crime the aggravablng factors specified in Idaho 
Code § 19-2515 that warrant the death penalty. Criminal Xnformation, filed July 
13, 1989; Amended Criminal Information, filed September 21,1.989. 
Nor did the instru&ons to the jury at trial defmmg first-degree murder 
include the aggravating factors as elements of: the crime. Porter. was neither 
char@ nor tried for the crime of capital murder. Instead the jury was instructed 
that it was not to concern itself with the penalty 
The jury has nothing whatever to do with the penalty which 
ma be infficted in this case if conviction i s  had. The province X of e jtuy is simply to determine the fa&. The penalty is for 
the Court to determine. 
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Jury Instructions Given by the Court, filed January 26,1990. 
Based on the evidence and those instructions, the jury convicted Porter of 
f i r s t - d e p  murder. Verdict, fired January 26,1990. The State then notified the 
defendant it would seek the death penalty. Notice of Intent to Seek the Death 
Penalty, filed February 1,1990. The State presented evidence of aggravating 
factom to the district judge at a sentencing hearing. Court Minutes, June 15, 
1990, June 29,1990. That evidence, if established beyond a reasonabIe doubt and 
found by the judge to outweigh the mitigating factom, permitted h to impose 
the death penalty. Idaho Code 9 19-2515. Porter did not ask the judge to indude 
the aggravating fadom as elements of the mime in his instructions to the jury or 
to involve the jury in the p d t y  phase of the proceedings. 
The district judge found the State established beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the murder manifested exceptional depravity, that Po* probably would be 
a continuing k a t  to society, and drat the murder was of an actual or potential 
witness in a criminal proceeding. Findings of the Court in Considering the 
Death Penalty hrsuant  to the Provisions of Idaho Code Section 19-2515(e), filed 
September 7,1990. The procedure followed by the trial. judge comported with 
supreme court precedent and I.C. f-j 19-2515(e). Aftrrc weighing the aggravating 
factors against the mitigating factors and based on his finhngs, the district judge 
imposed the death penalty. Judgment and Sentence, filed September 7,1990. 
Porter then appeded his conviction and death sentence to the Idaho Supreme 
Court. Notice of Appeal, filed September 30,1990. 
Porter next filed a series of post-conviction relief petitions. On November 
28,1994, more than four years after the judgment of conviction and the death 
sentence had been filed, Porter first broached the issue of the constitutionality of 
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the sentendng procedure. He contended the failure of the State to implement the 
Idaho Constitution and laws requiring "a jury to determine all questions of fact 
and the ultimate punishment of life or death deprived the Petitioner of h s  
guarantees to qua1  protection as engendered by the United States Constitution." 
S a n d  Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, filed November 28,1994, at  
15. The district judge denied the petitions. 
On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court upheld Porter's conviction and 
death sentence. It concluded the record did not support the district c o d s  
finding that an actual or potential witness had been murdered, It also held the 
Federal and Idaho Constitutians did not require the jwy to decide the 
aggravating factors: 
The United States Supreme Court has concluded definitively 
that the federal constitution does not require a jury 
determination of aggravating citcumstances. Spmiano D. Florida, 
468 U.S. 447,460,104 S.Ct. 3154,3162,82 L.Ed.2d 340 (1984). 
Additionally, this Court consistently has rejected arguments 
similar to Porter's and has upheld judiciaI determination of 
aggravaimg circumstances, as consistent with the Sixth, Eighth, 
and Fourtenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution and 
Article I, Sectiun 7 of the Idaho Constitution. (Citations 
omitted.) 
Porter v. State, 130 Idaho at 795%. 
At the time of the trial and sentencing, the Idaho Supreme Court had 
repeatedly held that the death pendty phase of a capital murder trial was 
appropriately decided by a judge and that excluding the jury from that process 
did not offend the Sixth Arnmdment right to a jury trial. See, e.g., Stafe v. Creedl, 
105 Idaho 362,670 P.2d 443, (1983); State v. Sizlak, 112 Idaho 197,731 P.2d f 92 
(1987); Sfate v. Fain, 116 Tdaho 82,774 P.2d 252 (1989); State v. Charboneau, 126 
Idaho 129,7'74 P.2d 299 (1989). 
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Following the Idaho Supreme Court decision on the appeal, the district 
judge issued a death wanrant commanding the warden to put Porter to death. 
Death Warrant, filed January 12,1998. The execution w s  scheduled for 
February 4,1998. Supreme Court Jusfice Sandra Day CYComor stayed Porter's 
execution on January 23,1998, pendrng Porter's petition for certiorari to the 
United States Supreme Court. Order, filed J m u q  29,1998. Upon denial of the 
certiorari pctitio~ the district: judge issued a new death warrant. Death Warrant, 
filed May 29,1998. 
Pwter filed a successive post-conviction petition; the State moved for 
summary dismissal; the district judge granted the motion; and the supreme c w u t  
dismissed fhe appeal, Porter v. State, 136 Idaho 257,32 P.3d 151 (2001) (Porter I f ) .  
Porter's murent petition seeks retroactive relief from his death sentence 
pmuartt to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Ring. The Ring court 
held that aggravating factors wfuch an Arizona trial judge had found justified 
the death p e d t y  in connections with a fi rst-degree murder convietion, were 
elemenb of the crime of capital murder. Since the Sixth Amendment right to a 
jury triaI contemplates a jury, not a judge, decide aII the factual elements of a 
crime, the Court conduded the death sentence violated Ring's right to a jury 
trial. Ring, 122 S.Ct. at 2443 
On August 27,2002, the State moved for summary dismissal of the 
petition. I am now calIed on to decide Porter's petition for relief and the State's 
motion for summary dismissal. 
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Dl. I3EATI-l PENALTY mSPRUZ)ENCE 
Because the conclusion 1 reach depends largely on the nature and role of 
the jury m American criminal jurisprudence, a brief hstory of the jury's 
evolution is helpful. 
By the middle of Lhe thirteenth century the jury had become the body that 
determined the facts m English aiminat cases. See, Welsh S. %te, Fncf-Finding 
a d  the Death Penalty: The S q e  of a Grpital De-nf's Righf to a jury Trial, 65 
 NO^ DAME L. RDV. 1.6 (1989). In their early role jurors were persons who had 
personal knowledge of the facts. The judge's role was to tell the jury what cnrne 
the law ascribed to the facts and the jury had found to exist. Id. 
The jury, with its unfettered role a s  the factfinder, became the buffer 
between an overreadung and harsh sovereign and the subjeds whom the 
sovereign accused of wrongdoing. Jurors used their factfinding power to nullify 
or reduce the charges by what they found the facts to be. By that means the jury 
could refuse to impose the penalty that the sovereign was trying to exact. Id. at 7. 
Dufing the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries jurors became limited to 
considering only evidence presented to them during a trial. Despite threats and 
prurssure by Crown-appointed judges to accommodate the Crown's wishes, the 
jury resisted intrusions on its independence and role in criminal cases. Id. at 7 - 
11. 171e turning pomt in jury independence occurred in Bzlshell's h e ,  which 
held a judge muld not impose Bnes or imprisonment on jurors whose verdict he 
disliked. Id. at 9 (citing Case of the Imprisclnment of Edward Bushell, 6 Howell's 
State Trials 999,1010,124 Eng.Rep. 1006,1012 (1670)). The rationale was that 
since the decision of what the facts were was the sole province of the jurors, the. 
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judge, a5 a matter of definition, could not conclude the verdict was contrary to 
the law. Rather, the legal penalty had to comport with the facts thcz ~ury found. 
Id. 
The American colonists were keenly aware of the vital role a jury played 
in protecting the king's subjects from his arbitrary w h s .  In 1735, John Peter 
Gnger published the Nau York Weekly Jbrtrnal in New York City. The Crown 
charged Zenger with the crime of sedition by "printing and publishing a false, 
scandalous and seditious libel in which His Excellency, the Govanor who is the 
h g ' s  immediate representative here, is greatly and unjustly scandalized as a 
person that has no regard to law or justice." V. Buranelli, The Trial of Peter 
Zenger, 94 (1957); 17 Howeff's State Trials 675 (1735). 
Andrew Hamilton, ZRnger's lawyer, admitted Zknger had published the 
issues of the Journal the governor found offenstve. The Crown argued the 
sedition statute required the jury trr return a guilty verdict. The judge agreed 
and prohibited Hamilton from presenting evidence that what Zenger had said 
was h e .  But Hamiltort. argued to the jurors that they were "witnesses to the 
truth of the facts we have offered, and are denied the liberty to prove." BuraneIli 
at 112. The jury acquitted h g e r  "in a small time." Buranelli at 132. 
f i e  tension between the prerogatives of the sovereign and the rights of 
the governed could not have been more pmnounced. The jury, and the jury 
alone, decided Zenger would be free, the truth would be known, and the 
governois prerogatives would be banished from the co&oom. 
By the time of the American Revolution, in the coionies, as in England, the 
jury's mIe in criminal cases was secure. The jury had become an especially 
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important buffer between the sovereign and the governed because many crimes 
were punishable by death. Whte, at 9 - 11. 
When a person was charged with a mme he or she knew exactly what the 
penalty would be if they were convicted as charged. The judge's role was not 
dhcre t iow;  he administratively imposed the penalty the statute prescribed for 
h e  offense the jury found had been c ~ ~ t t e d .  If thejury found a lesser offense 
had been cornrnitted, the judge, again, was limited to imposing the sentence 
prescribed for titat offense, rather than the offense that had h e n  charged. 
A p p r d i  u. N m  Jersey, 530 US. 466,478-80 (2000), (citing 4 Blackstone, 
Commentaries on the Laws of England, 368-70 (Cooley ed. 1899)). 
Our Declaration of Independence complained of the king "depriving us in 
many cases, of the benefits of Trial by Jury. . ." Alexander Hamilton authored 
the pamphlet supporting the right to a jury during fhe FederaIist Papers 
campaign to persuade the wlonies to approve the new constitution. 
The friends and adversaries of the plan of the convention, if 
they a r  in nothing else, concur at least in the value they set 
upon e tsid by jury; or if there i s  any vast difference between 
them it consists in h e ;  the former regard it as a valuable 
safeguard to Iiberty; the latter represent it as the very pdladium 
Czi" free govement .  
T m  FEDERALIST NO. 83 (Alexander Hamilton). 
It is little wonder, therefore, that when the hot-headed revolutionaries 
who put their lives, fortunes and sacred honor at risk during our war of 
independence became the sedate and somber founding fathers we now revere, 
that they included the right to a jury trial in both the Constitution and Bill of 
Rights. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION, PORTER V. STATE, SP-02-041 
The Constitution provides, "[tlhe Trial of all Crimes, except in cases of 
impeachmat shall be by Jury . . ." US. CONST. art. 111, § 2, cl. 3. The Sixth 
Amendment stipulates that "in all cnmind p r ~ t i o n s ,  the accused shaU enjoy 
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury. . . ." U.S. Corm. 
amend VT. 
As the Natioi~ matured, legislation gave judges more &suetion in 
sentencing by establishing a range of punishments for specified crimes. When it 
came to the death penalty, however, juror discretion led to its arbitrary 
application. For the same crime some died, others lived. The poor and 
minorities fared worse for the same offense. This disparity became so 
pronounced that in 1972 the United States Supreme Court declared that the 
death penalty, as applied, violated the cruel and unusual punishment prohibition 
of the Eigh& Amendment. Furman v. Geor*, 408 U.S. 238,92 S.Ct 2726 (1972). 
Justice Potter Stewart c o n d  in the decision, saying, "I sirnply conclude that 
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments cannot tolerate the i.rd~&on of a 
sentence of death under legal systems that permit this unique penalty to be so 
wantonly and so freakishly imposed." 4138 U.S. at 320,92 S.Ct. at 2763. 
Forlowing Fttrrnan, the states that wanted to retain the death penalty 
redrafted their statutes to ensure a mom objective and uniform application of the 
penalty. Those states established aggravating factors, which, rf proven to 
outweigh mitigating factors, would justify the death sentence. Most of the states 
Ieft the deternunation of those factors to the jury. Idaho, together with Arizona, 
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Colorado, Montana, and Nebraska, assigned that role to the judge.2 See, John W. 
Podos, Liabilify Rrrles, Sentencing Factors, and Sixth Amendment Right to n Jury 
Trial: A Preliminary Irzqtiiy, 44 U. MLAMI L. REV. 643,657-60 (1990). 
Dwing the last eighteen years the United States Supreme Court struggled 
with the issue of whether the aggravating factom were part of the penalty 
procedure to be decided by a judge or whether they were elements of the crime 
itseif to be decided by the jury. Spaziam v. Florida, 468 U.S. at 459 ("The Sixth 
Amendment never has been thought to guarantee a right to a jwy determination 
of that issue [death penalty sentemel."); Walfon v. Arizana, 497 U.S. 639, 110 S.Ct. 
3047 (1990) (aggravating factors properIy assist the sentencing judge); 
Alrnendarez-Grres u. United States, 523 U.S. 224,118 S.Ct. 1219 (1998) (sometimes 
the aggravating factors are elements of the &me); Jones v. United Stntes, 526 U.S. 
227,120 S.Ct. 2348 (1999) (interpreted statute so that the aggravating factors were 
elements of the crime); Apprendi v. New J e r q ,  530 U.S. at 490 ("Other than the 
fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond 
the prescribed maximum must be submitted to a jury, and pmwd beyond a 
reasonable doubt."). 
v. R,ri'vGw. ARIZONA 
The Supreme Court resolved this urgent question for capital cases in Ring 
V .  Arizona, 122 S.Ct at 2443. It concluded that any fact that increased a penalty is 
an elanent of the crime and must be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 
It held that aIIowing a judge to determine if the death penalty should be imposed 
infringed on an accused's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. 
IDAHO CODE 9 19-2515; Am!. RBv. STAT. 5 13703; COLO. W .  STAT. fj 18-1.3- 
12021 $16-11-103 (2001); MONT.CODE.ANN. $ 46-18-301; NEB.REV.STAT. § 29-2520. 
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Because Arizona's enmerated aggfavating c i m s t a n c w  
aperate as "the functional equivalent of an element of a greater 
offense," Avrmdi, 530 U.S., at 494, n. 19,220 S.Ct. 2548, the 
Sixth Annendrnent require6 that they be found by a jury. 
* * *  
"The guarantees of jury trial in the F e d d  and State 
Constitutiam reflect a profound judgment about the way in 
which law should be enforced and justice administered. . . . If 
the defendant preferred the common-sense judgment of a jury 
to the more tutored but perhaps less sympathetic reaction of the 
single judge, he was to have it." f i nan  v. Louhiarur, 391 U.S. 
14,155-156,88 S.Ct. 14&$20 L.EX.2d 491 (1968). 
Id. The flawed Anzona sentenmg procedure in Ring is virtually identical to 
Idaho's. The Idaho Supreme Court followed Ring's mandate in State lir. Fetterly, 
137 Idaho 729,52 P.3d 874 (2002). 
VI. IS PORTER'S CLAIM: FUR RELIEF WAIVED? 
The State first asserts that Porter did not comply with the Act's provision 
that post-conviction d a m s  for relief that were "known, or reasonably should 
have been known" are deemed waived unless filed within forty-two days of the 
"filing of the judgment imposing the judgment of death and before the death 
warrant is filed. . . . " I. C. 5 19-271 9(3), 
Porter did not directly raise fhe issue of whether aT1 the elements of a 
capital case should be tried only to a jury in his 1984 post-conviction relief 
petition. He did argue that trylng ail elements of all aimes to a jury except a 
capital crime offended the Equal Protection Clause. Second Amended Petition 
for Post-Convictim Relief, filed November 28, 1994. 
The State nonetheless argues that Porter reasonably should have known 
about the claim within forty-ttvo days of the judgment imposing the death 
sentence whtch was filed on September 7,1990, Brief in Support of Motion for 
Summary Dismissal, at 6-7,ll-13. Since Porter did not file any "legal challenge 
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to the sentence or conviction," (I.C. 4j  19-2719 (3)), within forty-two days, the 
State argues he is "deemed to have waived" it by virtue of I.C. § 19-2719 (5). 
Brief in Support of Motion for Summary Dismissal, at 11-13. 
Porter responds that he could not have raised the Ring decision within the 
forty-two day limit becaw it was not decided until twelve years later, He 
contends he diligently complied with the Act by bringing his petition within 
forty-two days of the Ring decision. Petitioner's Response to Motion for 
S m n ~ q  Dismissal of Rule 35 Motion at 2. 
When Porter was convicted the United States Supreme Court had held 
that judges could decide the aggravating factors necessary to justify the 
imposition of the death penalty. Walfun v. Arizona, 497 US. at 649; see, Spaziano v. 
Fbrida, 468 U.S. at 459. The Idaho Supreme Court had specifically hefd that the 
U.S. and Idaho Constitutions pemtted a judge to decide whether the death 
penalty should be mposed. Sfate v. Creeclr, 105 Idaho at 367,670 P.2d at 468 
("We hold that there is no federal constitutional requirement of jury participation 
in the sentencing process and that the decision to have jury participation in the 
sentencing process, as contrasted with the judicial discretion sentencing, is 
within the policy detamination of the individual states."); State v. Sivak, 106 
Idaho at 902-903. There was no reason at that time to thnk that either of those 
courts would reverse itself. 
The only decision during that time that upheld an accused's right to have 
a jury decide all the elements of capital murder was Adamson v. Rickets, 865 F.2d 
1011 (9th Cir. 1988). The Idaho Supreme Court specifically rejected 
Adamson in State v. Cbnrborieau, 116 Idaho at 146,774 P.2d at 317. It said: 
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To accept [Appellant's] w e n t  that the jury must be 
involved in determining whether aggravating cirnunstances 
exist; we wodd have to conclude that the aggravating 
c i r m s m m  listed in I.C. 5 19-2515(g) are elements of fimt 
degree murder. We unable to reach that conclusion. The 
circumstances Listed in the statute are clearly cirmstmces to 
be consid& in sentencing and not elements of first degree 
murder. It is not u.nconsbtutional for a judge, instead of a jury, 
to determine whether m y  of the aggravating circumstances 
listed in the statute exist. 
Our opinion in this aspect of the case is not changed by the 
deasion of the Ninth Circuit in Adamson v. Rickets, 86s F. 2d 
IOll(% Cir. 1988). In Rdarnson the Ninth Cixcuit held 
Arizona's death penalty sentencing statutes to be in violation of 
the Sixth Annendnnent During reargument of this case to 
determine what impact Adarnso~z might have on our ophion 
here, the soliator general for the state of Idaho acknowledged 
that there is no significant chfference between the Arizona death 
penalty sentencing statutes and those of Idaho. Nevertheless, 
we are not convinced that Adamson correctly states the 
requirements of the Sixth Amendment on this issue. 
The undeniable fact is, as  a matter of adjudicated law in Idaho, and in the 
'United States, there did not exist a mdible claim for relief based on the assertion 
that the judge rather than the jury decided whether a person convicted of first- 
degree murder lived or died. That issue had 'been definitively decided. Walton, 
497 U.S. at 649;  creed^, 105 idaho at 367; Charboneau, 116 Idaho at 146. The Idaho 
Supreme Court demonstrated the txansparent futility of such a claim when it 
peremptorily dismissed Porter's constitutional appeal on that issue in a single 
paragraph without dissc311t. State v. Porter, 130 Tdaho at 795796,948 P.2d 150- 
The Act does not say that any issue which might conceivably have been 
raised, even if contrary to all appeIlate precedent, must be raised within the 
forty-two day time frame or be forever bmed. Rather, it dems  waived "such 
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claimfir  relzefas known., or reasonably should have been known" (mphasis 
added), I.C. $j 19-2719 (3). 
A claim for relief by definition is a claim based on a prinaple of law or a 
cmstihtional right that entitles a petitioner to a change in his or her legal status. 
Porter's stafus quo js that of a person convicted of b t d e g r w  murder against 
whom a warrant of death has been issued. f ie relief he seeks is to have the 
death warrant vacated. The predicate for his petition is that the aggravating 
factors which resulted in the warrant were decided by a judge instead of a jury. 
The right to have a jury decide those factors did not exist in a capital case untiI 
JuIy 24,2002, the date Ring was decided. 
f i e  State contends that even though both the Nation's highest court and 
Idaho's hghest court had decided that the judges' imposition of the death 
penalty passed constitutional muster, Porter was nonetheless obliged to raise 
that issue within the forty-two day filing litnit prescribed by I.C. 9 19-2719- It 
argues that Ring himself raised that issue as a basis for a favorable ruling on his 
behalf and no less should be expected of Porter. 
I arn unpersuaded. At the time Porter was sentenced, Walfun and Spaziano 
were the on1 y United States Supreme Court decisions on the jurydeath sentence 
horizon. When Ring was sentenced by the trial judge in 1997 (Ring, 122 S.Ct. at 
2435), the leg& landscape was significantly altered. The Court had expressly 
held that all the elements of a crime must be tried to a jury in Bowley v. United 
States, 523 U.S. 614, 118 S.Ct. 1604 (1998) and Unifed Stafes v. Gaudin, a 5  U.S. 506, 
510, 115 S.Ct 2310,2320 (19951, which put the ~ t i t u t i o n a l  moorings of Walbn 
011 very shaky footings. 
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The issue Porter raised in his 1994 petition for post-conviction relief and 
on his appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court met with the predictable adverse 
result. Porter 1,130 Idaho at 795796,948 P.2d at 150-151. I condude for one to 
have reason to know there is a claim for retied there must be at teat some credible 
authovify to support it, In Idaho at the time Porter was sentenced to death there 
was none. The judge's role in decidiag whether a person who had committed 
first-degree murder lived or died had the imprimatur of the only two supreme 
courts from which Porter could seek reiief. 
tm. DOES THE ACT'S BAR TO RE'I'ROACITVE EFFECTkPPLY? 
The State next argues the appIicatim of Ring to Porter is precluded by the 
Act because it provides that a pleading asserting an exception to the forty-two 
day time lirni t for filing a claim for relief "shall 'be deemed facially insufficient to 
the extent it seeks retroactive application of new rules of law." LC. 9 19- 
zn9 (5 ) (~ ) .  
The right to have aU the r?lements of a capital case tried to a jury is not of 
recent vintage. As discussed above, until the various states tried to cope with the 
F~rman decision finding the death penalty uncomtitutional, that right had never 
been questioned, It was d y  after Idaho and four other states relegated that 
duty to a judge that any question about the jury's role arose. Spaziam validated 
the aberrant approach in 1984, Wnlton confirmed it in 1990, and Ring ended it in 
Having a jury try aII the eIements of a crime was not a n m  ruIe of law. 
See, e.g., In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358,364 (1970) ("[Tf he Due Process CIause 
protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged."). 
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It was not the rule of law, however, during the time Porter was prosecutcrd and 
sentenced to death. The Idaho Supreme Court acknowledged as much in State u. 
Creech, I05 Idaho at 372-373,670 P.2d 473474, when it said, "At other places or at 
other times, juries have been given an rntegmI mle in imposing the death 
sentence. However, we hold that jury participation in the sentencing process is 
not consfi hrltionalf y required. " 
Even if Ring had announced a new rule of law, the Act's ban on its 
retroactive effect would not apply to Porter. The Act was amended m 1995 to 
include subsection (5)(c). The first inquiry, therefore, i s  whether its constraints 
against retroactivity apply to Pder, whose conviction and death penalty 
preceded the date of the amendment's enactment. The statute ifxielf makes no 
provision for its retroactive effect. Idaho Code 5 73-101 instructs that "[nlo part 
of these compiled laws is retroactive, unless so declared." The Idaho 
Supreme Court has decided the statute means what it says. Nebeker v. Piper 
Airuafl Carpamtion, 113 Idaho 609,614,747 P.2d 18,23(1987). 1 condude, 
therefore, that Idaho Code § 19-2719(5)(c) has no retroactive effect in this case. 
Vllf. DOES RING APPLY RETROACTIVELY TO PORTER? 
The next inquiry and the gravamen of Portds petition is whether Ring 
. applies retroactively to his death sentence, 
The State argues that a new criminal procedural d e  is not retroactive, 
citing Tq14e v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288,109 S.Ct. 1060 (1989), and that finality of death 
sentences preceding Ring is essential, because "[tlo require the application of 
Ring to those cases and potentially force the msmtencing of every capital 
defendant would seriously undermine any deterrent effect associated with the 
death penalty." Reply Brief In Support of Motion For Summary Dismissal at 4-7. 
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Porter argues Rilzg defines a substantive rule, a ting Bousley, 523 US. at 
620. He mntends the T a p e  ban on retroactivity only applies to procedural rules 
of law and that Ring involves a substantive right that is within the "concept of 
ordered Liberty," citing Davis v, United Stafes, 417 U.S. 333 (1974). Petitioner's 
Response to Motion for Sutnmary Dismissal at 16-22. 
The right to a ifair Ma1 is a hdamentnl liberty secured by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 16295 S.Ct. 8% (1975); see also, 
Maftftews v. Eldrirlge, 424 US. 329,96 S.Ct. 893 (1976). Porter's petition does not 
question the fairness of his trial for fint degree murder. It does question the 
fairness of a trial for first-degree murder that results in a sentence for the crime of 
capital murder. Stated another way, he mntends it is fundamentally unfair to 
sentence him for a crime for which he has not been convicted by a jury. 
The history and role of the jury in Anglo-American jurisprudence is 
pivotal to my decision. In my judgment the jury is h e  single-most vital 
guarantor of our democratic form of government. Legislators can legislate, 
executives can execute and judges can adjudicate, but, as Peter Zenger 
discovered 265 years ago, it  is ultimately a jury that protects our individual 
Liberties as citizens from their overreaching. There is a very simple reason for 
that 
Twelve persons who are governed by the sovereign sit in judgment of the 
charges against the accused brought by the sovereign that governs them. Their 
Iife experiences, common sense, and collective wisdom buffer the unsavory traits 
that power and ambition often foster in those who govern. The fact that all 
twelve jw-ors must agree that the state has made its case beyond a reasonable 
doubt tempers any arbitrary or subective approach that any one individual . 
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might indulge, which is the peril of having just one person make a decision as 
fateful as Iife and death. 
The United States Supreme Court acknowledged the jury's role when it 
held that "the right to a jury trial in serious criminal cases is a fundamental right 
and hence must be recognized by the States as part of their obligation to extend 
due process of law to a11 persons within their jurisprudence." Duncan V .  
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145,154,88 S.Ct. 1444,1450 (1%8). 
Both the United States Supreme Court in Teague, 489 U.S. at 305-311,109 
5 . 0 .  at 1072-1075, and the Idaho Supreme Court in lit the Matter of Gafird, 127 
Idaho 472,476,903 P.2d 61,65 (1995) carve out an exception to the general rule 
that new constitutional rules are not retroactive if: the d e  is "implicit in the 
concept of ordered liberty." If a right to a jury trial is a "fundamental right" and 
essential element of due process, as  the Duncan Court has held it is, then, by 
definition it is implicit in the concept of ordered liberty. 
The State's ~ t iance  on Fet-ferly v. State, 121 Idaho 41 7 (1992) and Grifith u. 
Kmtudry, 479 U.S. 314 (1987) is misplaced. There the courts assumed the new 
constitutional rules under review were procedural, Both d@cisiom preceded 
Tecrgue and Gafirri. The T~agjtle distinction between a procedural rule and 
fundamental right is now dispositive regarding retroactj vity . 
In that vein, the State argues that Ring just establishes a new procedural 
r u l e  for kyrng capital cases and therefore is not retroactive under Teague. I 
disagree. In Boirsley t-he Supreme Court heId that the actual use of a weapon 
rather than its mere possession was a necessary element of the crime of 
"knowingly and intentionally [using] . . . firearms during and in relation to a 
drug traf-fieking crime." 523 U.S. at 616. Because the existence or absen.ce of 
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actually using a weapon determined guilt or innorrnce of the crime, the decision 
establishg that distincfion was mnsidered substantive, and therefore 
retroactive. Buustq, 5523 US, at 620. 
The Court in &usley reached that condusion because of the "significant 
risk b t  a defendant stands convicted of 'an act that the law does not make 
criminal,"' (quoling h i s  v. United States, 417 US. at 3G),  523 U.S. at 620. Here 
Porter stands sentenced to death for capital murder, which the Idaho legislature 
had not made a crime and which was not submitted to the jury for its decision. 
In sum, Porter has been sentenced to die for a crime for which a jury has 
not convicted h m .  His armstance is indistinguishable in principle from 
Bousley. In Bouslqy the factual question was whether the weapon was being used 
while drugs were being trafficked. 523 U.S. at 620. In Ring, it was whether an 
aggravating factor existed when the murder was committed. 122 S.Ct. at 2434-37. 
The flaw in the Arizona and Idaho statutes was that the judge was entitled 
to decide the aggravating factors preasely because that determination was 
erroneously considered to be procedurd. f i e  teaching of Ring is tkat the factors 
that decide life and death are substantive elements of the oime itself, not simply 
a procedural protocol to be wrapped up by a judge at the end of the trial. 
At its core' the right to a jury trial is the right of all citizens to have the 
State's criminal charges against them decided by their fellow citizens, rather than 
by a judge who is employed by the same State that has brought the charges. 
There can be no more fundamental and substantive right in a free society than to 
have one's liberty decided by one's pwm. Permjtbng a judge to dedde the facts 
that detemute whether a murder is capital murder subverts the very essence of 
the right to a jury trial. Even worse, it anbraces the peril of an arbitrary judge . 
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h t  the jury has to steaclfady vanquished in criminal trials during the past eight 
hmxhd  y e m  of Angl+Aant3.rim j~spmdmm.  
Porter was sentenced to death for a crime that the jury had not found he 
murder. That akin@ had a d d i ~ m d  factual 
elements the jury was not m e e d  to decide. I condude, thmfom, that 
sentacing Porter to death for a &me for which the jury did not convict him 
denied kin hs Sixth h e n b e n t  right to a jury trial and the process he was due 
by virtue of tfte Fourteenth b e n h e n t .  
The m e d y  for that wrong is prescribed by precedent. When a person 
has been convided for a crime bawd on an instruction that omitted an essential 
eltrment of that &me, the person can be sentenced ody fur the crime which the 
instructions defined. Sfate v. reppiesen, 138 Idaho 7 l ,  76,57 P.3d 782,787 (2002); 
State v. Nrmez, 133 Idaho 13,19-20,981 P.2d 738,74445 (2999). That principle is 
no less applicable h e .  Since Porter was convicted by the jury an only those 
elements which define first-degree murder, I conclude that it the only crime for 
which he can be sentenced. fd. 
IX. omm 
1.. The State's Motion for Summary Dismissal is denied; 
2. Porter's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and / or Writ of Habas 
Corpus (Lewis County Case No. 02-041) is granted; 
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